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Abstract 
This thesis is a study of an attempt to help create a transnational. movement 
against the nuclear arms race and the Cold War in the 1980s. The attempt began 
with the drafting and launch of the Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament in 
early 1980. The thesis describes and analyses the work of the British group, 
European Nuclear Disarmament, or END, which was founded in order to further 
the aims outlined in the Appeal. 
The thesis examines END's work in three, overlapping, geographical 
areas: Britain, where END acted mainly as a pressure group on and/or ginger 
group within CND in an attempt to internationalize - END-ize - its work; in 
Western Europe (including Britain), where END (with other Western peace 
groups) was trying to create and sustain enduring ties amongst Western peace 
groups; and across the East-West divide, where END was one of a number of 
groups that engaged in dialogue with independent forces in the Soviet bloc - 
while maintaining relations with the regimes - with the aim of creating some 
kind of pan-European alliance that would bring together above all these forces 
and Western peace groups. 
The study is conducted in terms of an explanatory framework that 
emphasizes the pre-existing networks out of which END emerged; the distinctive 
END worldview or 'frame' and the ways in which END supporters campaigned 
in its terms, tried to persuade others to adopt it, and/or adapted it - above all in 
dialogue with independent groups in the Soviet bloc; the resources and structure 
that helped determine the work END activists could do; the way in which this 
campaigning was shaped by END's relationship with other peace groups, in 
Britain above all CND; and the political opportunities and constraints that END 
activists faced. 
To date there has been no full-length study of END nor one that analyses 
the various dimensions of its campaign and how they shaped each other. This 
thesis thus aims to be a contribution to our knowledge of the West European 
peace movements of the 1980s; it also hopes to add to our understanding of 
transnational social-movement campaigning. 
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Chapter 1 
A Transnational Initiative in the 
Western Peace Movement 
In the 1980s, in Western Europe, tens, sometimes hundreds, of thousands - 
occasionally millions - of people campaigned against the nuclear arms race, 
the Cold War, and the nuclear weapons policies of the superpowers and their 
alliances (though above all against the USA and NATO). These 'peace 
movements9- to use shorthand' - emerged between 1979 and 1981 and began 
to go into decline from the middle of the decade. Simultaneously, similar 
cmovements' were active in many other countries around the world, including 
the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and various small countries 
in the Pacific. There was also peace campaigning in some countries in the 
Soviet bloc. 
Maguire has argued that the INF crisis was international in scope but 
-) 2 was fought out on the national level' . The mobilizations 
in Western Europe 
were national in the sense that each movement was mostly made up of people 
living within the borders of the particular country; and these people directed 
most of their campaigning at their own national government since this had 
taken, or was threatening to take, the particular policy decision with which the 
campaigners disagreed. The organizations or coalitions that dominated the 
0 mobilizations were national: for example, in Norway, Nei til Atomvapen; in 
' Movement activists and many observers called them 'peace movements'. However, the term 
was contested in the West: some opponents of the peace mobilizations challenged the latter's 
claim that the movements promoted peace and that their opponents (for example, governments) 
by implication favoured war. In addition, some of the Western peace campaigners' 
interlocutors in the East were at pains to point out that 'peace' had to include peace within 
states, that is, respect for human rights (see Chapter 6). However, unless otherwise indicated, I 
use the terms 'peace activist' and 'peace movement' neutrally, that is, as alternatives to 'anti- 
nuclear weapons activist', 'anti-nuclear weapons movement' and similar terms. 
For a discussion of 'movement', see below, 'Assessing Success and Failure'. 
2 Diarmuld John Maguire, 'New Social Movements and Old Political Institutions: the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 1979-1989', PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1990, 
25. ('INF': Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces. ) 
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West Germany, the Koordinationsausschuss and its (in 1983-84) 30 member 
organizations; 3 in Britain, the Campaign for Nuclear Disan-nament; and in the 
Netherlands, the Inter-Church Peace Council (IKV). The publicly visible high 
points of the peace campaigns were the huge national demonstrations in many 
West European capitals in the autumn of 1981 and 1983. Many of the studies in 
English of the peace mobilizations of the 1980s have thus, understandably, 
4 focused on national movements. They have tended to analyse the domestic 
conditions facilitating or hindering peace campaigning; the demands made on 
national governments; and the allies at home national movements have or have 
not been able to find. 
Yet these movements, as some scholars have shown, also had a strong 
'transnational' element. 5 That is - in a very simple definition - the movements, 
or parts of them, were regularly linked with each other across national borders. 
On the one hand, the national movements had been brought into being above 
all by NATO's 12 December 1979 decision to deploy cruise and Pershing 11 
missiles as well as by the deterioration of East-West relations and the 
perceived growing bellicosity of the United States government (see Chapter 2). 
As a result - despite having additional national priorities - the movements had 
a central concern in common: opposing the deployments of these weapons 
systems. 
On the other hand, the movements were connected with regard to 
actions and organization. Examples of campaigners crossing borders to 
participate in peace campaigning in the 1980s include activists from northern 
Europe taking part in the peace camp at Comiso in Sicily; women from West 
Germany, Holland and Sweden making up the 30,000 who 'embraced' 
Greenham Common air base on 12 December 1982; activists from Italy, 
3 Steve Breyman, Movement Genesis: Social Movement Theory and the 1980s West 
German Peace Movement, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998,203-4. 
4 See note 12 for some examples. 
' Studies of this transnationalism include Chapter 5 of April Carter, Peace Movements: 
International Protest and World Politics since 1945, LondoniNew York, Longman, 1992 and 
Thomas Rochon, Mobilizingfor Peace: The Antinuclear Movements in Western Europe, 
London, Adamantine Press, 1988. 
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Denmark, Britain, the Netherlands, Finland, Norway, Sweden, West Germany, 
and Ireland joining Belgian campaigners in Brussels at Easter 1981 to 
demonstrate for a nuclear-free Europe; and the peace march from Copenhagen 
to Paris in summer 1981, inspired by the Appeal for European Nuclear 
Disarmament, which passed through five countries, picking up support on the 
way. 6 
The more institutionalized, longer-term transnational networks of, and 
links between, national movements included the International Peace 
Coordination and Communication Centre (IPCC), under whose auspices of 
representatives of non-aligned peace groups in Western Europe and the USA 
met regularly to plan tactics and strategies; and the annual END Conventions at 
which non-aligned movements, political parties, trade unions, churches and 
other institutions came together to exchange ideas and plan strategy. 7 
The Western peace movement also contained another a kind of 
transnational element. From the early 1980s, some groups - motivated by the 
desire to create some kind of "trans-continental movement" against the anns 
race and the Cold War - engaged in dialogue, and tried to work with, actors in 
Central Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (CEE/SU). 8 
The transnationalism of the Western peace movement in the 1980s has 
been (as indicated above) the subject of studies of the role transnational 
relations play in domestic and international politics. However, most deal with 
specific aspects of this transnationalism. Thomas Rochon's Mobilizingfor 
6 For details of some of these events see: 'Peace Camp Inspiration' END Journal 6, 
October-November 1983), 6 (Comiso); April Carter, Peace Movements: International Protest 
and World Politics since 1945, London and New York: Longman Books, 1992 (Greenharn 
Common); Tony Simpson, 'Brussels- Easter 198 Vand Rip Bulkeley, "'Is There Anyone Here 
From Bonn/Leiden? "', END Bulletin 5, Summer 1981,20-21; 'On the March For a Bomb-Free 
Europe', END Bulletin 5, Summer 1981,3-4, and 'It's a Long Way to Paris', END Bulletin 6, 
Autumn 1981,8- 10 (Scandinavian march); 'Five Nations Supplement', END Journal 6, 
October-November 1983; and 'Beyond the Blocs Speaking Tour', END Journal 12, October- 
November 1984,32. 
7 The terrn 'non-aligned' was used in the 1980s to denote those Western peace groups - the 
majority - that opposed the nuclear weapons of both sides: in other words, were not pro-Soviet. 
It is important to note that the term also covers groups that supported the END Appeal but were 
sceptical about the value of the dialogue with independent groups in the East. 
' Quotation from 'Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament', in E. P. Thompson and Dan 
Smith, eds, Protest and Survive (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1980), 225. 
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Peace, for example, focuses on the West European work of the peace 
movements but not at the relationship with groups and regimes in the East. 
Others have concentrated on the East-West campaigning of the movement. 
These latter works, in addition, look specifically at one or more of the possible 
outcomes of this campaigning: the (alleged) impact of the Western peace 
movement and/or other non-state actors on 'new thinking' in the Soviet Union 
under Gorbachev; the role that Western peace groups, by giving support to 
independent groups in CEE/SU, 9 might have played in the 'velvet revolutions' 
of 1989-90; and the ideas that characterised, and the legacy for the post-Cold 
War period, of the relationship between independent groups in East and West. ' 0 
In addition, most of these studies - Rochon's book is the exception - have been 
(necessarily) brief. There has, as yet, been no full-length study of this 
transnationalism that focuses on transnational 'movement-building', that is, of 
how activists actually went about creating and sustaining these transnational 
relations. II 
It would thus seem important, if one wants to understand the 
transnationalism of the Western peace movements of the 1980s (and thus get a 
fuller picture of the movements as a whole), to try to explain not only thefull 
9 Western peace activists variously called the non-state groups in CEE/SU with which they 
were in contact 'independents', 'unofficials', 'dissidents', 'our friends', or 'our partners'. 
'Independents', which I use in most cases in this thesis, highlights the most significant 
characteristic of these groups: that they were independent of their respective regimes. 
'0 See Patricia Chilton, 'Mechanics of Change: Social Movements, Transnational Coalitions, 
and the Transformation Processes in Eastern Europe', in Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing 
Transnational Relations Back In: Non-state Actors, Domestic Structures and International 
Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 189-226; Matthew Evangelista, 
Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War, Ithaca/London: Cornell 
University Press, 1999; Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War, Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2003, Chapter 3; David Meyer, 'Below, Beyond, Beside the State: Peace and 
Human Rights Movements and the End of the Cold War', in V. M. Skidmore and D. Hudson, 
eds, The Limits of State Autonomy, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993; Gillian Wylie, 
'Creating Alternative Visions: The Role of National and Trarisnational Social Movements in 
the Demise of Polish State Socialism', PhD Dissertation, University of Aberdeen, 1996. 
" One partial exception to this is Gerhard Jordan's MA thesis, which is an account of the 
East-West dialogue 'from below' (and which analyses the role in this dialogue) of Austrian 
peace groups: 'European Nuclear Disarmament. Der 'END-Prozess' und sem Beitrag zurn 
Ost-West Dialog der unabhdngigen Friedensbewegungen Europas in den 80-er Jahren' 
['European Nuclear Disarmament. The "END Process" and its contribution to the East-West 
dialogue of independent peace movements in the 1980s'], MA Dissertation, University of 
Vienna, 1997. Padraic Kenney devotes one chapter to this dialogue in A Carnival of 
Revolution: Central Europe 1989, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002. 
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geographical range of this transnationalism - its East-West and its West 
European dimensions - but also how and why it emerged, and was sustained 
and developed - and to do so in depth. One way to do this would be to focus on 
one group of campaigners who consciously set out to help create a 
transnational movement - and who, in so doing, intersected with many other 
such groups. Peace activists at all 'levels' of the movements both did the work 
of linking up national movements in the West and engaged in the 'dialogue' 
with actors in CEE/SU. A crucial role, however, was played by one, British, 
initiative and the activists, organizations and institutions associated with it: 
European Nuclear Disarmament. This initiative began life as the drafting, and 
then launching in April 1980, of the Appeal for European Nuclear 
Disarmament. It continued, among other things, with the work of the British 
group European Nuclear Disarmament (END), the Bertrand Russell Peace 
Foundation (the main organization behind the drafting and dissemination of the 
END Appeal), and the international END Conventions. 
There have been no full-length studies of END to date. In addition to 
some of the works mentioned above, there were, in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
a number of studies which considered END (usually briefly) as one component 
in the British or international peace movement. 12 The first book-length account 
of the East-West politics of the Western peace movement, E. P. Thompson's 
Double Exposure, was published in 1985 and thus does not cover the second 
12 Peter Byrd, 'The Development of the Peace Movement in Britain', in Werner Kaltefleiter 
and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, eds, The Peace Movements in Europe and the United States, 
London/Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985,63-103; Carter, Peace Movements; Paul Byrne, The 
Campaignfor Nuclear Disarmament, LondoniNew York/Sydney: Croom Helm, 1988; Martin 
Ceadel, 'Britain's Nuclear Disarmers', in Walter Laqueur and Robert Hunter, eds, European 
Peace Movements and the Future of the Western Alliance, New Brunswick/Oxford: 
Transaction Books, 1985,218-244; James Hinton, Protests and Visions: Peace Politics in 20th 
Century Britain, London: Hutchinson Radius, 1989; John Keane, 'Civil Society and the Peace 
Movement in Britain', Thesis Eleven, 8,1984,5-22; Maguire, ibid (note 2); John Mattausch, A 
Commitment to Campaign: A Sociological Study of CND, Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1989; Amitabh Mattoo, 'The Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament: A Study of its Growth Re-emergence and Decline in the 1980s', PhD 
Dissertation, University of Oxford, 1992; Rochon, Mobilizingfor Peace; Richard Taylor and 
Nigel Young, 'Britain and the International Peace Movement in the 1980s', in Richard Taylor 
and Nigel Young, eds, Campaignsfor Peace: British Peace Movements in the Twentieth 
Century, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987,287-301; and E. P. Thompson, 
'Resurgence in Europe, and the r6le of END', in John Minnion and Philip Bolsover, eds, The 
CND Story, London: Allison & Busby, 1983. 
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half of the decade. 13 All of these works provide some insight into British 
END's activity and the ideas its supporters advocated. 
14 However, they are all 
- not just those cited earlier - partial analyses: none of them looks at the full 
geographical range of British END's work, nor do they study it in depth. 
In principle, there are other ways to approach the transnationalism of 
the 1980s peace movement. For example, one could survey, using a 
comparative approach, the work of many or all of the Western peace groups 
involved in this 'cross-border' story. In doing so, one could focus on the 
broader structural changes that, arguably, helped give rise to the Western peace 
movement; 15 or one could focus on these groups as conscious agents. 16 This 
study is certainly an example of the latter: what Horn and Kenney called the 
"voluntarist variant" of transnational study. 17 But it concentrates on one group, 
rather than on many groups, above all because the breadth of analysis one 
would gain from the latter approach would be balanced, perhaps undermined, 
by a loss of depth: it would be difficult to analyse in the necessary detail the 
three-dimensional nature of these groups' campaigns. The attempt to create a 
transnational movement consisted of END (and other Western peace groups) 
simultaneously trying to influence a domestic audience, develop ties with other 
West European groups, and both create and sustain a relationship with actors, 
state and non-state, in the Soviet bloc. A detailed study such as this brings out, 
I hope, the peculiarities and difficulties of this work. Above all, I think, this 
" London: Merlin Press, 1985. 
14 A useful brief study of some of END's ideas is Peter Baehr's 'E. P. Thompson and 
European Nuclear Disarmament (END): A Critical Retrospective', OJPCR: The Online 
Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, 3.1, March 2000, 
http: //www. trinstitute. org/ojpcr/p3 lbachr. htm 
15 See, for example, Mary Kaldor, 'After the Cold War', New Left Review 180, March-April 
1990,25-37; and The Imaginary War: Understanding the East-West Conflict, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1990. 
16 Some of these groups were in North America: for example, the New York-based Campaign 
for Peace and Democracy, East and West, and the San Francisco-based journal Across 
Frontiers. 
17 Padraic Kenney and Gerd-Rainer Horn, 'Introduction: Approaches to the Transnational' in 
Gerd-Rainer Horn and Padraic Kenney, eds, Transnational Moments of Change: Europe 1945, 
1968,1989, Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2004, ix-xii. 
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approach is well suited to elucidating a key feature of the East-West aspect of 
END's transnationalism: the tensions inherent in campaigning against nuclear 
weapons in the West while at the same time trying to unden-nine the Cold War 
by engaging with state and non-state actors in CEE/SU. 
I do not claim, however, that British END was necessarily 
representative of the Western peace groups engaged in transnational peace 
campaigning. On the contrary, the fact that I have chosen to study one such 
group implies that I think that each group - for example, CODENE in France; 
IKV in Holland, ARGE-UFI in Austria - had its distinctive characteristics that 
have to be explained. However, I would contend that there are similarities 
between these groups, and between the contexts in which they operated and 
that this study can thus shed some light on the work of END's allies in the 
Western peace movement. If nothing else, this study should indicate some of 
the research questions that can be asked about the transnational work of these 
other groups. 
A note about names 
The name European Nuclear Disarmament (END) referred, on the one hand, to 
the British group END and, on the other, to the END Convention and its main 
organizing body, the Liaison Committee. British END and the 
Convention/Liaison Committee, though they had a common origin, and though 
both had as their political framework the END Appeal, were separate entities. 
END was just one of many groups and organizations represented on the Liaison 
Committee and at each Convention. There was no pan-European organization 
called END. Nor is it accurate to label the Western peace movement as a whole 
'European Nuclear Disarmament', as there were many organizations in the 
movement that were to a greater or lesser extent sceptical of, even hostile to, 
the END 'idea'. One can, perhaps, talk of an END 'current' in the Western 
peace movement: this would consist of groups who campaigned within a 
framework provided above all by the END Appeal. But one would have to 
remember, as I argue in this thesis, that these groups interpreted the END 
approach differently. Finally, though the British group END was not referred to 
8 
at the time as British END, I will do so when it is necessary to distinguish it 
clearly from the Convention and the Liaison Committee. 
Explanatory Framework 
In this thesis I want to explain: 
- both why and how a particular initiative, END, emerged as part of the 
general peace mobilization of 1980 and the particular institutional forrns it 
took; 
- British END's strategy and tactics, throughout the decade, for creating 
a 'transnational' movement not just in Western Europe but spanning the 
continent. Doing this entailed developing relationships, in the West, above all 
with peace groups and to a lesser extent with political parties, and, in CEE/SU, 
with both independent peace and human rights groups as well as with state 
bodies. And 
- the extent to which British END's tactics and strategies, and its overall 
campaign can be said to have been a success or a failure. 
The vast literature on social movements - spanning the disciplines of 
political studies, sociology, social psychology, international relations and 
history - has generated a wide range of ideas about and approaches to the study 
of social movements. Much of this work has been stimulated by the 
mobilizations in Western Europe and North America since the 1950s - the 
peace movements of the late 1950s and early 1960s; the US civil rights 
movement; the student movements; the anti-Vietnam war movement; the 
women's movement; the environmental movement; and the peace movements 
of the early 1980s, to give only a partial list. Within this body of work one, 
influential, trend, 'synthetic' social movement theory, offers a framework for 
the study of social movements that combines two traditionally different 
approaches. 'Resource mobilization theory', long predominant in US studies of 
social movements, has traditionally emphasized, as the principal conditions for 
the formation and mobilization of social movements, changes in resources; 
opportunities for collective action - including those generated by the political 
process within which social movements become involved; and group 
9 
organization. 18 Amongst European theorists, by contrast, social 
constructionism and framing theory have influenced work on social movement 
emergence and development. 19 McAdam, McCarthy and Zald write of an 
69 emerging synthesis" in the study of social movements, one which emphasizes 
three main factors: the "structures of political opportunities and constraints" 
that movements face; the formal and informal organizational means "available 
to insurgents"; and the "collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and 
social construction that mediate between opportunity and action". 20 Christian 
Smith, in his study of the US peace movement that opposed the two Reagan 
administrations' Central America policy in the 1980s, also uses a three-part 
"multidimensional" approach: this argues that successful movements must 
enjoy concurrently expanding political opportunities, strong facilitating 
organizations, and rising insurgent consciousness". 21 
While the studies in McAdam et al and Christian Smith's, as well as 
those by other scholars, focus on movements, not organizations, a 'synthetic' 
approach - as I hope to illustrate in this thesis - could profitably be used to 
explicate the work of an organization within a movement. 22 A theoretical 
framework that sought to explain the work of British END could thus focus on 
the 'framing' processes in which END activists engaged; the 'organizational 
" See Jean L. Cohen, 'Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary 
Social Movements', Social Research 52,4,1985,675; Jenkins, J. Craig, 'Resource 
Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements', Annual Review of Sociology, 1983, 
528. 
19 Adam Lent, 'Surviving the Boom and Bust of Social Movements: Lessons from Synthetic 
Theory', conference paper abstract, in Colin Barker and Mike Tyldesley, eds, Conference 
Papers, Volume II, Sixth International Conference on Alternative Futures and Popular Protest, 
Manchester: Manchester Metropolitan University, 2000. For further examples of the 'synthetic' 
approach, see Klandermans and Tarrow, 'Synthesizing'; Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social 
Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998; 
and Adam Lent, British Social Movements since 1945: Sex, Colour, Peace and Power, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001. 
20 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, eds, Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996,2. 
21 Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: the U. S. Central America Peace Movement, 
Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1996,88. 
" For further examples of the 'synthetic' approach, see Klandermans and Tarrow, 
'Synthesizing'; Tarrow, Power in Movement; and Adam Lent, British Social Movements since 
1945: Sex, Colour, Peace and Power, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 200 1. 
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capacity5 - structure and resources - of the 
END campaign; and the political 
opportunities and constraints faced by END campaigners. To these elements 
one could add two others which might enable one to analyse a group's specific 
place in the movement of which it is a part: a consideration of the pre-existing 
networks out of which the group emerged and which helped give it its 
organizational and 'ideational' character; and an analysis of the group's 
relationships with other parts of the same movement. I will briefly discuss and 
illustrate these elements of an explanatory framework before considering how 
- in terms of this framework - one might assess the success and failure of the 
END campaign. 
Already Existing Networks and Organizations 
Movements, as many scholars have shown, do not emerge out of nowhere. Jo 
Freeman argues that any investigation into the origins of social movements 
must be concerned with the "microstructural preconditions for the emergence 
23 
of a ... movement center" 
[an organization or core group] . Drawing on data 
about the civil rights, student, welfare rights, and women's liberation 
movements in the US in the 1960s and 1970s, she makes a number of 
propositions about movement origins. These include 1) that a "preexisting 
communications network" must be present "in the social base of the 
movement" if the movement is to emerge; and 2) that this network must be 
"cooptable to the new ideas of the incipient movement": that is, it must be 
composed of people who are "receptive to the ideas of a specific new 
movement". If a cooptable network (or more than one) is/are in place, then one 
or more "precipitants" are needed, depending on how well formed the network 
is: a "crisis"; and people must begin organizing - they must found a new group 
or spread an idea. But the crisis cannot have an impact nor the organizing 
succeed unless the cooptable network is in place. 24 
23 Jo Freeman, 'On the Origins of Social Movements', in Jo Freeman, ed., Social Movements of the 
SL): ties and Seventies, New York/London: Longman, 1983,9. 
24 Ibid., 10. 
II 
Christian Smith makes a similar case in his study of the origins of the 
US Central America peace movement of the 1980s. He shows how the 
movement was able to emerge (and continue) in part because of the work of 
'movement midwives' and of 'feeder organizations'. 25 Movement midwives are 
already existing organizations that "intentionally foster the initial emergence of 
a movement by helping to organize movement carriers [the organizations that 
help execute the movement's work]", but they do not try themselves to become 
movement carriers. 26 'Feeder organizations' are all those organizations that are 
not part of a social movement but which "channel ... an ongoing supply of 
new members to the movement". 27 
Framing 
The people who come together to engage in collective action must, arguably, 
agree, however broadly, that a problem exists and about who or what is 
responsible for it - that is, they share a grievance. They must also, again 
possibly in broad terms, agree on the solution to that problem; on how the 
solution is to be effected; and on why effecting the solution is important. 
The metaphors 'frame' and 'framing processes' usefully capture this 
key activity of a social movement (or part of one). They highlight the way 
social movement actors are actively engaged in a process of "fashion[ing] 
shared understandings of the world and of themselves" that will encourage 
others to become active - or, if they are already active, to remain so, 
28 or to 
otherwise demonstrate support. (These 'understandings' will - as indicated 
above - in part be 'carried' into the new movement by people who make up 
some of the networks out of which the new movement or groups emerge, 
though they will be combined with new ideas. ) 
25 Smith, Resisting Reagan, 109-117. 
" Ibid., 109. 
27 Ibid., I 10. 
2' McAdam et al, eds, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, 6. 
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The work of a social movement (or a part of one) can thus partly be 
understood as an attempt to get others to 'align' themselves with its frame: to 
see the world as it does and to campaign in terms of that vision. To this end 
movement actors are (among other things) actively trying to disseminate or 
diffuse their ideas. These framing processes can be broken down into four main 
elements: 29 actors identify a problem and attribute blame or causality - what 
Snow and Benford (and others) have called diagnostic framing; they specify, in 
terms of tactics, strategies, and final aims, a solution to this problem - 
prognostic (sic), or remedial framing; they specify the agent of the solution; 
and they present moral arguments, appeals to a better life, or something similar 
- motivational framing. 
The term 'frame' can mislead, however - when it is used as a noun - in 
two ways. First, because it can encourage the analyst to reify, that is, to treat 
the ideas and actions as if they constitute a thing that is somehow separate from 
the movement or group. The analyst must simply be careful not to fall into this 
trap; to remember that 'frame' is simply a convenient metaphor for the 
changing ideas and actions created by the actors who make up a movement. 30 
Secondly -a related point - the term 'frame' can suggest that the common 
understanding that helps bind collective actors together is static. On the 
contrary, within a movement activists are continually engaged in a process, 
framing. 3 1A group of people comes to a shared understanding about the world 
(or an aspect of it). Indeed, for a social movement (or part of one) to exist - 
that is, for people to think that they constitute a 'movement', and for others, 
outside the movement, to think the same -a group of people must share some 
kind of basic understanding. Yet this understanding is provisional in as much it 
'9 David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, 'Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant 
Mobilization', in Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow, eds, International 
Social Movement Research, Volume 1, From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement 
Research Across Cultures Greenwich, Conn:, JAI Press Inc., 1988,199-204; Tarrow, Power 
in Movement, 108-122. 
30 Robert D. Benford, 'An Insider's Critique of the Social Framing Perspective', Sociological 
Inquiry, 67,4, November 1997,418. 
" Ibid., 415-420. 
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depends on everyone sharing it. It can be interpreted differently, and modified, 
by those who hold it; and it can be the subject of 'negotiation' and 'frame 
disputes'. 32 Over time, a frame can develop; it can even cease to exist. Gamson 
and Meyer have written that framing should be thought of as an "internal 
process of contention within movements with different actors taking different 
positions". 33 
This points to another aspect of 'framing'. The concept 'frame' 
indicates that there are 'boundaries' around the ideas shared by participants in a 
movement; that is, that participating in a movement (or in a particular group 
within a movement) entails excluding certain ideas from one's analysis. If one 
participates in a movement for unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain one 
cannot simultaneously advocate that Britain acquire a new submarine-based 
nuclear missile system and be considered to be part of the movement. 
Agreement with the ideas (and actions) that constitute a frame can 'liberate' an 
individual or a group to act in a particular way; it can also, by (necessarily) 
setting limits, constrain actors. 
Another danger for the analyst is to present frames simply as the 
creation of 'leaders' which are then handed down to potential or actual 
activists. 34 1 would argue that, while frames might be initially fashioned by 
certain individuals they then become the property of all who subscribe to them 
and can thus be, and are, modified by others. Benford has argued that, "for a 
more comprehensive understanding" of framing processes[j ... we need to 
design more studies which include the interactions, understandings, talk and the 
like of non-elites as well as of elites". 35 
32 See Robert D. Benford, 'Frame Disputes Within the Nuclear Disan-nament Movement', 
Social Forces, 71,3, March 1993,677-70 1. 
33 William A. Gamson and David S. Meyer, 'Framing Political Opportunity', in McAdam et 
al, eds, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, 283. 
34 For an example of this approach see Baehr, 'E. P. Thompson and European Nuclear 
Disarmament (END)'. For critiques of this approach see Benford, 'An Insider's Critique', 
421-422; Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh, 'Some Quotidian Meanings of "Frame and "Framing" 
and Some Non-Democratic Tendencies in Social Movement Theory', in Colin Barker and 
Mike Tyldesley, eds, Conference Papers, Volume II, Sixth International Conference on 
A lternative Futures and Popular Protest, Manchester: Manchester Metropolitan University, 
2000. 
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Organizational Capacity 
The generation of a distinct set of ideas cannot, however, on its own account 
for collective action. Activists (or would-be activists) must also create (or 
sustain) an organizational forin or structure in order to conduct the campaign; 
and they must 'mobilize' resources on which to draw once established and 
when deciding on tactics and strategies. 36 The structure, and the kinds of 
resources available, will be partly shaped by the already existing networks and 
organizations out of which the movement or organization emerged. 
Structure 
Social movement scholars agree that the structure of a movement (or of an 
organization within a movement) is an important factor in shaping the form and 
37 
content of the movement's campaigning work . Both Byme and Maguire have 
shown that the CND of the 1980s had a structure that combined party-style 
hierarchy and representative decision-making with decentralized, autonomous, 
decision-making by specialist sections and local groups. 38 This allowed for 
national policy to be decided at the national level (amongst other places, at the 
annual conference and by the National Council and its committees) and for 
component parts of the organization to organize their own sub-campaigns. In 
Poland between 1985 and 1989, to take another example, Freedom and Peace 
was a decentralized, pluralist, movement: while the Freedom and Peace groups 
(or 'circles') in individual towns and cities were linked by their public and 
imaginative opposition to the regime, they had their own distinctive characters. 
35 Benford, 'An Insider's Critique, 421-422. 
36 See Jo Freeman, 'A Model for Analyzing the Strategic Options of Social Movement 
Organizations', in Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies, 195-199; John D. McCarthy 
and Mayer N. Zald, 'Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory', 
American Journal of Sociology 82,1977,1216. 
37 See Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction, Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1999; Tarrow, Power in Movement, passim. 
38 Maguire, 'New Social Movements and Old Political Institutions, 223-229; Byrne, The 
Campaignfor Nuclear Disarmainent, 81 ff. 
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Individual groups thus had the freedom to organize their own actions on their 
39 
own initiatives (to which other groups were invited) . 
Resources 
A movement's (or an SMO's ) resources can be tangible and intangible, 40 and 
they are either external to or located within the organization. Tangible 
resources include money with which to fund its work (which can come from 
non-activists, such as funding bodies, but also from passive members or 
supporters); places to meet; and means of publicizing the SMO's work 
independently (for example, by producing its own publications and then 
distributing them). The single most important such resource is money, as it can 
be translated into many other kinds of tangible resource. 
The most significant intangible resource (or, to be more precise, source 
of resources) is people. Freeman argues that movements "rely heavily" on 
people and, indeed, that social movements are "low on tangible resources, 
especially money, but strong on people resources". 41 People, she writes, bring 
three types of resource to a movement: time, commitment (both of which 
anyone can provide), and "specialized resources" (which only a few people 
have), such as expertise, access to expertise (for peace campaigners, for 
example, this can include defence experts), or access to the media. (They can 
also, one might add, constitute a financial base, in the form of regularly-paid 
membership fees. ) 
Relations with Other Organizations 
Social movements consist of many groups and individuals. The form the 
movement's campaigning takes is partly shaped by the kinds of relationships 
with each other the parts of the movement have. The West German 
environmental movement of the 1980s, Dieter Rucht has argued, was 
characterised by three dominant types of relations amongst the organizations in 
39 Kenney, A Carnival of Revolution, 64-65. 
40 Freeman, 'A Model for Analyzing', 195. 
41 Ibid., 196 
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it: cooperation, competition, and conflict. 42 Cooperation and coordination were 
cc essential". He cites exchanges of information, holding joint press conferences, 
and engaging in joint actions. However, competition and conflict were also 
typical. By competition, Rucht means a "zero-sum ... struggle" 
between 
organizations with "equal or similar means and ends" for "the same pool of 
resources" (which he defines as "sympathizers, adherents, members, donations, 
public subsidies") and thus for a position better than that of their competitors, 
as well as the fight for "access to administrative and political procedures" and 
"public attention". 43 By conflict Rucht is referring to differences between 
actors with common interests over "preferred means and/or ends" - that is, 
what I have called frame disputes or tensions. An example of this in the 
environmental movement are the tensions between, on the one hand, the 
"nonpolitical conservationists" who offer a moderate critique of aspects of 
environmental policy and favour dialogue with the authorities, and, on the 
other, the "conflict-oriented political ecologists", who favour "disruptive 
actions" and argue for a fundamental social changes. Related to these 
differences are tensions over organizational forms, with the political ecology 
groups rejecting the hierarchical and bureaucratic structure of the more 
traditional conservationist groups. The three 'sectors' of this movement - 
conservationism, environmentalism, political ecology - "constitute the scene 
for an ongoing fight over resources, alliances, programs, and modes of 
actions". 44 
McCarthy and Zald also argue that SMOs in the same 'industry' 
compete for resources from both individuals and institutions (for example, 
government bodies, foundations, churches). However, in contrast to Rucht, 
they emphasize the "relative lack of conflict and the extent of cooperation 
42 Dieter Rucht, 'Environmental Organizations in West Germany and France: Structure and 
Interorganizational Relations', in Bert Klandermans, ed., International Social Movement 
Research, Volume 1, Organizingfor Change: Social Movement Organizations in Europe and 
the United States, Greenwich, Connecticut, London, 1989,61-94. 
43 Ibid., 77-88. 
44 Ibid., 78. 
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among related SMOS gi. 45 They offer four reasons for this: 1) SMOs in a "fairly 
well established" industry agree to concentrate on particular functions and/or 
geographical areas (task specialization); when necessary they exchange their 
skills and expertise; 2) external social control can force SMOs to cooperate; 3) 
those SMOs with boards of directors or advisory council can share board 
members with other SMOs; these members will advise that the SMOs 
cooperate; and 4) SMOs may have overlapping memberships. 
Political Opportunities and Constraints 
Finally, while movements, or parts of them, frame the world, and while their 
work is shaped both by their organizational capacity and by their relations with 
other parts of the movement, they also operate in political contexts. Many 
social movement scholars have argued that one key variable in the explanation 
of the rise, campaigning and decline of social movements is the presence (or 
absence) of 'political opportunities'. 46 On the one hand, there are relatively 
stable, or enduring, aspects of opportunity and constraint, which include what 
Kriesi calls the "formal institutional structure of the state", 47 "informal 
procedures and prevailing strategies", 48 and, in Tarrow's view, "modes of 
repression". 49 
On the other hand, there are more changeable aspects of political 
opportunity. These include increased access to a political system; shifting or 
unstable political alignments; divisions amongst elites; the emergence of 
" Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy, 'Social Movement Industries: Competition and 
Conflict Among SMOs', in Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy, eds, Social Movements in 
an 
Organizational Society, New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987,170. 
46 
Power in Movement, 76-77. 
4' Hanspeter Kriesi, 'The Political Opportunity Structure of New Social Movements: Its Impact 
on Their Mobilization', in J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans, eds, The Politics of Social 
Protest. - Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements, London: UCL Press, 1995, 
169 ff, Tarrow, Power in Movementi, 81 ff; Doug McAdam, 'Conceptual Origins, Current 
Problems, Future Directions, in McAdam, et al, eds, Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements, 27ff 
Kriesi, ibid. 
49 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 83-85. 
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influential allies in or linked to the political system; and repression. Diannuid 
Maguire has shown how such an analytical framework can be usefully applied 
to the study of the rise and fall of CND. 50 He argues that CND's "emergence, 
evolution, and impact " were strongly shaped by its relationship with the 
Labour Party. 
It would be a mistake, however, to regard political opportunities simply 
as objective factors. In considering the impact of political opportunity 
structures on mobilization, one must distinguish between these opportunities 
51 
and how they are framed . 
Anti-Politics 
Synthetic theory can help one explain many aspects of a movement's (or part of 
a movement's) work. Yet it underemphasizes an aspect of contemporary social 
movements that another influential trend in writings about social movement - 
4 new social movement theory' - highlights. Some new social movement 
theorists argue that a "new politics" or a new "political paradigm" has emerged 
as a reaction to structural transformations of advanced industrial societies. 52 
The "new politics", writes Habermas, is concerned with the defence, or 
reinstatement, of "endangered life styles", or with putting "reformed life styles" 
into practice; with "quality of life, equality, individual self-realization, 
participation, and human rights". 53 Underpinning these diverse issues is a 
distinct set of values: "autonomy and identity ... and opposition to 
,, 54 manipulation, control, dependence, bureaucratization, regulation, etc. The 
50 Maguire, 'New social movements and Old Political Institutions'; 'Opposition Movements and 
Opposition Parties: Equal Partners or Dependent Relations in the Struggle for Power and 
ReformT, in J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans (eds), The Politics of Social Protest. 
Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements, London, UCL Press, 1995,199- 
228. 
51 McAdam, et al, eds, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, 26. 
52 Hirgen Habermas, 'New Social Movements', Telos 49,1981,33; Claus Offe, 'New Social 
Movements: Challenging the Boundanes of Institutional Politics', Social Research 52,1985,4, 
820. 
53 Habermas, 'New Social Movements', 33. 
54 Offe, 'New Social Movements', 829. 
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new politics has typical modes of action, too. Internally, NSMs tend to be fluid, 
decentralized, and non-hierarchical. Externally - in their relations with the 
outside world in general and political opponents or addressees in particular - 
they use "unconventional" methods such as large demonstrations, sit-downs, 
and peace camps. 55 They do not play by the rules Oust lobbying political 
parties, for example, or, in general, expecting established political institutions 
to solve problems). 
The movements formulation of demands in the negative - 'No Cruise! '; 
'Atomkraft? Nein Danke! '; and so on - is also unconventional. It indicates that 
NSMs are often ad-hoc and single-issue "veto alliances", 56 rather than 
ideologically coherent and organizationally formal associations with positive 
programmes. Finally, with regard to the new social movements' constituency, 
Habermas has argued that 'new politics' is mainly the province of "the new 
middle class, the younger generation, and those groups with higher levels of 
formal education"; 57 while Dalton, Kuechler, and Mirklin assert that the 
NSMs' constituency is not a "distinct class, ethnic, or other social stratum"; 
rather, it is drawn from "communities of like-minded people". 58 These types of 
social actors, Offe writes, produce a "pattern of social and political conflict" 
that is the polar opposite of the model of class conflict: it is not between agents 
of the "mode of production"; and the demands are not "class-specific" but 
either universalistic or particularistic. 59 
Explanations of social movements based on broad structural change 
may be too general, too reductionist to be useful for a study such as this, in 
which the unit of analysis is not a movement but a group within a movement. 60 
15 Ibid., 830. 
56 Ibid., 830. 
57 Haben-nas, 'New Social Movements', 33. 
58 Russell J. Dalton, Manfred Kuechler, and Wilhelm BUrklin, 'The Challenge of New 
Movements', in Russell J. Dalton, Manfred Kuechler, and Wilhelm BUrklm, eds, Challenging the 
Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies, Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1990,12. 
59 Offe, 'New Social Movements', 831-832. 
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Tarrow has argued that, by suggesting that contemporary social movements 
share basic characteristics that place them in the same 'paradigm', NSM theory 
does not distinguish enough between and within movements. Can - for 
example - the peace movement, which has "deep roots in European history and 
a fundamentally political/security concern", be regarded as part of the same 
social phenomenon as, say, the German alternative scene, the Dutch squatters' 
movement, or the women's movement? Perhaps it can, but only if parts of 
some of these movements are excluded as 'old' .61 Relatedly, Tarrow and 
Klandermans have argued that NSM theory does not explain how broad 
structural changes in advanced capitalist societies produce concrete instances 
of collective action. 
However, while structural explanations might not help us understand 
the peace movement as distinct from other movements, nor a group within a 
movement - such as END - as distinct from other parts of the movement, the 
emphasis NSM theory places on contemporary social movements as 
expressions of a 'new politics' arguably points to an important aspect of these 
movements. The alleged distinctive characteristics of the NSMs - their values, 
issues, forms of action, demands, and their constituency and the kind of 
conflict it generates - can arguably be summed up by the term 'anti-politics'. 
These movements, that is, want neither to seize state power nor just to 
influence political parties. Instead, as Keane has argued - while they may also 
cultivate relations with the world of established politics - they concentrate on 
unpolitical activities: 62 these can include publicizing hidden information, 
producing and disseminating new interpretations of existing problems, and, in 
60 See Sidney Tarrow, Struggle, Politics, and Reform: Collective Action, SocialMovements, and 
Cýycles of Protest, Western Societies Program Occasional, Paper No. 2 1, Ithaca: Cornel I 
University, 1989; Bert Klanden-nans and Sidney Tarrow, 'Mobilization into Social Movements': 
Synthesizing European and American Approaches' in Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and 
Sidney Tarrow, eds, , International 
Social Movement Research, Volume I (From Structure to 
Action: Comparing Social Movement Research Across Cultures, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press 
Inc., 1988,1-38; and Dieter Rucht, 'Themes, Logics, and Arenas of Social Movements: A 
Structural Approach', in ibid., 305-328. 
61 Tarrow, Struggle, 59. 
62 See 'Introduction', in John Keane, ed., Civil Society and the State: New European 
Perspectives, London/New York: Verso, 1988 (London: University of Westminster Press, 
1998), 12-13. 
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the form their campaigning takes, expressing the values they cherish. Keane 
and others have argued that the concept 4anti-politics', and the related paradigm 
6civil society-state' - in which civil society is a sphere of self-organized 
activity distinct from the state and official politics - help one understand the 
nature of the peace mobilizations of the 1980.63 To the explanatory framework 
outlined above one could, then, add this insight of new social movement 
theory: the notion of an 4anti-political' societal sphere distinct from (but also 
acting upon the state) could be understood as an element in a frame -that is, 
movements (or parts of them) explicitly frame themselves as having this role. 
At the same time, it could be a useful concept for analysing the work of 
contemporary movements. 
Most of the studies cited above are of national movements. Will the 
framework outlined above, derived as it is from studies of social movements in 
one country, help explain transnational social movement activity of the kind 
being studied in this thesis? Keck and Sikkink, in their study of 'transnational 
advocacy networks', argue that 'synthetic' theory can help explain their objects 
of analysis. They consider the "institutional structures, both domestic and 
international, that encourage or impede ... transnational activism", thus 
pointing to the fact that, in addition to national political opportunity structures, 
groups or movements active transnationally might also be affected by 
opportunity structures in more than one country, or indeed by 'international 
opportunity structures'; that is, by regular formal or informal relations amongst 
states; the "resources that make a campaign possible"; "relationships ... 
among network actors, and between activists and their allies and opponents"; 64 
and, centrally, the "construction of cognitive fTames" by network actors". 65 
Indeed, the networks they describe have characteristics very much like those of 
63 Keane, 'Civil Society and the Peace Movement in Britain', 6; Kaldor, Transnational Civil 
Society', 200. 
64 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998,6-8. 
65 Ibid., 17. 
22 
national movements. Others have studied the East-West work of the Western 
peace movement at least partly in terms of the concept 'civil-society-statel. 
Patricia Chilton, in her account of the "transnational coalition" made up of 
Western peace groups and independent groups in CEE/SU, describes this as 
having consisted of "civil society contacts" - where civil society refers to, in 
the East, the groups that were "not of the state", and, in the West, roughly to 
(6new social movements". 66 Mary Kaldor has focussed on the ideas, and the 
legacy, of the relationship between "social movements in ... East and West". 
She argues that the dialogue between these actors gave rise to a cluster of new 
ideas - "the coming together of peace and human rights ... a new 
understanding of citizenship, and civil society, and ... transnationalism or 
internationalism at the level of society" - which are expressed by the notion of 
"European or global civil society". 67 The object of analysis in these studies is 
principally transnational relations amongst groups. The focus of this thesis is a 
national initiative that produced a national organization, British END, but 
which had transnational goals and helped give rise also to number of 
transnational institutions and practices. Yet it seems a reasonable assumption, 
given the questions about END which I am trying to answer, that an 
explanatory framework which combines a 'synthetic' approach with insights 
derived from a 'new social movement' approach would be appropriate for this 
study. 
Assessing Success and Failure 
Most studies of social movements (or of parts of movements or of similar 
entities), when they discuss the question whether the movement has 
'succeeded' or 'failed', focus, in part or whole, explicitly or implicitly, on 
6external' success. They consider whether or not the movement has been able 
66 
195-6. 
67 , Transnational Civil Society', in Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, eds, Human Rights in 
Global Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999,195-213; Bringing Peace 
and Human Right Together, Lecture Series: 'The Ideas of 1989', London, The Centre for the 
Study of Global Governance, The London School of Economics, 2000; Global Civil Society: 
An Ansiver to War, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003. 
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to influence the policies or behaviour of institutions, or sets of institutions, in 
the world outside the movement, group, or network 
Keck and Sikkink, in their study of "transnational advocacy networks', 
measure success and failure, or "effectiveness', principally in terms of the 
influence that such networks have on the discourse, the procedures, the 
policies, and the behaviour of states and of public and private international 
organizations. They also measure influence in ternis of "issue creation and 
agenda setting". While these can, in principle, happen without states and 
institutions being affected, Keck and Sikkink are mainly concerned with how 
they affect these bodies. 68 Smith identifies four judgements that can be made of 
the Central America peace movement; two of these concern 'external' 
achievements: the movement's failure to influence government policy; and its 
"political successes' ("cautious[ly] apprais[ed]"). 69 William Gamson, in his 
study of 53 "challenging groups" in the USA between 1800 and 1945, suggests 
that we think of success as a "set of outcomes". These have two basic fonns: to 
what extent is the "challenging group" accepted by its antagonists as a "valid 
spokesman for a legitimate set of interests'? and to what extent does the 
group's "beneficiary" gain "new advantages' during and after the challenge? A 
group may have success in both categories, though to different degrees; in one 
only; or in neither. 70 
Measuring success and failure in these terms is hard. Gamson has 
written that "success is an elusive idea". Is a group successful if its leaders are 
"honoured and rewarded" while its "supposed beneficiaries linger in the same 
cheerless state as before"? Or is a group successful whose leaders are vilified as 
its programme is implemented? 71 It is even harder when the group under 
consideration has its external goals bringing about major changes in state-level 
international relations. Patricia Chilton points out in her study of the East-West 
68 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 25 
69 Smith, Resisting Reagan, 3 65-77. 
70 William Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest, 2nd ed., Belmont, California: Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, 1990,28. 
7' Gamson- ibid., 28 and Chapter 3, passim. 
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"Peace and Human Rights Transnational Coalition" of the 1980s that it is 
difficult to prove "[c]ausal connections ... where massive social and political 
5 72 change occurs'. Christian Smith highlights an even more basic problem with 
trying to establish whether or not a movement has succeeded. Without a 
66 comparative control case" - in which, in the case of his study, the Reagan 
administrations would not have been constrained by a peace movement - it is, 
in a sense, "impossible" to establish the degree of success or failure. 73 
Gamson distinguishes between "external" and "organizational" goals. 
The latter he defines as the "enhancement of the strength and ability of the 
challenging group". 74 To this one could add that activists succeed or fail in 
organizational terms to the extent that their 'organizational capacity', the mix 
of resources and organizational structure they achieve, both corresponds to its 
supporters'/members' wishes and is suited to the goals they want to reach. If 
the aim, for example, is to change a government's defence policy, is it best to 
set up a small and disciplined pressure group that targets policy-makers; or a 
large umbrella organization, such as CND, that combines the work of a 
pressure group with the radical, sometimes confrontational, politics of 
demonstration and resistance? 
Activists, however, may be trying not just to influence external bodies, 
or to build and sustain a group, but also to create a movement or a network of 
movements or groups, either within national borders or transnationally. To this 
end, they will establish contact with other groups, or individuals and - if they 
are already active - conduct campaigns with them, or - if not - persuade them 
either to join and then stay in the campaign or to campaign in a particular way. 
In this process 'frame alignment' - establishing that others see the world in 
tenns of how you frame it, or getting them to do so - is crucial. Tarrow argues 
that the constituent parts of a movement are connected through "common ways 
of seeing the world" or "common purposes and social solidarities"; they enjoy 
72 Pat Chilton, 'Mechanics of Change', 221. 
73 Smith, Resisting Reagan, 365. 
74 G am son, The Strategy of Social Protest, 4 1. 
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"solidarity and collective identity". 75 Mario Diani argues that one defining 
characteristic of a movement is that a plurality of individuals, groups and/or 
organizations have a "shared collective identity". In the process of elaborating 
a shared definition of themselves as being part of the same side in a social 
conflict" 76 they give "meaning to otherwise unconnected protest events or 
symbolic antagonistic practices, and make explicit the emergence of specific 
conflicts and issues"; that is, they create a 'frame' which helps bind them 
together". 77 On the basis of this common frame the network of groups and 
individuals engages in conflict with, or challenges, authoritieS. 78 Keck and 
Sikkink suggest that 'transnational advocacy networks' consist partly of people 
"generat[ing] and organiz[ing] information" within "categories or frames". 79 In 
certain cases, political opportunities or constraints will also affect if, and how, a 
movement or network is formed. An authoritarian regime, for example, will try 
to make it difficult for citizens to become active, let alone for groups to link 
together to form a movement, whether those groups are all within its borders or 
some of them are abroad and are trying, with the domestic groups, to create a 
transnational entity. 
Success and failure can thus be measured in terms of the ability to 
create a movement or a network. Tarrow implies as much when he defines the 
West European peace movement of the 1980s as a transnational social 
movement: "sustained contentious interaction with opponents - national or 
nonnational - by connected networks of challengers organized across national 
boundaries"; the "challengers" were "rooted in domestic social networks"; the 
challenges were "contentious in deed as well as in word"; and the challengers' 
connectedness, which consisted either of "common ways of seeing the world" 
or of "informal or organizational ties", was more than "episodic". 80 This begs 
75 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 184. 
76 Mario Diani, 'The Concept of Social Movement', The Sociological Review, 40,1992,2. 
77 
Ibid., II- 
78 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 4. 
'9 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 10. 
"' Tarrow, Power in Movenient, 184. 
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the question, how was such a transnational entity created? Keck and Sikkink - 
though, as indicated above, they are mainly interested in whether or not such 
networks succeed in influencing others - devote much of each of their case 
studies to analysing the ability of activists to create 'transnational advocacy 
networks'; they thus implicitly regard this latter activity as a goal of such 
activists, and one which can therefore be assessed in terms of success and 
failure. 
It is important to remember, however, that, although a movement is a 
network, one can use the term 'network' for other entities. In one case, for 
example, we may speak of a transnational movement, as Tarrow does with 
regard to the Western peace movement of the 1980s. In other cases, there may 
be fewer or and/more fragile ties between activists in different countries: Keck 
and Sikkink's 'transnational advocacy networks', for example. 
This thesis is concerned not with the 'external' goals of the END 
initiative, as assessing success/failure with regard to these would be, as 
suggested above, extremely difficult, if not impossible. It is concerned, rather, 
with the process by which a group of activists tried to achieve their goal of 
creating a transnational alliance against the nuclear arms race and the Cold War 
and with whether they succeeded or failed in this aim. It will thus focus on the 
organizational form these activists created and on the ways in which they tried 
to create this transnational entities. It does so in the belief that this case study 
can make a contribution to understanding the characterisitics of transnational 
social movement activism. 
The Argument of this Thesis 
The argument of this thesis is presented in terms of an explanatory framework 
that combines 'synthetic' theory with insights from 'new social movement' 
theory to highlight the key features of the END campaign. The catalyst for the 
fon-nation of END, as for much of the Western peace movement, was NATO's 
1979 'dual-track' decision. But this alone cannot explain the founding of END. 
END emerged partly out of various 'preexisting communications networks' 
made up of people who were receptive to the ideas that went into the END 
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world-view. Not everyone in these networks went into British END or got 
involved in the END Convention process; but these networks 'provided' people 
who did. The networks facilitated the emergence of END; they helped 
determine its organizational capacity once it had been founded; and they 
'provided' some of the ideas which distinguished END from other peace 
initiatives. 
In addition to the networked individuals involved, three distinct 
organizations -'movement midwives'- helped 'give birth' to the END 
initiative: the International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP), 
the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND); and, above all, the Bertrand 
Russell Peace Foundation (BRPF). Unlike Christian Smith's movement 
midwives, these organizations already had, or went on to acquire, roles in the 
peace movement. Yet the point still applies: they were crucial to the emergence 
of END. 
The END initiative was distinguished above all by its 'frame'. The 
formulation and propagation of ideas was a, perhaps the, key feature of END 
campaigning: much END work consisted both of publishing ideas and of 
engaging allies, would-be allies, and opponents, at home and abroad, in often 
detailed, sophisticated, dialogue. The END frame, which grew in part out of a 
specific non-aligned tradition in the post-war British and European Left - was 
'created' by the founders of END (above all Edward Thompson). It blamed 
both sides for the nuclear arms race and the Cold War; argued, as an 
alternative, for the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Europe and the 
ending of the division of Europe; and identified above all social and political 
forces in both East and West, working together across the division of Europe, 
as the agents of this alternative. 
The creation of this frame was accompanied by the founding not only 
of, in Britain, a new organization, END, but also, across Western Europe, of a 
new transnational institution, the END Convention 'process'. One can talk of 
an END 'current' in the Western peace movement; this was made up of those 
individuals and groups who supported the END Appeal. 
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END activists in Britain were engaged in to three, densely linked, types 
of campaigning. The basic aim of this work was to help create a 
"transcontinental movement" (END Appeal). On the one hand, they were 
trying to influence - to END-ize - the British peace movement, above all 
CND: that is, they were trying to get CND to incorporate into its campaigning 
an END approach to the nuclear anns race and the superpower conflict. Dan 
Smith, one of END's co-founders, has described END as a "pressure group 
within the movement". 81 At the same time, ENDers with other Western peace 
groups, were trying to link up non-aligned peace groups, as well as political 
parties and other actors, throughout Western Europe (and beyond): the END 
Convention was a key vehicle for this. (This entailed, among other things, 
promoting ties between CND and non-aligned groups in Western Europe. ) 
Some END supporters were also trying, in a 'twin-track' approach, to 
help create a pan-European, "trans-continental" alliance with independent 
groups in the East, whilst maintaining relations with state bodies. This 
approach came to be labelled by some 'detente from below'. Some END 
activists conceived of the first 'track' in terms of societal spheres distinct from 
and acting upon the state - 'civil societies' - linking up with each other. This 
campaigning entailed British END both itself engaging these groups in 
dialogue and trying to bring others in the West into these relations, including 
CND. 
The dialogue with independent groups in the East involved thus not 
only the difficult work of trying to find common ground with independent 
activists whose worldview had been shaped by quite different circumstances. It 
entailed also trying to bridge two sets of dissimilar frames: that of the 
mainstream Western peace movement -including CND - which focussed on 
opposing Western nuclear weapons, and those hold by various independent 
actors in CEE/SU. Unsurprisingly, this East-West work gave rise to frame 
disputes and tensions within the END current and beyond, some of them quite 
serious. While British END largely pursued the dual approach outlined above, 
others, including some in the END current, were sceptical of the value of this 
" Interview, 5 August 2003. 
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work and paid more attention to developments at state level in CEE/SU. Others 
again saw little value in trying to sustain a dialogue with official bodies in the 
East and concentrated their efforts on working with independent forces. 
These three approaches to East-West relations - which represented 
three different conceptions of how movements could help end the East-West 
conflict, and each of which could be, and was, justified in terms of the END 
'frame' - were often in tension with each other in the END current. Sometimes 
they gave rise to fierce disputes, above all at END Conventions. On occasion, 
there were arguments within British END over its Ostpolitk. British END's 
relations with its allies were partly marked by these tensions. END's 
relationship with CND, for example - which, to date, has not been analysed in 
any depth - was cooperative to the extent that both were campaigning against 
Western nuclear missiles and shared both 'leaders' and less prominent activists. 
(Nor were the two groups competing for resources: END's size meant that it 
could not be a significant competitor in this respect. ) But, with regard to East- 
West politics, there was a degree of conflict - 'frame disputes' - between CND 
and END, which made the task of influencing CND that much harder. (In 
addition, British END could occasionally feel constrained in its East-West 
work by the need to exercise this influence. ) 
Similarly, British END had cooperative relationships with a variety of 
West European groups outside the UK, in the IPCC and in the END 
Convention, and 'bilaterally' outside these frameworks. This is not surprising, 
as these groups not only campaigned broadly within the framework of the END 
Appeal, but emphasized that part of the END 'frame' which prioritised working 
with independent actors in CEE/SU. However, even with some of its allies in 
the West European movement END was sometimes in conflict over tactics and 
strategies: those representatives of peace organizations, political parties, and 
trade unions who were much more sceptical about the value of the dialogue 
with the 'independents' in CEE/SU. (In addition, some of these tensions were 
rooted in the different campaigning styles of END and other peace groups, on 
the one hand, and political parties and trade unions on the other. ) 
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Most accounts of END focus - unsurprisingly, given its distinctiveness 
- on the END 'vision' and pay little or no attention to the role resources and 
END's organizational form played in structuring its campaign. 82 Yet END's 
campaigning was shaped not just by ideas; END's 'organizational capacity' 
also had important consequences for the kind of campaigning END was able to 
do. For example, well before the 1980s both Edward Thompson and Ken 
Coates were publishing many of the ideas that went into the END Appeal and 
otherwise informed END work; 83 yet it was in part only when a new 
organization had been created that these ideas could reach a wide audience. The 
amount of money to which British END had access; the specific 'internal' 
resources which its activists brought with them, and the external ones on which 
it could draw - including using the CND structure as a way to reach the wider 
peace movement; and its structure (a loose, federal organization, with no, or 
[later] a very low, membership): all these shaped the kind of work British END 
could do. 
British END's work was at least partly also shaped by its relationship 
with political systems, above all with regard to its 'cross-bloc' work. Here both 
national POSs in the East and international factors had an impact, directly and 
indirectly. Directly, because individual regimes in CEE/SU could, and 
sometimes did, implement an 'exclusive' strategy towards foreign activists. By 
doing this, these regimes hoped to undermine the contacts between these 
activists and 'independent' actors in their own countries. Indirectly, because the 
way the regimes treated their own domestic challengers, above all those who 
had contacts with the Western peace movement, affected the nature of these 
contacts. In addition, one could argue, as some have, 84 that a distinctive set of 
82 See Baehr, 'E. P. Thompson and European Nuclear Disarmament (END)' ; Wylie, 'Creating 
Alternative Visions; Kaldor, Global Civil Society, Chapter 3 (which is also about other like- 
minded groups). 
83 See Ken Coates, 'Introduction', and E. P. Thompson, '136tente and Disarmament', in Ken 
Coates, ed., D&ente and Socialist Democracy: A Discussion with Roy Medvedev, European 
Socialist Thought Series No. 6 (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1975), 1-6 & 119-138. On E. 
P. Thompson's thought, see Kate Soper, 'Socialist Humanism', in Harvey J. Kaye and Keith 
McClelland, eds, E. P. Thompson: Critical Perspectives, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990,204- 
232. 
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state-level international relations facilitated the East-West work of END (and 
other Western peace groups): the Helsinki Accords of 1975. But what also 
shaped END's work in this respect was how END supporters framed the 
regimes in the East and the political opportunities they offered or denied. 
The relationship with the political system in Britain was arguably less 
important in shaping END's work; here it was the relationship with CND that 
mattered above all. Similarly, with regard to END's work in non-UK Western 
Europe, the concept of POS has relatively little explanatory power. The groups 
in the other West European countries with which British END was trying to 
cooperate were, one might assume, affected by their national POSs. But as 
British END was not trying - or able - to affect policy or political debates in 
these countries it did not experience directly the effect of political opportunities 
and constraints in these countries. 
Did British END create the right organizational form for its work? It 
was small and had a loose, federal structure; this gave it an autonomy which 
allowed it to initiate and develop politically controversial projects such as the 
dialogue with independent groups in the East and the END Convention process. 
At the same time, END's close relationship with CND, and its leading role in 
international fora such as the END Convention process and the IPCC, gave 
END supporters platforms from which to broadcast their message much further 
than the size of the group would otherwise have allowed them to. On the other 
hand, END was relatively poor: it certainly had less money than it needed for 
its ambitious campaign. And being a non-membership organization for part of 
its existence meant that END found it hard to draw new people into its 
campaign. 
Did the attempt to create a "transcontinental movemenf' succeed or 
fail? The West European movement was, as Tarrow and Rochon have 
suggested, a transnational social movement. END activists played a role in 
linking movements with each other, above all by initiating and helping to 
sustain the END Convention process, but also by starting and participating in 
campaigns, such as the North Atlantic Network. In Britain, END supporters 
84 Wylie, 'Creating Alternative Visions'; Kalclor, Global Oill Socie(y. 
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helped to keep CND engaged with other West European movements. Across 
the East-West divide, no 'movement' emerged. Instead, the dialogue between 
Western peace groups and independent CEE and Soviet groups gave rise to a 
network the participants in which gradually established some common political 
ground. This ground was firm enough for some of the participants in the 
dialogue to be able to cooperate in the founding of a new, post-Cold War, 
transnational citizens' initiative, the Helsinki Citizens' Assemly. 
In the West, however, many mainstream peace organizations, including 
CND, were not, or only barely, involved in this dialogue. Morever, END's 
participation in the dialogue, and the frame which underpinned this 
participation, was a source of tension between British END and CND. There 
was also an increasingly unbridgeable gap in the END 'current' between those 
groups committed to this dialogue and those sceptical of its value. The latter, 
particularly in the Gorbachev period, set much greater store in state-level 
changes in the East. 
Sources and Method 
This study draws on a range of secondary material and primary sources. The 
latter include published works by and semi-structured interviews with former 
END and other peace activists in Britain and elsewhere in Western Europe, as 
well as interviews with former interlocutors of END in CEE/SU. Most of the 
interviews lasted one to one-and-a-half hours. Of crucial importance, however, 
were the previously almost entirely unused archives of British END. 85 Most Of 
these were, when the present author came to use them, still uncatalogued. The 
exceptions were the papers relating to British END's work in Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union, which Hugh Baldwin, a foriner END 
activist and trained librarian, had put into order. My first task, therefore, was to 
catalogue the remaining END papers. In addition, this thesis draws on private 
and public archives of both CND and END activists, as well as on the official 
CND archive in the LSE. 
85 Gillian Wylie used a few documents in these archives for her PhD thesis. She was unable to 
use more because, at the time, the END papers were still largely uncatalogued. See Wylie, 
'Creating Alternative Visions'. 
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The other primary source is of a different nature: the author's own 
memory of these events. I was an activist in British END from the middle of 
1982, when I attended the END Convention in Brussels and then joined the 
small London END group, until the end of 1989. From the summer of 1983 to 
the late spring of 1987 1 was an employee of END. This experience both helped 
and hindered me in my research. On the one hand, I started out knowing a lot 
about much of what British END did (though about the periods 1980-mid- 
1982 and Spring 1987-89, when I was, respectively, not involved in END or 
only in one small part of it, I knew relatively little). This meant, arguably, 
among other things, that I could make better (or at least faster) sense of internal 
documents than could someone without my previous knowledge of END. On 
the other hand, one can know too much: I had to avoid getting bogged down in 
recounting events that seemed important to me as an activist but which were of 
little or no relevance for an historical account. In addition, my experience was, 
necessarily, partial, and in two senses: I was, as indicated, only actively 
involved in parts of END's work; and, with regard to certain matters - 
particularly those to do with END's Ostpolitik -I often was, or at the time had 
felt myself to be, on one of two or more sides of an internal argument. The 
latter was a bigger obstacle to overcome (the first could be removed by finding 
out what I didn't know): I had to ensure that I was not misrepresenting the 
views of END activists with whom, at the time, I did not agree. I hope I have 
been able to do so. Nevertheless, I do have an interpretation of END's work, 
which should emerge from this study. 
Outline of this Study 
In Chapter 21 trace the founding of END in the context of the emergence of 
the peace movement in the UK in 1979-80 and I present and analyse the END 
world view - the 'frame'which helped give END peace campaigning its 
distinctive character. In Chapter 31 examine British END's structure and 
resources and consider how these shaped the kind of campaigning END 
activists were able to engage in. The following three chapters focus on this 
campaigning: Chapter 3 looks at END's work in the UK, above all the central 
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relationship with CND; Chapter 4 at the attempts of END supporters to 
construct durable networks amongst West European peace groups and 
movements; and Chapter 6 at the dialogue with independent forces in Central- 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the simultaneous relationship with 
Soviet bloc regimes. In Chapter 71 consider the extent to which END's 
campaign can be said to have been a success or a failure. 
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Chapter 2 
Beginnings 
Peace Movements Emerge 
The founding of END in Britain in early 1980 was one event in the 
beginning of the anti-nuclear weapons mobilizations in Britain and 
elsewhere in Western Europe. The catalyst of these mobilizations - the 
immediate 'grievance'- was the NATO 'dual-track' decision of 12 
December 1979 to deploy 572 intermediate-range nuclear missiles (464 
Tomahawk cruise, 108 Pershing 11 ballistic missiles) in five West European 
countries, beginning in 1983, in 'response' to the Soviet Union's 
continuing deployment of its intermediate-range ballistic missiles, the SS- 
20s. These new Western weapons would be under the sole command of the 
US. West Germany would receive 96 cruise missiles and all the Pershing 
Ils; Italy 112 cruise; Belgium and the Netherlands 48 cruise each; and 
Britain 160 cruise missiles. The other part of the December 1979 'dual- 
track' decision stated that none of these missiles would be deployed if the 
USSR withdrew all its SS-20s; the USA would, thus, enter into 
negotiations with the Soviet Union with the aim of removing these 
intermediate range nuclear weapons from Europe. 
The central focus of the West European peace campaigns over the 
next four to six years, depending on the country, was preventing the 
deployment of these US weapons. I Movement activists argued that, far 
from providing a necessary 'balance' to the SS-20, cruise and Pershing 11 
missiles offered a qualitatively new threat. Activists directed their criticism 
not just at the missiles but also at the military strategies that would govern 
their use. Before and at the beginning of the mobilizations, however, other, 
more general, factors help explain the origins of the peace mobilizations: 
the decline of the d6tente and a growing fear of war; and, in Britain, a 
1 Rochon, Mobilizingfor Peace, 4; Carter, Peace Movements, 114 
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series of policy statements and moves by the British government (and 
revelations about past governments' behaviour). 
National and international public opinion polls registered growth in 
the late 1970s in the fear of war amongst the publics of various NATO 
countries. Eurobarometer polls indicated that there was a "sharp upsurge in 
the 'fear of a world war within the subsequent ten years"' in what would be 
the five 'deployment' countries and France. 2 The opening words of the 
END Appeal appear therefore to have reflected a real mood: "We are 
entering the most dangerous decade in human history. A third world war is 
not merely possible, but increasingly likely'. 3 
The growth of the fear of war in this period correlates with a 
decline in superpower detente. Russet and Deluca point out that it is not 
clear exactly when this increase in a fear of war became strong; but that it 
is likely to have been after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 
1979.4 The decline of detente was gradual; but it accelerated in the second 
half of 1979 and in 1980. In the late 1970s, there was increasing, and open, 
disquiet in Western military and political circles about the growth in Soviet 
military power and the 'projection' of this power into parts of Africa; in 
1977 President Carter announced that the USA would deploy the 'neutron 
bomb' in Western Europe (and then cancelled this decision in 1978); in 
1979 the US Senate made it clear that it would not ratify the SALT 11 
Treaty that had been signed in June of that year by President Carter and 
CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev - and Carter withdrew it rather 
than have it defeated in the Senate 5; and December 1979 saw the 'dual- 
track' decision and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 1980, the US 
2 See Bruce Russett and Donald R. Deluca, 'Theatre Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in 
Western Europe', Political Science Quarterly, 98,1983,179-86; Berthold Meyer, 
'Neutral istische Traumereien? Offentliche Meinung, Frieden und Friedensbewegung', in 
Reiner Steinweg, ed., Die neue Friedensbewegung. Analysen aus der Friedensforschung, 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 
1982,118-128; Rochon, ibid., 46ff ; Breyman, ibid., 178-8 1. 
'Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament', 223. 
4 See also Meyer, 'Neutralistische Trdumereien? ', 119. 
' Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War, 2 nd ed., London: Verso, 1986,121. 
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boycott of the moscow Olympics and, above all, the election in November 
of the right-wing and fiercely anti-Communist Ronald Reagan as president 
confinned the ascendancy of a tough public 'anti-Soviet' policy in the 
USA. Less publicly, in July of that year President Carter had signed 
Presidential Directive 59 (PD59), which allowed for the use of nuclear 
weapons in fighting, rather than deterring, war. 6 
In Britain, national developments also encouraged the growth of 
peace campaigning. Amongst the most important was the fact that, since 
the general election of May 1979, Britain had had a Conservative 
government led by a markedly right-wing, and, in foreign relations, 
strongly anti-Communist, prime minister, Margaret Thatcher. In 1980 a 
series of government policies (or revelations about them) helped stimulate 
anti-nuclear weapons campaigning. In February 1980, Panorama broadcast 
the civil defence film that the goverm-nent would show in the run-up to 
nuclear war, while, in March 1980, the government published the pamphlet 
Protect and Survive, which proposed that people defend themselves from a 
nuclear bomb-blast and radiation by, amongst other things, sitting under a 
table or in a cupboard under the stairs. In June 1980, the government 
announced that 96 cruise missiles would be stationed at Greenham 
Common airbase; and it followed this, in July 1980, with the 
announcement that it would buy the Trident missile system from the USA 
as a replacement for Polaris as Britain's 'independent' nuclear deterrent. 
Slightly earlier - in January 1980 - the House of Commons Defence 
debate had revealed that an earlier Labour government was also 
responsible for the perceived nuclear threat: in 1974 Labour government 
had secretly updated the Polaris missile system with the Chevaline 
7 
warhead . James Hinton 
has argued, in the 1980s, that most "CND activists 
were in no mood to trust the Labour party". 8 
6 See Gwyn Prins, Defended to Death, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1983,109; 
Ceadel, 'Britain's Nuclear Disarmers', 230. 
7 Dan Keohane, Labour Party Defence Policy Since 1945, Leicester: Leicester University 
Press, 1993,29; Joan Ruddock, 'Why the 1980 Revival Happened - And Where We Go 
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Yet the Labour Party was also involved in the upsurge of new anti- 
nuclear weapons campaigning. After the defeat of Labour in 1979 the left 
vigorously pursued a campaign to 'democratize' the party; that is, to make 
the parliamentary party more accountable to the party outside parliament. 
One source of dissatisfaction on the left was precisely the Wilson and 
Callaghan Labour governments' ignoring of conference policies on defence 
and of the left-dominated National Executive Committee's proposals for 
cutting defence expenditure. 9 The NEC (as well as ordinary Labour 
activists) promoted unilateralist policies as part of their campaign against 
the party leadership. The first mass demonstration of the new anti-nuclear 
weapons mobilization - an anti-cruise missiles rally in London on 20 June 
1980 - was called by the NEC; the numbers attending it - about 20,000 - 
indicated, among other things, that there were many Labour activists ready 
to campaign on this issue. The passing by the October 1980 party 
conference of a resolution in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament was 
more evidence of a groundswell of support for this stance amongst 
activists. Maguire has argued that these developments helped create 
political opportunities conducive to the rise of the peace movement. While 
the party was not "present as an organized political entity at this stage of 
the movement's development" in Britain, local party members were: they 
worked with religious leaders, former peace activists and organizers of 
other movements to "get the peace campaign of the 1980s off the 
ground". 10 
From late 1979 new peace groups sprang up around Britain. These 
included, amongst the earliest, the East Anglia Campaign Against the 
Missiles (EACAM) and the Campaign Against the Oxfordshire Missiles 
(Campaign ATOM) - each stimulated by the (incorrect) assumption that 
From Here', in John Minnion and Philip Bolsover, eds, The CND Story, London: Allison 
& Busby, 1983,96. 
8 Hinton, Protests and Visions, 189. 
9 Keohane, ibid., 28ff-, Paul Anderson and Nyta Mann, Safety First: the Making of New 
Labour, London: Granta Books, 1997,332ff. 
10 Maguire, 'Opposition Movements and Opposition Parties', 211. 
39 
cruise missiles would be deployed at, respectively, RAF Lakenheath in 
Suffolk and RAF Upper Heyford in Oxfordshire - and Peace Action 
Durham, founded in January 1980. By the end of September 1980 there 
were more than 300 local groups with a combined membership of over 
40,000.11 
Developments at different 'levels', then, can be said to have 
stimulated the new peace mobilization in Britain (and elsewhere in 
Western Europe): the overall deterioration in relations between East and 
West; the strengthening anti-Communism in the United States, and its echo 
in the United Kingdom; developments in US nuclear weapons strategy; the 
dual-track decision of December 1979; a series of policy decisions by the 
British government. Some or all of these developments, one can assume, 
stimulated the relatively marked fear of war in 1979 and 1980. Peace 
campaigners attested, at the time and later, that these were amongst the 
developments were the reasons why they became active, and/or the cause 
of the new mobilizations. 12 In addition, there was a growing enthusiasm for 
anti-nuclear weapons policies within the Labour Party. 
The Founding of END 
Alongside the multitude of local and regional groups that sprang up in 
1980, two new initiatives with - as their names indicated - ambitious aims 
were launched: the World Disarmament Campaign (WDQ (in 1979) and 
European Nuclear Disarmament (END). (Mattoo has explained 
persuasively why the WDC did not become a mass campaign and dwindled 
into obscurity after the second United Nations Special Session on 
Disarmament in 1982.13) 
11 Mattoo, 'The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament', 59. 
" See, Hinton, Protests and Visions, 182; Kaldor, 'Transnational Civil Society', 198; 
Ruddock, 'Why the 1980 Revival Happened', 96-7 ; John Minnion and Philip Bolsover, 
' Introduction', in Minnion and Bolsover, eds, The CND Story, 34-5 ; interviews with 
Lynne Jones, 9 March 1996 and 10 August 1998. 
13 Mattoo, 'The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament', 69-7 1. 
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The founding of END can be explained partly in the same terms as 
one would use to explain the emergence of the many other peace initiatives 
in Britain. For example - as we shall see - one founder of END, Edward 
Thompson, began his campaign with an attack on the proposed deployment 
of cruise missiles; another founder - Ken Coates - was an active 
participant in the arguments within the Labour Party and wanted END to 
be a forum for discussion and debate that would, amongst other things, 
influence the party. 14 But there is a crucial additional explanation for the 
launching of the END campaign: its founders, 'carriers' of specific political 
traditions on the British left, consciously wanted to create a distinctive 
initiative; and they were parts of networks and organizations which enabled 
them to do so. 
An important part of the END initiative had its roots in the ideas 
and actions of the British New Left that emerged partly out of the splits in 
the Communist Party in 1956.15 Dorothy Thompson, a co-founder of END, 
has written that a "non-aligned ... [ New Left] political position" - 
"against the communists and the fell ow-travel lers, on the one hand, and 
Natopolitan social democrats, on the other" - could be "traced in the years 
before 1980, and it certainly emerged in the eighties with the foundation of 
END". 16 The 'carriers' of this 'position' were, among others, Thompson 
herself and her husband Edward, one of the most important founders of 
END and certainly the best known exponent of the END idea. Edward 
Thompson, looking back at END in 1990, wrote that, from 1956 "we [ex- 
Communists] developed in little j ournals, and then with the first British 
New Left - in association with friends in West Europe and C. Wright Mills 
in the USA -a new strategy of 'active neutrality' and a third way of peace 
14 Interview with Ken Coates, 12 December 200 1. 
15 And perhaps before: James Hinton has written that "[t]here is an obvious continuity 
between 'Third Force' ideas of democratic socialism between the two superpowers in the 
1940s, and the 'Beyond the Blocs' politics of European Nuclear Disarmament in the 
1980s". Hinton, Protests and Visions, ix. 
" Dorothy Thompson, 'On the Trail of the New Left', New Left Review 215, 
J anuary- February 1996,95. 
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and human rights". 17 Thompson had, since the 1950s, campaigned in 
support of, and debated with, 'dissidents' in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. Elsewhere, Edward Thompson spoke about the "long inheritance" 
of the END ... line"', and his "own personal association" with it, which 
66 stemmed from the impact of the 1956 events in the world Communist 
movement - the Hungarian insurrection and so on". 
18 
In Beyond the Cold War, he traced his commitment to an undivided 
Europe back to the end of World War Two when "[t]houghout Europe men 
and women looked forward to the fruits of victory: a continent both 
democratic and at peace" - before these "expectations" were shattered by 
the "onset of the Cold War". 19 Kate Soper has argued that the "core 
themes" of Thompson's 'socialist humanism' - the "rejection of the 
antithetical 'philistinisms' of social democracy and Stalinist Communism; 
the insistence that the sole route to genuine socialist emancipation lay on a 
course between the two; and the affirmation of our moral autonomy and 
powers of historical agency" - provided "the unbroken thematic thread of 
all Thompson's writings", from the biography of William Morris published 
in 1955 to the "denunciation of Cold War stasis and the 'exterminist' logic 
of the arms race in the 1980s". 20 
Another 'carrier' of the New Left position in the 1960s and 1970s - 
indeed, in Dorothy Thompson's view, one of its "most important and 
lasting vectors"21 _ was the Institute for Worker's Control (IWC). (She 
later described IWC events as "the only worthwhile thing happening on the 
Left in the 1970s". 22). Set up in 1964, the "principal inspiration" behind the 
17 E. P. Thompson, 'Ends and Histories', in Mary Kaldor, ed., Europeftom Below. An 
East-West Dialogue, London/New York: Verso, 1991,2 1. 
18 Ben Webb, 'Making History. An Interview with E. P. Thompson', Peace and 
Democracy News, Vol. V, No. 2, Summer 1991,2 1. 
19 E. P. Thompson, Beyond the Cold War, London: Merlin Press/END, 1982,5 & 6. 
20 Soper, 'Socialist Humanism', 205. 
2' Dorothy Thompson, 'On the Trail of the New Left', 95. 
22 Interview with Dorothy Thompson, 20 June 200 1. 
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Institute -a historian of the Labour Party's political thought has written - 
were Ken Coates and Tony Topham, who were also founding or early 
members of END. 23 Coates was also the leading figure in the Bertrand 
Russell Peace Foundation (BRPF). The BRPF was another 'vector' of New 
Left ideas. It played a central role in the launch of - indeed, it was the key 
'movement midwife' of - the END initiative (see below). 
Ken Coates - who, amongst other things, had also run defence 
campaigns for Central East European and Soviet 'dissidents' (sometimes 
with the Thompsons) 24 , and most recently for Rudolf Bahro, the 
imprisoned East German Marxist regime critic - has traced the origins of 
END back to a seminar, 'The Just Society', convened in Bradford in 1976 
by the Russell Foundation. (The papers from this conference are more 
evidence of a 'Third Way' tradition on the European Left. 25 ) At the 
conference, Coates recalls, the exiled Czech scholar Eduard Goldstuecker 
suggested that the poor state of relations between East and West Europe 
and the "adverse conditions of work" of "independent socialist thinkers in 
the East" were "intricately related"; and only a "new and comprehensive 
European peace movement" could offer hope of a "real change for the 
better". 26 Goldstuecker's comments prompted Coates, he writes, to see how 
such a movement could be brought to life: "we began to explore every 
contact which might help to generate such a movement.... I and others 
returned to this theme again and again, at international conferences of one 
kind or another" (including at one organized by the Italian Socialist 
2' Geoffrey Foote, The Labour Party's Political Thought: A History, 2 nd ed., London: 
Croorn Heim, 1986,309. 
24 See E. P. Thompson, Double Exposure, London: Merlin Press, 1985,14-15. 
25 Ken Coates and Fred Singleton, eds, The Just Society, Nottingham: Spokesman, 1977. 
As are those collected in Ken Coates, ed., D&ente and Socialist Democracy: A Discussion 
with Roy 
Medvedev, European Socialist Thought Series No. 6, Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 
1975. 
26KenCoates, Foreword', in Human Rights and Disarmament: An Exchange of Letters 
between E. P. Thompson and Vaclav Racek, Nottingham: Spokesman, 1981,1-3; 
Listeningfor Peace, END Papers Special 2, Nottingham: Spokesman, n. d., 11. 
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Party). 27 They had some success, as another account suggests: speaking 
later about the origins of END, Edward Thompson said that "it was all 
based upon earlier political work - the Russell Foundation had quite a 
large network of people in Europe and America to build on". 28 Coates 
himself wrote later that the result of his "skirting around the question of a 
European peace movement" in the 1970s was that "I had a small network 
of well placed Europeans, who could pick up on the END Appeal as soon 
as we were ready to circulate it". 29 Many of these contacts were in Social 
Democratic, Labour (Socialist International) and 'Euro-Communist' 
parties, as well as in trades unions. 
The catalyst for the formation of END, as for the peace 
mobilizations throughout Western Europe, was, as indicated above, 
NATO's 1979 decision to deploy cruise and Pershing 11 missiles. Edward 
Thompson had responded to the decision with a polemical article in New 
Society (one of a series of six entitled 'The State of the Nation'; 
October-November 1979) and in the New Statesman ('The Doomsday 
Consensus'; 20 December 1979). 30 In early January 1980 he wrote a letter 
to Tony Benn asking him to consider whether the Labour Party could not 
help mobilize a movement against cruise missiles. 31 Tony Benn turned 
down the request. In Ken Coates's account, this was because the Labour 
Party, as a constitutional party, could not be seen to be promoting civil 
disobedience; 32 though he may also have done so because such a campaign, 
as described by Thompson, would have involved Labour cooperating, in 
27 Coates, Listeningfor Peace, 11. 
28 Webb, 'Making History', 22. 
29 Ken Coates, letter to author, 7 March 2001. 
30 Thompson began the New Society series - only a small part of which was about cruise 
missiles - before the NATO decision. Both the New Society and the New Statesman 
articles were republished (in a sub-section tellingly entitled 'Active Neutrality') with other 
essays in Writing by Candlelight, London: Merlin Press, 1980. 
31 The letter is dated 3 January 1980. END Archive. See also Coates, Listeningfor Peace, 
12. 
32 Coates, Listeningfor Peace, 12; Interview with Coates. 
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some kind of official capacity, with a range of organizations and social 
forces to which it was ideologically opposed (for example, Trotskyists and 
Eurocommunists) and over which, in such a campaign, it would have had 
little control. Thompson and Benn copied Coates into the correspondence; 
Coates was also in regular contact with Stuart Holland, the economist and 
left-wing Labour MP who became a leading figure in END in the early 
1980s; and he had talked with the Marxist political thinker Ralph Miliband 
about a campaign against cruise missiles. 33 
In his letter to Benn, Thompson had referred enthusiastically to the 
idea of a "conference around themes of european action against nuclear 
war (possibly neutrality? ) [sic]" - which, he wrote, another leading left- 
wing MP, Eric Heffer, had told him he and Benn were thinking about. The 
idea was "splendid"; and a combination of a national campaign against 
cruise missiles" with a "reaching out to european allies" would create a 
political initiative not seen for two decades (that is, since the demise of 
CND and the 'positive neutrality' initiative in the 1960S. )34 In 'The 
Doomsday Consensus' he revived "the policy of 'active neutrality"' as an 
(. 4 altemative" to NATO policy 35 
The beginning of the END campaign as such can be dated to the 
suggestion made by Ken Coates, in a telephone call to Edward Thompson 
in early January 1980, that there should be a European campaign against 
nuclear weapons the essence of which would be the demand for a nuclear- 
free zone in Europe. 36 Thompson, Coates recalls, "enthusiastically accepted 
this idea". He then wrote an article for The Guardian, 'European Nuclear 
Disarmament', the first published text to outline some of the key features 
of the END approach, or frame (see below). 37 
" Coates, ibid., 12; Interview with Coates. 
34 See Richard Taylor, 'The British Peace Movement and Socialist Change', The Socialist 
Register 1983,135. 
35 Thompson, Writing by Candlelight, 272. 
36 Coates, Listeningfor Peace, 12; Coates, letter to author, 7 March 200 1. See also E. P. 
Thompson, 'Resurgence in Europe', 81. 
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Thompson then also prepared the first draft of what would become 
the END Appeal. The drafting, and circulation of the Appeal over the next 
2-3 months brought together individuals many of whom had personal, 
professional and campaigning ties going back many years; 38 as well as 
organizations: the not just the BRPF, but also CND, the Catholic peace 
organisation Pax Christi; and the International Confederation for 
Disannament and Peace (ICDP), based in London. From the outset, the 
promoters of the initiative were bringing other people into the embryonic 
campaign. This work was done above all by the Russell Foundation. 39 
Mary Kaldor, a defence/peace researcher based at the Science Policy 
Research Unit at Sussex University, recalls that she was first approached 
by Ken Coates, whom she knew through having attended IWC events: "I 
had lots of contact with Ken .... I'd been doing a lot of stuff on defence 
conversion and I'd been working with the Vicker's shop stewards and with 
40 Lucas Aerospace .. they were all connected" . She also knew Stuart 
Holland, who lived in the same building as her in Brighton. Dan Smith also 
recalls being approached by Ken Coates, whom he had met a few times. 41 
Smith and Kaldor already knew each other. As defence analysts, they had 
been members of the Labour Party Defence Study Group and co-authors of 
Sense About Defence. 42 Smith - who was just to bring out a left-wing 
critique of British Defence policy, The Defence of the Realm in the 1980s 43 
- was also a leading figure in CND: he had been its national organizer for 
37 Reprinted as 'European Nuclear Disarmament' in Writing by Candlelight, 277-282. 
38 On the organizations, see Ken Coates, 'For a Nuclear-free Europe', in E. P. Thompson 
and Dan Smith, eds, Protest and Survive, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980,240. 
39 Interview with Dan Smith, 5 August 2003. 
40 Interview with Mary Kaldor, 20 September 2002. 
41 Interview with Dan Smith. 
-32 Sense About Defence. The Report of the Labour Party Defence Study Group, 
London/Melboume/New York: Quartet Books, 1977. 
43 London: Croorn Heim, 1980. 
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six months in 1973; its General Secretary in 1974 and 1975; and, since 
then, a member of its National Council. 
On 12 February, after a meeting between the Thompsons and four 
directors of the BRPF, Ken Coates wrote to a list of left-wing politicians, 
trade unionists, writers, academics, as well as peace activists or 
organizations - mainly in Britain but a handful from abroad - inviting 
them to a meeting on 8 March to discuss Thompson's draft: "the proposal 
for a nuclear-free zone in Europe, from Poland to Portugal". 44 This list 
included Bruce Kent, who, after having been Chair of CND since 1977, 
became its General Secretary in 1979; Pax Christi; Arthur Scargill, the 
president of the National Union of Mineworkers; Peggy Duff, who had 
been CND's first General Secretary, 45 and General Secretary of the ICDP 
since 1964; Ralph Miliband; Robin Cook MP; and also Antonio Bronda, 
Claude Bourdet and Zhores Medvedev. Antonio Bronda was a journalist 
with L'Unita, the Italian Communist Party's daily newspaper; Claude 
Bourdet had been a leading figure in the non-aligned French Left since the 
Second World War, and "one of the main European theoreticians of a 'third 
way' since 1947". 46 His links with the Thompsons and Coates went back 
to the 1950s. 47 Zhores Medvedev was a Soviet bio-chemist in exile since 
the Soviet government had stripped him of his citizenship while he was on 
an officially arranged research trip to Britain. He had close contacts with 
the BRPF. 
44 Letter dated 12 February 1980. (END Archive. ) 
45The ICDP was a non-aligned peace organization founded in 1963 and dissolved in 
1984 when it merged with the International Peace Bureau. See Richard Taylor, Against 
the Bomb. The British Peace Movement 1958-1965, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1988,108-111; April Carter, Peace Movements. International Protest and World Politics 
since 1945, London/New York: Longman, 1992,118. 
46 Jolyon Howorth, France. - The Politics of Peace, London: Merlin Press/END, 1984, 
65-6. 
47 Dorothy Thompson, 'On the Trail of the New Left'; Interview with Coates. 
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Thompson's draft was not only discussed at this meeting - held at 
Friends' Meeting House in the Euston Road in London 48 _ but was also 
circulated more widely for comments - in the UK and elsewhere in 
Europe. In Thompson's words, it was "knocked about and greatly revised, 
to its advantage" by, among others, Dorothy Thompson, Ken Coates, Mary 
Kaldor, Dan Smith, Bruce Kent, Ulrich Albrecht, Claude Bourdet, and 
Zhores Medevedev. 49 (Albrecht, a well-known West German peace 
researcher living in West Berlin, was brought into the growing END 
discussion by Mary Kaldor, who knew him through her work in peace 
research networks. ) 
At the 8 March meeting, following a proposal from Arthur Scargill 
that the Appeal should be addressed to a British audience - "Arthur didn't 
want any messing about with Europe ... 
it didn't exist", Coates later 
commented 50 - it was agreed, as a compromise, that potential signatories 
outside Britain should be asked to endorse not the Appeal itself but an 
accompanying statement. The BRPF circulated the Appeal, in the UK and 
elsewhere in Europe with or without this statement, for signatures from 
March 51 (Which is why, in parts of continental Europe, the document 
became known as the 'Russell Appeal'. ) The second large meeting to 
discuss the appeal, and the accompanying campaign, took place on 27 
April in the Polytechnic of Central London building in the Marylebone 
Road. By this stage hundreds of signatures, in Britain and abroad, had 
already been gathered. The signatures were presented at the public launch 
of the Appeal at a press conference in the House of Commons on 28 April 
48 Richard Winkler, 'END comes to the UK', New Statesman 14 March 1980,380. There 
were other, smaller, meetings. See interview with Dan Smith; Coates letter 12 February 
1980. 
49 Accounts are given in: E. P. Thompson, 'Resurgence in Europe', 8 1, and Double 
Exposure, I Off, and in Ken Coates, 'For a Nuclear-free Europe', 240, and in Listeningfor 
Peace, 12-14. 
50 
Interview with Coates. 
51 E. P. Thompson, 'Wave of Consciousness to Sink the Warmongers' The Guardian, 28 
April 1980. Other ENDers did the same, though on a smaller scale. 
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1980. Other launch meetings were held simultaneously in Oslo, Paris, 
Berlin, and Lisbon. The European Nuclear Disarmament campaign had 
beenlaunched. 
The END frame 
With the drafting of the END Appeal its authors established a consensus. 
This consensus was, in its most succinct form, the END 'frame'. 
Signatories to the Appeal expressed their agreement with this frame. 
However, though the clearest statement of the aims to which British END 
subscribed, the END Appeal did not contain the last word on British 
END's goals, nor on those of the people and groups who signed it. Written 
by many hands (even if E. P. Thompson's is the most evident), the 
document was a compromise, as one of its authors, Ken Coates, has 
argued. 52 END activists could and did interpret the document differently, or 
emphasised some passages over others: in so doing they were stating, 
implicitly or explicitly, that they supported some, but not all, of the aims 
contained in the Appeal, or thought some more important than others. 
The fact that the Appeal and the approach it sketched out could be 
interpreted differently became most evident in the East-West work of the 
peace movement. Amongst those groups and individuals campaigning in 
END terms - the END 'current' institutionalised above all in the 
international END Convention 'process' - there were three approaches to 
East-West campaigning, all within the END framework: one - 'twin- 
track' - approach which prioritised the dialogue with independent forces 
but nevertheless sought to maintain a relationship with state bodies; 
another which was sceptical of the value of this dialogue and concentrated 
on relations with 'officials'; and a third which focussed on the relationship 
with independent groups and largely ignored official bodies such as the 
peace committees. British END subscribed broadly to the first approach 
but, amongst the founders of the group, those associated with the Bertrand 
Russell Peace Foundation pursued the second. 
52 
Interview wit Ken Coates. 
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I first describe the basic END 'frame' as presented in the END 
Appeal. I then show how Edward Thompson, British END's most 
influential campaigner, presented a fuller version of the END approach in 
early essays. 
The END Appeal 
The END Appeal is an important document not just because it expressed an 
agreement amongst a group of activists in early 1980. It is significant 
because, throughout the decade, it provided, in outline form, the political 
framework for END campaigning - and it did so because END 
campaigners explicitly recognised it as such a framework. For example, 
when British END became a membership organization in 1985, its 
membership form required potential members to sign the statement "I 
would like to join END. I endorse the END Appeal". Taking part in the 
END Convention Liaison Committee, and attendance as a full participant 
in the END Conventions themselves, was also dependent on one's 
endorsing the Appeal (or a statement expressing support for it [see aboveJ) 
When the Hungarian Peace Council decided to become involved in the 
END Convention process in 1987, it did so by signing the END Appeal. 
The END Appeal outlined an approach to peace campaigning quite 
different to that of other parts of the peace movement. CND's constitution, 
for example, while it had an internationalist element, framed the nuclear 
weapons problem as one that could be solved first by national, British, 
action. The END Appeal, by contrast, presented a pan-European approach 
that addressed the political underpinning of the nuclear arms race, the Cold 
War. 
The Appeal diagnoses a problem, proposes a solution to it, 
specifies an agents of the solution, and offers a rationale for why people 
should effect the solution. The fundamental stance it takes is that of 'non- 
alignment': that is, opposition to both sides in the Cold War. "We do not 
wish to apportion guilt between the political and military leaders of East 
and West. Guilt lies squarely upon both parties. " 
50 
The main problem - the threat - is the nuclear arms race, 
participation in which is driving both sides - NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
- to develop ever more usable nuclear weapons, as well as strategies that 
make 'limited' nuclear war more plausible. The increasing expenditure on 
the arms race exacerbates social and political strain, which "feeds upon the 
instability of the world economy and vice versa". The consequence of all 
this: that "a third world war is not merely possible, but increasingly 
likely". 53 
But it is not only the nuclear arms race that threatens. Though the 
phrase is not used in the Appeal, the fundamental problem is the Cold War, 
the whole confrontation - military, political, economic - between East and 
West. One aspect of this fundamental problem is that Europe is divided, 
people and ideas cannot travel freely within and across the blocs, and, on 
each side, as the "powers of the military and internal security forces are 
enlarged ... [the] civil rights of 
independent-minded individuals are 
threatened". In other words, the East-West conflict not only makes 
nuclear war more likely; it leads directly to curtailments of civil liberties on 
both sides. 
The solution has various elements. The first is to make "the entire 
territory of Europe, from Poland to Portugal" a nuclear-weapons-free-zone: 
"to free [Europe] from nuclear weapons" and all related facilities. The 
statement asks the superpowers to freeze their respective intermediate- 
range nuclear weapons programmes: the Soviet Union should "halt 
production" of the SS-20 ; the USA should not "implement the decision to 
develop cruise missiles and Pershing 11 missiles for deployment in Western 
Europe". And the authors of the Appeal "urge" the ratification of the SALT 
11 Treaty. 
The Appeal contains objectives that are even more ambitious: 
freeing "Europe from confrontation, ... [enforcing] 
detente between the 
" All quotations from END Appeal from 'Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament', 
223-226. 
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United States and the Soviet Union, and, ultimately, ... [dissolving] both 
great power alliances": in short, ending the Cold War. 
What would be the means to these ends? A "European-wide 
campaign" of popular protest. The Appeal's authors "do not wish to 
impose uniformity" on the movement; on the contrary, it "will be the 
responsibility of the people of each nation ... to decide upon its own 
means and strategy". But "this must be part of a "trans-continental 
movement" in which "every kind of exchange takes place; in which 
representatives of different nations and opinions confer and co-ordinate 
their activities'; and in which "less formal exchanges" between institutions, 
groups and individuals take place. The "common object" of these 
(exchanges': "to free all of Europe from nuclear weapons". 
The Appeal commits its signatories to "defend[ing] and extend[ing] 
the rights of all citizens, East and West, to take part in this common 
movement and to engage in every kind of exchange" - in other words, 
actively to defend the civil liberties of people, including in the Soviet bloc, 
who wish to take part in this movement. 
The Appeal offers a vision of what a Europe not marked by nuclear 
weapons could look like. It does so in a passage that is strongly 
'antipolitical' (and the style of which suggests it was written by Edward 
Thompson). This passage elevates the ties between people (and peoples) 
above those between states, and asks readers to pre-figure, in their actions, 
the goal for which they are aiming: 
We must commence to act as if a united, neutral and pacific Europe 
already exists. We must learn to be loyal, not to 'East' or 'West', 
but to each other, and we must disregard the prohibitions and 
limitations imposed by any national state. 
Finally, the rationale for this action is contained in the diagnosis of 
the problem: that the nuclear arms specifically, and the Cold War, not only 
threaten war in the near future, but also, in the present, suppress the civil 
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rights of people in Europe. Only by taking action themselves can 
Europeans free themselves from these burdens. 
The END approach was expressed not only in the Appeal, but also 
in the writings of some of its best-known activists, as well as in some of the 
actions of END supporters. To know END, one has to understand the 
messages contained in its texts. Essays, articles, and full-length books by 
Mary Kaldor, Ken Coates, Dan Smith, and other END activists throughout 
the 1980s laid out a broad END approach. The best-known writings, and 
the most influential at the time, however, were those of Edward Thompson. 
Many END activists have testified to the influence of Thompson's 
writings. Mary Kaldor later described Protest and Survive and the END 
Appeal as the "inspirational documents" at this time; Lynne Jones has 
written of the profound impact that this essay had on her; and James 
Hinton, an early END activist and a leading figure in CND, later wrote that 
it "served to unlock the imagination of at least one inert activist 
, 54 (myselff . 
In response to a question about how people had become interested 
in END in a survey of END supporters conducted in 1982,14 per cent 
mentioned newspaper articles and 15 per cent books, in both categories 
often those by E. P. Thompson. In addition, 32 per cent mentioned 
Thompson specifically as the reason, about which one of the organizers of 
the survey commented, "since he didn't have a separate category on the 
questionnaire it is likely that the true number is much higher. .. 
". 55 This 
does not mean, of course, that everyone inspired by Thompson agreed with 
his every word; but it does indicate that he was the single most influential 
thinker in END. 
54 Interview with Mary Kaldor, 20 June 2002; Lynne Jones, 'Time for a Change', END 
Journal 28/29, Summer 1987,17; Interviews with Lynne Jones; Hinton, Protests & 
Visions, 184; Interview with James Hinton, 21 June 2001. 
55 Peter Nias, 'END Supporters' Survey Report', 18 December 1982, unpublished.; and 
Carol Freeman, 'Report based on the END Supporters' Survey 1982', unpublished. Both 
END Archive. 
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Edward Thompson 
Thompson presented his own response to the 'Second' Cold War in various 
essays and articles published in the period 1979-91. Amongst the most 
influential were those written at the start of the decade: Protest and Survive 
and 'Notes on Exterminism, the Last Stage of Civilization' - written in 
April and May 1980, respectively - and Beyond the Cold War, published in 
56 
early 1982 . The tone, style and content of these essays differs, but they 
(with later essays) can be treated as expressions, with variations, of a single 
'take' on the Cold War. 
The Cold War - the "fulcrum upon which power turns ... 
in the 
world" and whose centre is in Europe - 
57 he writes in "Notes", has 
reached a state of 'exterminism'. Exterminism has, in both superpowers' 
societies, an "institutional base": this is the "weapons system" and its 
"entire economic, scientific, political and ideological support-system - the 
social system which researches it, 'chooses' it, produces it, polices it, 
justifies it, and maintains it in being". This "'leading sector' (weapons 
systems and their supports)" may not be highly visible, but it "stamps its 
priorities on the society as a whole", and " inflects the direction of 
growth". 58 So the USA and the USSR do not have military-industrial 
complexes", Thompson states - that term suggests the "evil ... can be 
restrained". Rather, they are such complexes": the "contamination, issuing 
from them permeates the "whole societal body". 
It is from these "bases deeply enstructured within the opposed 
powers" that the inertia arises that propels the Cold War forward. In both 
the US and the Soviet Union the choices that the political and military 
elites make are, partly, determined by developments in the weapons and 
factories. In the US "pressure rises upwards from the laboratories and the 
56 Edward Thompson, Protest and Survive, London/Nottingham: Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament/Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1980; 'Notes on Exterminism, the Last 
Stage of Civilization', republished in E. P. Thompson et al, Exterminism and Cold War, 
London: Verso, 1982,1-33; Beyond the Cold War, London: Merlin Press/END, 1982. 
57 Thompson, 'Notes', I 
Ibid., 22. 
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strategic war-games simulation room to NATO planning committees ... to 
the United States Secretary for Defence". 59 In the Soviet Union, the 
political elite's "decision" to pursue nuclear parity with the USA was taken 
under pressure from both ideological and bureaucratic. In both states 
politics "may be militarized: and decisions about weaponry impose the 
political choices of tomorrow". 60 
Thompson is not arguing that there are "structural symmetries in 
the opposed superpowers". If a symmetry is becoming apparent in the early 
1980s, it is "consequence and not causation". 61 On the contrary, at various 
points in his essays, Thompson emphasizes the differences between the two 
Cold War rivals. In Protest and Survive he writes that the United States 
"seems to ... be 
dangerous and provocative in its general military and 
diplomatic strategies, which press around the Soviet Union with menacing 
bases. It is in Washington, rather than in Moscow, that scenarios are 
dreamed up for 'theatre' wars; and it is in America that the "alchemists" of 
superkill, the clever technologists of "advantage and ultimate weapons", 
are found. 62 And, despite the obvious irritation he feels towards the 
"Marxist left" and its "immobilism" in relation to the Cold War, in 'Notes' 
he characterizes the particular nature of the US's contribution to the Cold 
War in (albeit necessarily simple) Marxist terms: a "strong contributory 
thrust to extenninism comes from the non-nal dynamics of gigantic 
capitalist enterprise". In addition, "one can observe a collective capitalist 
General Will for survival or expansion. " 
The "basic postures of the Soviet Union", by contrast (in an 
analysis which also echoes those of some of his left-wing disputants, who 
see the USA as the protagonist in the Cold War, the Soviet Union 
essentially as a reactive antagonist), "seem to me, still, to be those of siege 
59 Ibid., 9. 
60 Ibid., 7. 
6'E. P. Thompson, 'Europe, the Weak Link in the Cold War', in E. P. Thompson et al, 
Exterminisin and Cold War, London: Verso, 1982,335. 
62 Thompson, Protest and Survive, 25. 
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and aggressive defence". 63 On the Soviet side, the "incremental thrust ... 
towards exterminism is not aggressive and invasive, but ... 
ideological and 
bureaucratic". 64 
But if the two main participants in the Cold War are pushed by 
different forces, they are not only closely linked by, but to an extent their 
differences are subsumed under, their shared dependence on the Cold War: 
"the ruling groups [have] come to need perpetual war crisis to legitimate 
their rule, their privileges and their priorities; to silence dissent; to exercise 
some discipline; and to divert attention from the manifest irrationality of 
the operation". The Soviet Union and the USA need the Cold War and so 
each other; they are addicted to 'exterminism'. 65 
This mutual dependence is what makes the Cold War a "reciprocal 
and inter-active process". Its "inner dynamic" - each move by one 
adversary being matched by the other - determines that the Cold War's 
"military and security establishments are seýflreproducing. Their missiles 
summon forward our missiles which summon their missiles in turn. 
NATO"s hawks feed the hawks of the Warsaw bloc". 66 "Reciprocal" and 
"reciprocity" are key terms in Thompson"s writings. They "disclose", he 
argues, "not a categorical definition but a historical process of mutual 
formation: reciprocity (and mutual incitement) in weaponry, ideological 
hostilities, internal security, control of satellites and client states, and so 
forth". 67 
Within this logic of reciprocity, ideology plays a key role. Indeed, 
"ideology, as much as profit-making and bureaucratic growth, has motored 
the increment of weaponry". 68 c6 More than military-industrial pressures", 
63 
lbid, 70. 
64 Thompson, 'Notes', 19. 
65 
Ibid., 22. 
66 Ibid., 17. 
67 E. P. Thompson, 'The Ends of Cold War', New Left Review 182, July-August 1990, 
139. 
68 Thompson, 'Notes', 22. 
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he later wrote, ideology is the "driving-motor of Cold War Il". 69 In the 
United States there is anti-Communism: the idea that "the United States is 
the leader of "the Free World", and the Commies are the Other" . 
70 In the 
Soviet Union, there is the notion that that country is "the heartland of the 
world"s first socialist revolution, threatened by the Other - Western 
imperialism, in alliance with 1,000 million Chinese" .71 The 
intensity and 
effect of ideology is not identical in each camp: in the Soviet Union, he 
implies, ideology"s disciplinary function is greater; and it is "supplemented 
9 72 by more powerful and more intrusive security forces' . But though 
different in content and effect, in function the two camps" ideologies are 
the same, and in three ways: they motivate "war preparations", legitimate 
"the privileged status of the armourers", and police "internal dissent". 73 In 
addition -a modification of the last point - ideologies play a crucial role in 
bonding their respective populations together. 74 These last two functions 
also take place at the bloc level: ideology serves to keep in line the client 
states of the two superpowers. 75 These similarities in function may be why 
Thompson, in his discussion of both blocs simply refers to one 
phenomenon, "Cold War ideology". 76 
Thompson's contrasts his picture of the East-West conflict with two 
others, each of which proposes that the Cold War is marked by rationality. 
The "action-reaction" model implies that "the decisions of leaders actually 
detennined force structure and that the leaders" orders were carried out by 
69 E. P. Thompson, 'America and the War Movement', in The Heavy Dancers, London: 
Merlin Press, 1985,44. 
70 Thompson, Beyond the Cold War, 20. 
71 Ibid., 21. 
71 Ibid., 22. 
73 Thompson, 'Notes', 23. 
74 Thompson, Beyond the Cold War, 2 1. 
" Ibid., 19. 
76 
Ibid., 21. 
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the military bureaucracy "; it further implies that "'the leaders of each side 
[react] rationally to the behaviour of the other side"'77 .A Marxist analysis, 
for its part, "commonly" ascribes the "'cause' of the Cold War to the evil 
will of 'imperialism ... ; 78 it analyses events "in terms of imperialism's 
supposed "rationality". 79 In addition, Marxist analysts, with their over- 
attention to historical causes, actually prevent one from explaining the 
contemporary Cold War: "the Cold War today, in its military and 
ideological emplacements and ritual confrontations, cannot be explained by 
returning again and again to its origins and allocating blame"; 80 for "a river 
gathers up many tributaries on its way, and turns into unexpected 
courses 581 . The present, Thompson seems to be arguing, 
is historically 
formed and thus can be subjected to rational analysis; but such a rational 
analysis might not see that the "object of analysis" is, in fact, "irrational": 
if ("we drill all this in too tidy a logical formation we will be unprepared for 
the irrationality of the event". 82 Moreover, while, at earlier points in the 
Cold War - say, in its first years - "rational self-interest" might have 
driven the actions of the relevant elites, 83 this is no longer so. 
What, then, is to be done, in the face of this qualitatively new 
threat? In 'Notes' Thompson only briefly sketches the outline of an "anti- 
exterminist configuration": a popular movement of opposition to the Cold 
War, the "most critical and decisive point" of which may be to "engage in 
delicate and non-provocative work to form alliances between the peace 
movement in the West and constructive elements in the Communist world. 
. which confront the exterminist structures and 
ideology of their own 
77 Deborah Shapley, 'Arms Control as a Regulator of Military Technology', Daedalus 
109, Winter 1980, quoted in Thompson, 'Notes', 5. 
78 
Thompson, 'Notes', 2. 
79 
Ibid., 3. 
80 Thompson, 'Europe, the Weak Link', 341. 
81 Thompson, Beyond the Cold War, 9. 
82 
Thompson, 'Notes', I. 
8' Thompson, 'America and the War Movement', 44. 
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nations". 84 His relative silence on this matter, as he later suggested, can be 
attributed to the fact that the forces, in West and East, in which he placed 
his hopes, were visible only barely or not all . 
85 Similarly, the best-selling 
Protest and Survive contained only a few pages at the end on the 
"alternative logic", the "opposition at every level of society" which would 
have to be generated . 
86 (Though the tone of these passages - written at the 
same time as their counterparts in "Notes" - are more optimistic and 
enthusiastic than the latter; so perhaps Thompson"s pessimism waxed and 
waned by the week. ) 
In Beyond the Cold War Thompson outlined at more length a 
strategy for ending the Cold War. Here he presented a vision of a 'trans- 
continental movement' against the Cold War. Written in late 1981 as a 
lecture, the relative optimism of Beyond the Cold War reflects the fact that, 
throughout Western Europe, huge national, and internationally linked, 
peace movements had emerged; and that, in the East, the Western peace 
movements had had their first positive response from an "independent" 
group: on 15 November 1981 the Czechoslovak human rights group 
Charter 77 had issued a "Statement on West European Peace Movements", 
which, though by no means a simple endorsement of these movements, was 
wann and positive in tone. (See Chapter 6. ) For the first time since the 
writing of the END Appeal, it seemed to Thompson that the emergence of 
some kind of "trans-continental" force might be possible: "something 
remarkable is stirring in this continent today ... For the 
first time since the 
wartime Resistance there is a spirit abroad in Europe which carries a trans- 
continental aspiration". 87 Thompson points to the political significance of 
governments in East and West creating "nuclear-free zones": these "make a 
space of lessened tension between the two blocs ... and ... loosen the 
84 
Thompson, 'Notes', 28-29. 
85Thompson, 'Europe, the Weak Link', 329-330. 
86 Thompson, Protest and Survive, 30. 
87 Thompson, Beyond the Cold War, 27. 
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bonds of the bloc system, allowing more autonomy, more initiative to the 
smaller states. " But his attention is focussed above all on what people, not 
states, are doing and can do: "we can glimpse", he argues, "a detente of 
peoples rather than states -a movement of peoples which sometimes 
dislodges states from their blocs and brings them into a new diplomacy of 
conciliation, .. which sometimes defies the ideological and security 
structures of particular states". Only this movement can end the Cold War: 
"[i]t is, precisely, at the top of the Cold War systems that deadlock, or 
worse, takes place. If we are to destructure the Cold War, then we must 
destabilise these systems from below". 88 This "people"s detente", he spells 
out here, must entail the Western peace movement and the Eastern 
"movement .... for freedom" recognizing "each other as natural allies". 
On one level, arguably, this cross-bloc alliance is proposed for 
nstrumental reasons: if movements East and West opposing the Cold War 
appeared only in one half of the continent, they would - however 
immediately effective their work - be dismissed as agents of the other side, 
and so contained. A cross-bloc alliance was the key to the success of a pan- 
European network of anti-exterminist movements: "So long as each bloc"s 
resistance movement can be categorized as the "ally" of the other" he 
wrote in "Notes", "extenninism .... will be able to police its own territory, 
reassert ideological control, and, eventually, resume its thrust. , 89 Yet there 
is also an enthusiastic non-instrumental commitment to an undivided 
Europe, to the "reunification of European political culture". 90 
Thompson sometimes describes this trans-continental movement 
differently. In Beyond the Cold War he recognizes that the challenge being 
posed to "Atlanticist dogma" in the early 1980s by the "grumblers and 
third wayers" in West European Social Democracy is an expression of the 
tensions in the West which would contribute to such a movement. 91 But 
88 Ibid, 30-3 1 
89 Ibid., 29. 
90 Thompson, Beyond the Cold War, 30. 
91 Ibid., 16. 
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he argues (in a friendly tone) that the "transcontinental discourse" is the 
work of citizens, not politicians: "I am talking of a new kind of politics 
which cannot (with however much goodwill) be conducted by politicians. 
It must be a politics of peace, informed by a new internationalist code of 
honour, conducted by citizens. 9992 In "Notes" by contrast, he opens his arms 
to take in at least some political party activists: 
Only an alliance which takes in churches, Eurocommunists, 
Labourists, East European dissidents (and not only "dissidents"), 
Soviet citizens unmediated by Party structures, trade unionists, 
ecologists ... can possibly muster the force and the internationalist 
elan to throw the cruise missiles and the SS-20s back. 
These differences are not 'contradictions'. In both cases Thompson 
envisages a movement that is opposed to blocs, states, and governments. 
The differences can perhaps be explained by reference to the audience 
Thompson was addressing: in Beyond the Cold War a peace movement 
lecture audience and readership whose 'strength' - to quote from his 
address to the huge CND demonstration on 24 October 1981 - Thompson 
wanted them to feel; in 'Notes' in part a 'Marxist Left' whose sectarian 
rejection of alliances with 'class enemies' such as 'Christians, neutralists 
[and] pacifists' he wanted to confront. 93 Yet these differences nevertheless 
point, arguably, to a tension not only in Thompson's strategy for ending the 
Cold War but in that of END as a whole: namely, that between envisaging 
the 'trans-continental movement' as, on the one hand, an 'antipolitical' 
alliance of 'civil societies', of citizens outside state and political party 
structures; and, on the other, an alliance of such citizens and also forces 
within political parties. 
9' Ibid., 3 1. 
93 Thompson, 'Notes', 30. 
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With the launch of the END Appeal what one might regard as the first 
phase of END's work was over. The Russell Foundation and others had 
been collecting signatures, and drawing people into the campaign, since 
March. But the Appeal launch is the point at which, with the formal 
announcement of END's existence, the founders of the END initiative 
turned outward to an even bigger potential audience. They now set about 
trying to help create the pan-European movement the statement had called 
for. 
From now on, British END activists would focus on three regions 
(in campaigns that were often interlinked). In the UK, they tried to create a 
network of END groups and END-supporting individuals as well as to 
influence both other parts of the peace movement and institutions outside 
the movement (such as the Labour Party). In Western Europe (including 
the UK), they tried to help build links between movements and other 
institutions across the region. In CEE/SU they engaged in dialogue with 
'independent' groups and individuals as well as with state bodies while 
trying to help promote such dialogue elsewhere in the movement. In order 
to do so, they had to create and sustain an organizational presence in the 
UK and exploit internal and external resources. In the next chapter I will 
examine British END's organizational capacity and its impact on END 
campaigning in Britain and abroad. 
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Chapter 3 
Organization and Resources 
END Supporters/Members 
The nature of END's work was shaped partly by the kinds of people who 
campaigned under the END banner. In order to understand END, therefore, one 
must first know something about the characteristics of these people. 
Some of these characteristics were revealed in a survey conducted in the 
summer of 1982. The survey was carried out by Peter Nias, a trained market 
researcher and at the time an MA student in the Department of Peace Studies at 
Bradford University. ' It was sent out to the 700 subscribers of the END Bulletin in 
the May-June 1982 (no. 9) issue of the magazine. Two hundred and twenty 
completed questionnaires were returned (31.5 per cent). This response "[b]ecause 
of the rather anonymous way of delivering ... was considered to be excellent". 
2 
Where appropriate - in order to highlight the peculiarities of END supporters -I 
compare the results of this survey of END supporters with those of a postal 
national membership survey Nias conducted of CND members in autumn 1985. 
Paul Byme analysed the results of this survey in his 1988 study The Campaignfor 
Nuclear Disarmament. 
Nias used slightly different sampling methods for his 1982 END survey, on 
the one hand, and his 1985 CND survey, on the other: the former, as we have seen, 
went to all recipients of one issue of the END Bulletin; the CND survey 
questionnaires went to 1011 randomly generated national CND members (the 
latter were 10 per cent of the total). 3 However, Byme states not only that, 'in 
1 Peter Nias, 'END Supporters' Survey Report'; Carol Freeman, 'Report based on the END 
Supporters Survey 1982'. Both unpublished. END Archive. In the END survey, the percentages in 
most categories add up to more or less than 100 per cent. In some cases this is because respondents 
could tick more than one answer; in other cases one must assume it is either because percentages 
have been rounded up or because the survey analysts have left out 'don't-knows' or blank answers. 
2 With a "sample error on the whole sample" of +/- 7 per cent, the results, Nias wrote, "could be 
applied to END Supporters as a whole within that 'safety' margin. " Ibid. 
3 Byrne, The Campaignfor Nuclear Disarmament, 235. He received 620 replies, a response of 61 
per cent. He also indicates that his survey has a sample error of +/- 4 per cent. 
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general terms, all three ... previous surveys 
[of CND: by Frank Parkin in mid- 
1960s; Richard Taylor and Colin Pritchard in late 1970s; and by Nias in 1982 4] 
produced very similar findings', but also that the 'massive influx of new members' 
to CND between 1982 [when Nias conducted his first survey] and 1985 [the second 
one] 'had little or no impact on the character and nature of the movement'. 5 Also, 
there is no reason to assume that the characteristics of British END supporters 
changed after 1982. For these reasons it seems acceptable provisionally to compare 
the results of the 1982 END survey with that of national CND members in 1985. 
The END 'idea' attracted support from a noticeably older group than did 
CND's campaign. None of END's supporters were under 16; and only 7 per cent 
were aged between 17 and 24. The single largest number (43 per cent) were aged 
25-40. Altogether 51 per cent were over 41 (41-59: 26 per cent; 60+: 25 per cent. ) 
Of CND's national membership in 1985, by contrast, 4 per cent were under 16; 20 
per cent aged 17-24; 47 per cent 25-40; and only 29 per cent of whom were over 
41 (41- 49: 17 per cent; 60+: 12 per cent). 
British END was also noticeably more male than CND: 67 per cent of its 
supporters were men, 33 per cent women. CND's national membership, by 
contrast, was split almost exactly 50-50 between men and women. 
British END supporters were very well-educated: 19 per cent "left full-time 
education" aged 18 or younger; 38 per cent aged 19-22, which, the survey report's 
author states, "means that that they have some form of higher education"; and 40 
per cent finished their education after the age of 23, "which would non-nally mean 
that they had some form of post-graduate education". 6 In all, 78 per cent of British 
END supporters appear to have had some kind of higher education. 
Twenty-one per cent of British END supporters were teachers; 31 per cent 
were in "higher education, either as lecturers, professors, or researchers". That is, 
altogether 51 per cent worked in education. (Thirty two per cent were 
4 Frank Parkin's informed his analysis of CND published in 1968 as Middle Class Radicalism 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1968); for Richard Taylor's and Colin Pritchard's, see 
their The Protest Makers (Pergamon, 1980). 
5 Byrne, The Canipaignfor Nuclear Disarmament, 56-57. 
6 These figures leave 3 per cent of British END's supporters unaccounted for. See footnote 1. 
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17 "professionals in other fields" and 14 per cent were in "unskilled jobs . The rest 
were divided between working in the peace movement [3 per cent], in politics [1 
per cent], for the church [2 per cent], and "in some form of community action" [I 
per cent]. 8) 
The reasons people gave for being interested in END also reflected the 
strong academic or intellectual nature of END's 'supportership'. Fourteen per cent 
mentioned newspaper articles and 15 per cent books. 
END supporters in Britain, in other words, were highly educated, and many 
worked in education. (John Sandford, an END activist from 1980 [and a lecturer in 
German at the University of Reading] recalls that END, which had a "particularly 
strong constituency in academic and intellectual circles", was "[v]ariously - and 
perhaps not entirely fairly - apostrophised as 'Egghead CND' and 'PhD CND'. 
9 
At least 83 per cent worked in middle-class professions (if one assumes that 
"professionals in other fields" were in middle-class occupations). 
One must be cautious comparing the above figures about END with those 
for the educational levels and the occupations of national CND members as 
Nias/Byme seem to have asked slightly different questions about education and 
uses somewhat different categories for occupation. 10 Nevertheless a comparison 
7 It is not unclear to what this category refers (and how it would have been understood by 
respondents). 
8 Which comes to 104 per cent. See footnote I 
9 John Sandford, 'Mutual (Mis-)Perceptions: The GDR and the British Peace Movement in the 
1980s', unpublished draft, 2001,4. 
'0 Education While the British END survey seems to have asked only when respondents' education 
ended, the 1985 CND survey asked respondents first if they were a school pupil or a student; if 
neither, when their full-time education ended; and if they held a diploma or degree. See Byrrie, The 
Campaignfor Nuclear Disarmament, 236. 
Occupation. Byrne's categories for the answers to the questions about occupation and 
employment and the British END survey report categories are as follows: 
ByrneICND 1985 British END Survey 
Education Higher education 
--------- Secondary education (teachers) 
Other professional Professionals in other fields 
Caring ------- 
Scientific ------ 
Skilled manual ------ 
Manual In unskilled jobs 
-------- Work for the peace movement 
-------- Work in the church 
------- In politics 
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can be made. Byrne concludes that 57 per cent of CND members had 'either a 
degree or a diploma' (he doesn't ask if the qualification is post-graduate), 
compared with 78 per cent of British END supporters. Byrne classifies 63 per cent 
of CND's members as having (had) middle-class occupations (compared to British 
END's 83 per cent) -- of these, 25 per cent were in education (though he doesn't 
distinguish between secondary and higher education); 22 per cent were in 'other 
professional' occupations'; 13 per cent worked in 'caring'; and 3 per cent in 
scientific occupations. Of the remainder, he classifies 15 per cent as 'skilled 
manual'; and 4 per cent as 'manual'. 
One can conclude from these figures that, if CND was 'middle-aged, 
middle-class, and well-educated', British END was even more so; it 'exaggerated' 
what Byrne identifies as the social characteristics of CND. 11 
The strongly academic/intellectual nature of British END can be explained 
in two ways. First by reference to the 'academic' character of much of the END 
material: while the END Appeal was short and succinct, much of what END 
activists wrote -from Edward Thompson's Protest and Survive and 'Notes on 
Exterminism' or the END Special Reports, to many of the articles in the END 
Journal - was often dense and demanding and assumed a fair amount of prior 
knowledge. END would therefore have attracted activists who were drawn to, or at 
ease with, such material. Secondly, and relatedly, because of the networks of which 
both the founders and later activists were a part and along which they mobilized 
support for END: Dorothy Thompson, for example, with Jolyon Howorth of the 
French Department at the University of Aston, and John Sandford were extremely 
active in getting the Higher Education Lateral Committee off the ground in 1980. 
Universities and polytechnics were important 'feeder organizations' in the 
founding (and reproduction) of END. 
Community action 
On government work schemes 
No response 
11 Byrne, The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 5 6. 
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END SupporterslMembers as Resources 
The kind of activists that made up British END - highly educated, many working 
in education, and a high proportion of these in higher education - meant that 
certain types of resources were common in END: these included specialist 
knowledge, for example of defence, or of the history and politics of particular 
countries, such as France or West Germany, those in Central Eastern Europe, or the 
Soviet Union (SU); familiarity with foreign languages, or an ability to learn them; 
and experience in research and writing. For these reasons, it is not surprising that 
so much of British END's campaigning consisted of disseminating information and 
analyses in written form (see below). 
The 'academic' nature of END is also reflected in the time and energy 
devoted to discussion meetings: for example, from 1984, the 'quarterlys', all-day 
meetings, held every 3 to 4 months, at which END supporters would discuss 
strategic issues in depth: for example, on the future of NATO; or on END's 
relations with CEE/SU. 
Set up as an 'idea', not as a demonstration-organizing kind of campaign 
(though it did do some of this), END attracted many activists who felt happiest 
discussing and disseminating ideas; this in turn meant that END would most easily 
reach those people for whom the diffusion and discussion of ideas was a central 
part of their peace campaigning. Arguably, the age of END supporters is an 
explanatory factor here: older campaigners are more likely to be attracted to a 
group whose activities consist mainly of writing, publishing, and talking. 
These were not, however, the only resources within British END; and END 
was by no means only a publications and discussion group. There were plenty of 
people in the group with experience of, and skills in arranging, actions. From the 
outset, British END's campaigning also consisted of public meetings, rallies, 
pickets, petition-circulating, and solidarity actions. I look at these in later chapters. 
None of this is to say that ideas and strategic discussion were - by 
comparison - not a feature of CND's work, at the national, regional, or local, level, 
or indeed of other peace groups. On the contrary, CND could and did draw on a 
wide range of expertise -in defence and foreign policy, for example - in 
formulating its case; and it used its publications to make some of this expertise 
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available to a wider audience. it is simply to point out that the discussion and 
dissemination of ideas made up a much larger higher proportion END's activity 
than of CND's. 
'We are not an organisation, but an ideal 
An important decision which the founders of END had to take was about the 
organizational shape of END. Social movements, or the organizations which 
comprise them, in Britain in the post-World War 11 period have adopted various 
organizational forms, each of which has, arguably, reflected both the cultural 
values and aims of the particular movement and encouraged a particular style of 
campaigning. The Gay Liberation Front in 1971-72, for example, was a loosely 
structured, 'flat', network of self-organizing groups or networks, each made up of 
gays and lesbians who wanted to campaign in a style that suited them. There was 
no central steering committee. The organizational structure of the GLF, such as it 
was, reflected - indeed stated - both the movement's place in the 'counter-culture', 
its emphasis on changing societal values rather than government policy, and its 
commitment to openness; and it encouraged self-organization and self-expression 
in campaigning. 12 
CND in the 1980s, by contrast, was, in organizational terms, a hybrid. 13 On 
the one hand, its structure - with, for example, national members, an annual 
conference, and a National Council - resembled that of a political party. This in 
part reflected CND's links with the organized left (above all, in CND's wilderness 
years in the late 1960s and the 1970s, with the Communist Party), as well as the 
fact that one of its roles was as a pressure group in the political process. At the 
same time, local CND groups had a lot of autonomy to campaign as they saw fit. 
This reflected the fact that these groups had emerged independently of national 
CND. 
In principle the founders of END were faced with a choice between creating 
either a national membership organization with some kind of democratic structure, 
12 See Lent, British Social Movement since 1945,78 ff. 
13 See Byrne, The Campaignfor Nuclear Disarmament 81-2. 
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or a non-membership organization. 14 They opted for the latter: in an internal memo 
of April 1980 Edward Thompson wrote that it had "never been proposed that END 
should appear as a distinct organisation, with its own local branches, membership, 
&C. ", 5 
Ken Coates later described the choice as being between the first alternative 
and a federation of the organizations that had come together to launch the initiative: 
CND, the BRPF, and the ICDP- 16 In 1981 E. P. Thompson described the END 
committee as a "coalition of several movements". 17 While this might have been a 
more or less accurate description of END at that point (though one would have to 
point out that that even then some founders of END - for example the Thompsons 
themselves - were on the committee as individuals, not as representatives of other 
organizations) it would not have been later on: as END established its own identity, 
activists on its various committees and groups were, increasingly, just END 
activists. 
Why did END's founders not want to set up a new membership 
organization? To have done so might have (if significant numbers had joined) 
given END more (or more regularly available) resources, both 'tangible' and 
'intangible'; it might also have given END a greater presence, and therefore more 
influence, in the British peace movement. There are various possible reasons for 
this decision. END's founders may have wanted to concentrate not on 
organizational matters but on what they were good at: pushing ideas - the END 
'idea' - through talking, writing and publishing, and giving speeches. The words of 
leading END figures in the editorial of the third issue of the END Bulletin (October 
1980) suggest as much: "We are not an organisation, but an idea. " In his April 
14 See interviews with Dan Smith and Mary Kaldor. A membership organization on the British left 
in this period would almost certainly have had to have a formal, democratic structure. 
15 'END - the Next Steps: a Discussion Paper'. Internal memo. Reprinted, with cuts, as 'Thinking 
About the New Movement', END Bulletin 1,1980,13. 
16 'Memo on Relations Between END and the Russell Foundation, with Comments on Dan Smith's 
Text (Already Circulated)% 29 February 1982. END Archive. 
17 EPT statement in 3 March 1981 memo, quoted in Ken Coates, letter, 'To Members of the END 
Comm ittee', II March 198 1, END Archive. 
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1980 memo Thompson wrote END "offers ... to provide a European alliance to 
CND, and a European political perspective". 
The founders of END may also have thought that, if they wanted to 
promote an 'idea', there was no need to set up such an organization: they would be 
able to influence CND and the broader peace movement relatively easily without 
creating a new structure. (After all, Bruce Kent, CND General Secretary, was one 
of the founders of END. ) They may also have wanted not to be constrained by the 
demands that members of a democratic organisation make; and some may also 
have been wary of creating a structure that could be 'entered' by political groups 
and factions. In May 1981, when the 'democratization' of END was being 
discussed in the run-up to the first END Supporters' Conference, E. P. Thompson 
argued against a structure being created which would "allow room for dedicated 
sectarians to play politics inside". 18 He and Dorothy Thompson, as memos by them 
in this period indicate, 19 had another priority: for END to make its structures more 
'professional', and in this way to create a system of greater accountability in 
END. 20 
But the main reason seems to have been that a membership anti-nuclear 
organisation already existed - CND - which simply made it unnecessary to create 
a new one; and that to compete with CND could have weakened the peace 
movement. Edward Thompson wrote that END founders did not want to build a 
"mass membership organisation in competition with that of CND"21 _ not least 
because, as he later wrote, [END] had been "founded with the support of other 
22 
organisations (including CND)" . CND was not yet a mass organization 
in early 
18 Edward Thompson, 'Notes on the Memos of Bruce Kent, James Hinton and West Yorks END on 
END Organisation and Constitution', 10 May 1981. Unpublished. END Archive. 
'9 Dorothy and Edward Thompson, 'Retrospect and Next Steps', 18 August 1980; E. P. Thompson, 
'Notes on the Memos'; E. P. Thompson, 'END at September 198 V; Edward Thompson, 'Light on 
Dark Places'. DT's memo Summer 198 1. 
20 Though Thompson could also be unprofessional. Meg Beresford, British END's first organising 
secretary, recalls that the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation were unhappy with the way that she 
was recruited to her post: by a telephone call from Edward Thompson, who appears not to have 
consulted anyone else on the matter. Interview with Meg Beresford, 18 December 2002. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Edward Thompson, 'Five years On', END Journal 16/17 (Summer 1985), 48. 
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1980; indeed, Thompson later wrote that that, in early to mid- 1980, it was not clear 
that CND would be the "major beneficiary and organiser of [the] revived 
movement". 23 Nevertheless, as Dan Smith later recalled, the END founders felt 
there was simply no point in creating a membership campaigning group when one 
was already in place. 24 
After its launch - once END had established a presence - activists voiced 
concern about aspects of END under various headings: the lack of democratisation 
- by which was meant creating a transparent and representative decision-making 
structure involving the various parts of END - and accountability, and about how 
money was acquired and managed; indeed, these concerns eventually gave rise to 
significant tensions and disputes within END. James Hinton, a founder member of 
Leamington END, wrote in 1981 - echoes of 'PhD CND' here - that, being an 
unaccountable and ad hoc grouping, END was seen in the peace movement as an 
elitist ginger group, and that, unless it were democratised, peace activists would not 
be prepared to put their energies into it. 25 Meg Beresford, END's first organizing 
secretary seemed to confirm this prediction when, in Autumn 1981 - though not 
here advocating 'democratization' - she wrote that END's not being a membership 
organization meant that there simply not enough people to call on to perform 
mundane tasks like leafleting and running bookstalls. 26 As did Edward Thompson 
in mid- 1982 when he pointed out that END had not succeeded in involving new 
people or devolving functions to new groups within END. 27 That 'democratisation' 
was important for some END supporters is evident in the fact that a significant part 
of the discussion at the first supporters' conference, in May 198 1, was devoted to 
END's structure. 28 It was "generally" agreed, Bruce Kent's paper for the 
2' Thompson, 'Resurgence in Europe', 83. 
24 Interview with Dan Smith, 5 August 2003. 
25 James Hinton, untitled memo, undated (but clearly written for 1981 supporters' conference), 
END archive. 
26 Meg Beresford, 'Notes On END From the Office', undated. END Archive. 
27, Thompson, 'Light on Dark Places', 26. 
28 James Hinton, 'END National Supporters Conference', END Bulletin, 6, Autumn 1981,18. 
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conference on END's "interior structure" stated, "that what the Bradford meeting 
is about, is setting up the British Co-ordinating Committee on a more democratic 
29 basis" 
. The conference did this 
by agreeing to add to the Coordinating Committee 
representatives of lateral groups and, if they became effective organizations, of the 
regions; and for the CC to meet sometimes outside London. 30 These calls were 
friendly, and did not obviously reflect any tension generated by the issue. By the 
time of the next supporters' conference, however, in May 1982, END's 
organization had become a significant source of concern for END supporters. 31 
Participants felt, John Mepham wrote, that there is a "[flack of democracy within 
END", which "detracts from its credibility"; there is [o]rganisational confusion and 
mystery" - which are "real obstacles to our work". Reflecting this disquiet, the 
conference agreed to set up a working party on END's structure. This quickly 
produced and approved a draft constitution. 32 This was further amended at a special 
supporters' conference on 23 October on the question of a constitution for END, 
which, by a 'substantial majority', agreed that a formal constitution was 
necessary; 33 and the next regular supporters' conference, on 2-3 July 1983, adopted 
the constitution with a few amendments. 34 The new constitution did not radically 
change END's method of operations. But it formalised, and therefore made more 
transparent, its structure; and it added two new elements: it gave the supporters' 
conference some say in determining END policy; and it defined subscribers to the 
new END Journal as supporters. Part of its significance was, arguably, that from 
29 Bruce Kent, 'British END Co-ordinating Committee'. 
30 Hinton, 'END National Supporters Conference', 18. 
31 John Mepham, 'Links with Europe, END supporters conference', END Bulletin no. 10, July- 
August 1982,2. 
32 The constitution was drafted by Dan Smith, and slightly amended at the 31 August 1982 meeting 
of the group (see Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 'The Choice Before END Supporters', insert 
in END Bulletin No. 11,2). 
33 James Hinton, 'END Special Supporters' Conference', END Journal 1, December 1982-January 
1983,22. 
;4 See Sheena Phillips, 'END Looks to the Future', END Journal 5, A ugust- September 1983,28-9 
and minutes of END CC, 29 July 1983. 
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now the dissatisfaction expressed by END supporters about END's organization 
would take up less of END's time. 
Three years later, in 1985, when END did become a membership 
organization, the main arguments made in favour of this move were that it would 
raise END's profile - partly by 'disentangling' END from CND - help END reach 
people who would otherwise find it inaccessible, provide a more regular source of 
income, and create a bigger pool of activists 35 . Mary Kaldor argued that it had been 
a mistake not founding END as a membership organization in competition with 
CND, as this would have given END much more influence. Arguably, however, by 
1985 it was too late to expect great benefits from END being a membership 
organization: as the numbers attending CND demonstrations indicated, the peace 
movement was shrinking. END membership never went above approximately 600. 
It is, of course, impossible to know how END would have developed had it 
become a national membership organisation in 1980 and gained a significant 
number of members. It is possible - in a period, 1980-8 1, when people were 
forining all sorts of groups and, apparently, not seeing them as alternatives to each 
other - that END would not have competed with CND, but complemented it. 
Alternatively, END might have rivalled or even supplanted CND. It might also 
have had more influence in the British peace movement, and perhaps beyond it, 
amongst left-wing and liberal political activists. And it might not have suffered as 
many financial crises (see below). On the other hand, it is possible that END's 
being very small and unconstrained by a 'democratic' structure and membership 
allowed it to pursue organizationally difficult and politically sensitive projects. It is 
arguable, for example, that Ken Coates and other END activists in the BRPF would 
have found much more difficult to set up the END Convention process if they had 
been answerable to a membership (Chapter 5); and that a larger membership, 
almost certainly more 'mainstream' left-wing in its attitudes towards Eastern 
Europe, would have prevented END from increasingly emphasizing, as it did, the 
'links' between peace and human rights in Eastern Europe (Chapter 6). 
These are all, however, counter-factual considerations. What we do know is 
that the founders' decision about END's organizational form helped determine 
35 John Mepham, 'END Supporters' Conference' END Journal 16/17, Summer 1985,47. 
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what kind of presence END would have in the British peace movement and in 
British politics more generally: END became, and would remain, a small pressure 
group in its relations with actors outside the movement; and, in its relations with 
other parts of the movement, above all CND, a 'ginger' group. 
Finances 
If they are to campaign, activists must have money (in addition to their own skills 
and commitment and to externally acquired resources). How much money a group 
can raise, and the way it raises it, shapes the kind of work it can do. The decision of 
its founders not to create a national membership organization dictated how the 
group would raise money - as well as, arguably, how much money it could find. 
This, in turn, influenced shaped its campaigning. 
A membership organization has a regular and relatively reliable source of 
income in the form of its members' dues. It has to 'service' that membership in 
some way (for example - in CND's case - by providing information in a variety of 
forms: CND national members received, for example, Sanity, a members' 
newsletter, and briefing sheets). In return the national campaign can use a 
proportion of income from members' dues to fund other parts of the campaign: 
these include staff wages and office overheads; organizing national events that 
local or regional groups could not have put on themselves; organizing the annual 
conference; lobbying national political decision-makers; and generally keeping the 
campaign visible at a national level. 
END, by contrast, had no (or very little) such income. According to a BRPF 
statement of accounts, from February to November 1980 (when, as indicated, the 
BRPF had the only END account) 84 per cent of END's money came from 
donations and collections; from December 1980 to June 1981,62 per cent. 
According to END's audited accounts, in financial year 1981-82,62 percent of its 
income came from donations; in 1982-83,79 per cent; in 1983-84,74 per cent; in 
1984-85,70 per cent; in 1985-86,69 per cent; and in 1986-87 (when 
donations were in decline) 49 per cent. 36 (Put differently, between financial years 
36 The figures have been rounded up or down to the nearest figure. from the 'Report to the END 
AGM 1987'; these figures were, in turn, taken from the audited accounts. No audited accounts, or 
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1981-82 and 1986-87, END's income from donations averaged 67 cent per year; if 
one counts only 1981-82 to 1985-86,71 per cent. ) This donated money came 
from two main sources: from individual and institutional donors in the United 
States and the UK. 
Another possible source of income for a campaigning organization like 
END is sales of publications. From 1983-84 to 1985-86, according to the 
audited accounts, money from sales produced 14 per cent, 21 per cent and 20 per 
cent, respectively, of END's income. The bulk of this income was subscriptions to 
the END Journal; with smaller amounts made up of income from second-hand 
sales and from the sale of pamphlets and books. However, the increase in income 
represented by sales of the END Journal was more than made up for by the huge 
increase in expenditure represented by the costs of producing the END Journal (see 
below). 
From the outset, then, END relied heavily on donations for its income. This 
made it very susceptible to 'donor fatigue', as the decline in money donated in 
1986-87 indicates. 
END's Structure 
The basic size structure that END would have for the rest of the decade took shape 
over the 12-15 months following the launch of the END Appeal. What emerged 
was a loosely organized federation, around (for most of this period) a national 
'centre', of individuals and a few small regional and specialist groups of 
'supporters'. In the early years at least, the phrase 'ad hoc' (or even 'inspired 
adhocery') crops up in reports and internal memos as a description of how END 
functioned. A certain 'order' was introduced into END with the adoption, by its 
1983 Supporters' Conference, of a constitution (which among other things, defined 
the composition of END's Coordinating Committee and stipulated that there had to 
be elections for key posts), by the concomitant separation of the BRPF and END, 
and with the introduction of membership in 1985. But the federal, and relatively 
informal, nature of END's organization remained unchanged. One feature of the 
indeed any end-of-financial year figures, are available for subsequent years: either they were not 
completed or the documents have been lost or are otherwise unavailable. 
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informality was that the constituent groups of END enjoyed a considerable degree 
of autonomy. 
'National'END 
Those attending the 27 April 1980 consultation decided to create a 'steering 
committee' - known as the 'Committee of 7' because it had seven members: Ken 
Coates, Stuart Holland MP, Mary Kaldor, Dan Smith, Bruce Kent, Peggy Duff, and 
Edward Thompson. By the end of 1980 the 'Committee of 7' had given way to a 
'Coordinating Committee' (CC), which met monthly from early 1981 and was, at 
least formally, the main decision-making body of END from then until the demise 
of the group in 1992. 
In January 1981 END campaigners established a Finance and General 
Purposes Committee (F&GP). This did not convene again until July 198 1; after this 
it met more or less regularly until 1989. The F&GP, at various points, gave rise to 
ad hoc groups such as a policy group and a structure group. 
In 1980 and early 1981 the END 'office' was that of the BRPF in 
Nottingham; this reflected in part the leading role the BRPF had played in the 
founding of END, as well as the unwillingness of END campaigners to centralize 
the operation either in London or at the Russell Foundation in Nottingham. In 
February 1981 an END office was opened in London, in a room rented from the 
ICDP; 37 from then until the end of 1982, when END and the BRPF separated, 
British END had two 'centres'. In 1980 and until early 1981 END's only bank 
account was the BRPF's. An END bank account was opened in January 198 1; 
END had sets of bank accounts from that point until the END-BRPF separation in 
1982. 
British END 'supporters' came together annually, from 1981 to 1985, at 
'Supporters' Conferences'. The first such event was on 16 May 1981 in Bradford, 
where more than 300 supporters gathered; the second at County Hall in London, 
the third in Oxford; the fourth in Birmingham; the fifth in London. After 1985, 
when British END became a membership organization, its annual gatherings 
became AGMs. 
37 At 6 Endsleigh Street. 
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Publications 
Among the most important of British END's committees were the editorial boards 
or collectives of the roughly quarterly END Bulletin (1980-83) and the 
approximately bi-monthly END Journal (1982-89). Founded in the summer of 
1980 by the Russell Foundation, which produced the first three issues very largely 
on its own, 38 the Bulletin was published until May 1983. The END Journal came 
out, under Mary Kaldor's editorship, from December 1982 to Spring 1989 (37 
issues). These two magazines were important because they were amongst the most 
visible forms END campaigning took in Britain (and, to an extent, abroad) - and 
were thus central to the END's function as an ideas-disseminating group; 39 they - 
and above all the END Journal - used up a considerable proportion of END's 
income (see below); and the END Bulletin was a source of the intense 
disagreements that drove END and the BRPF apart in 1982 (see below). After the 
demise of the END Bulletin, the Russell Foundation continued to bring out END 
Papers, a booklet-sized magazine which had first appeared in 198 1. 
Both the BRPF and END produced a considerable number of other 
publications. The BRPF, through its press, the Spokesman Press, continued, after 
Protest and Survive, to publish pamphlets. END Churches Lateral Committee 
published its own journal, The Churches Register (see below). And, between 1982 
and 1986, END (guided by its publications committee) published (in most cases 
with the Merlin Press) a range of pamphlets, most of which came out at short 
notice and covered topics of current importance . 
40 END did not publish books 
38 See Dan Smith, 'Memo on END/BRPF Sort Out Promised Last November', 27 January 1982; 
Stephen Bodington, 'Reflections on Various END Papers'. Both in END archive. 
39 They overlapped only once, in May 1983, when the BRPF brought out the final issue of the END 
Bulletin. 
40 E. P. Thompson, Beyond the Cold War, London: Merlin Press/END, 1982); Jean Stead and 
Danielle GrUnberg, Moscow Independent Peace Group, END Special Report, London: Merlin/END, 
1982; Ferenc K6szegi and E. P. Thompson, The New Hungarian Peace Movement, END Special 
Report, London: END/Merlin Press Ltd, n. d [1982]; Ben Thompson, Comiso, END Special Report, 
London: Merlin Press/END, 1982; Olafur Grimsson and Angus McCormack, The Nuclear North 
Atlantic, London: /Glasgow: Merlin/END, 1982; John Sandford, The Sword and the Ploughshare. 
Autonomous Peace Initiatives in East Germany, London: Merlin Press/END, 1983); Jan Kavan and 
Zdena Tomin, eds, Voicesfroin Prague: Documents on Czechoslovakia and the Peace Movement, 
London. - END/Palach Press, 1983; E. P. Thompson, The Defence of Britain, London: END/CND, 
1983; Andrew White, Sýymbols of War. Pershing H and Cruise Missiles in Europe, London: Merlin 
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itself, but END supporters were the driving force behind a number of commercially 
produced volumes. 41 END activists also generated a wide range of internal 
publications. These were aimed at supporters/members or at peace activists in 
general and included briefing sheets on a wide range of topics; newsletters, both 
those produced centrally for END supporters/members as a whole or by individual 
working groups; and often lengthy reports of journeys to foreign countries. 
Local and Regional Groups 
In the upsurge of peace campaigning in 1980 not only did campaigners launch the 
END Appeal; some also created local END groups. In the end, however, relatively 
few groups with 'END' in their title emerged, or remained in existence for very 
long; and those that did were small. In May 1981 the END activist James Hinton 
could write that outside "the universities, Yorkshire and one or two towns like 
Gateshead and Leamington, END has little established presence on the ground". 42 
This picture did not change in the rest of the decade. Only a handful of small local 
or regional END groups were established: London END; West Midlands END; and 
Glasgow END; West Yorkshire END, Hull END; Sheffield END; Nottingham 
END. Some peace groups without 'END' in their name did support END: Halifax 
Nuclear Disarmament Group, for example. 43 But there was only the most basic 
national network of explicitly END groups. At the local level END was one, small, 
current in the movement. 
Press/END, 1983; Jean Furtado, ed., Turkey: Peace on Trial, END Special Report, London: 
END/Merlin Press, 1983; Jolyon Howorth, France: The Politics of Peace, London: END/Merlin 
Press, 1984; North Atlantic Network: The Alternative Alliance, END Special Report, no publication 
details, n. d; E. P. Thompson and Ben Thompson, Star Wars: Setf-Destruct Incorporated, London: 
Merlin Press, 1985; Louis Mackay, China: A Powerfor Peace?, London: Merlin Press/END, 1986. 
4' These included E. P. Thompson and Dan Smith, eds, Protest and Survive, Han-nondsworth: 
Penguin 1980; Mary Kaldor and Dan Smith, eds, Disarming Europe, London: Merlin Press, 1982; 
E. P. Thompson et al, Exterminism and Cold War, London: Verso, 1982; E. P. Thompson, Zero 
Option, London: Merlin Press, 1982; E. P. Thompson, The Heavy Dancers, London: Merlin Press, 
1985; E. P. Thompson, Double Exposure, London: Merlin Press, 1985; E. P. Thompson, ed., Star 
Wars, Harmndsworth: Penguin, 1985; E. P. Thompson, Mary Kaldor, et al, Mad Dogs: the US 
Raids on Libya London: Pluto Press, 1986; Dan Smith and E. P. Thompson, eds, Prospectusfor a 
Habitable Planet Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987; and Louis Mackay and Mark Thompson, eds, 
Something in the Wind: Politics after Chernobyl, London: Pluto Press, 1988. 
42 James Hinton, 'END National Supporters Conference', 18. 
" Interview with Julian Harber, 21 November 2002. 
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Lateral Committees 
In 1980 and 1981 END activists set up - in addition to the editorial board of the 
END Journal and the Publications Committee - specialist groups that focused on 
specific areas of activity. These 'lateral committees', the founders of END hoped, 
would establish links across Europe with people in similar professions, interest 
groups, or other social categories. Five 'laterals' were created: the Higher 
Education Lateral Committee (HELC), the Churches Lateral Committee (Clc), a 
Women's Lateral Committee, the Trade Union Lateral Committee, and a 
Parliamentary Lateral Committee. 44 HELC played an important role in the early 
1980s in disseminating information about END through higher education institutes 
and in organizing dayschools on international aspects of the peace movement, for 
example one in Febraury 1982 on the West German peace movement. The 
Women's Lateral Committee also concentrated on education and information 
dissemination through dayschools - for example one, in February 1983, on 
'Women and Peace in the Soviet Union' - but it was also active in the early stages 
of British END's dialogue with the GDR, as women on the committee travelled to 
the GDR to meet independent activists and official organizations. The Trade Union 
45 
Committee promoted links with trade unions in other European countries . The 
most durable of the committees was the END Churches Lateral Committee. The 
founder and the moving force behind it was Stephen Tunnicliffe, a fon-ner music 
teacher in Shropshire who had taken early retirement in 1980. Like so many others 
his concern for nuclear disarmament had been awakened in particular by Edward 
Thompson; and it was Thompson who helped push him into setting up the 
committee (with Mark James of the Catholic peace organization Pax Christi). The 
committee was founded in mid- 19 81 and was an active part of END until 31 
December 1987, when Tunnicliffe stepped down as its coordinator. 46 
44 'For a Nuclear-Free Zone in All Europe', END Bulletin 1,980), 3. 
45 The Parliamentary Lateral Committee was the least active of all. 
46 Stephen Tunnicliffe, 'Final Report on the Work of Churches Lateral Committee', 15 January 
1988. END Archive. 
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END (like CND) was a largely secular organization. The Clc, though very 
productive (as we shall see) contained only a small number of END activists. As 
the coordinator, in his final report, wrote: the committee was always "in the main a 
loose affiliation of Christians coming together as representatives of their various 
organizations ... and owing their first allegiance to those rather than to END". As 
such, the Clc could, he wrote elsewhere, "claim to be fairly representative of 
Christian peace initiatives". These initiatives included, in April 1983, Christian 
CND, Pax Christi, the Anglican Pacifist Fellowship, Quaker Peace and Service, 
Clergy Against Nuclear Arrns, the Christian Peace Conference, and the World 
Conference of Religions for Peace. By June 1984, this list had been extended to 
include the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the British Council of Churches Peace 
Forum, Coventry International Peace Centre, and the West Gen-nan organization 
Aktion Suhnezeichen Friedensdienste; in September 1987, all these organizations 
were still on the CLc. 47 In addition, various Churches were represented: in 1983, 
for example, the Baptist Church, the Church of England, the Methodist Church, 
and the Mennonites. The fact that there only a few END activists on the Clc, and 
that those that were (apart from Tunnicliffe) "tended to be fully committed outside 
the Clc", 48 meant that most of the committee's (and thus of END's Christian) work 
was done by Tunnicliffe himself. That he was able to do so was partly a 
consequence of his being retired and thus having time for this work. 
The committee's work, conducted within a broad END framework, fell, like 
that of other parts of END, mainly into two categories: linking up and promoting 
dialogue amongst Christian peace activists; and disseminating infonnation about 
Christian peace campaigning. In an early statement Tunnicliffe wrote that the CLc 
saw its "main task" as "coordination" in a context in which there were already 
many connections "between churches in different European countries ... and peace 
organizations are often church-originated, or actively supported by the churches". 
In particular, it hoped to "provide a forum for the many peace initiatives that have 
started within churches of many different denominations" in the UK; and it wanted 
47 Membership lists, 20 June 1984 and 21 September 1987. 
48Tunnicliffe, 'Final Report'. 
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to help establish a Christian peace network throughout Europe' ,. 49 Later he wrote 
that the CLc was set up to "establish links with like-minded organizations in the 
UK 
.... and overseas, starting in Europe 
but not restricted to any one geographical 
area". 50 To this end, the committee organized various, relatively small-scale 
4 actions' or events. Its main work, however, consisted of bring out its own journal, 
The Churches Register, and of organizing two international theological seminars, 
in Hungary, under the title The Theology ofPeace. (See Chapter 6). 
Task GroupslWorking Groups 
Until 1983-84 the lateral committees were British END's only specialist groups. 
However, as the 'dialogue' with independent groups in CEE/SU developed END 
supporters came together to monitor peace movement-relevant developments in 
particular countries. They often did so at first informally, later more fon-nally in 
'task groups' (later 'working groups'). The first such group was the Hungary 
Working Group, set up in late 1982 following the foundation of the Peace Group 
for Dialogue in, and END visits to, Hungary; this was followed by a Soviet 
Working Group, set up after the foundation in June 1982 of the independent 
Moscow Trust Group; a Polish Working Group, established in 1983 by END 
activists formulating a reply to a letter from the independent group KOS 
(Committee for Social Self-Defence); a GDR (later 'German' and sometimes 
'German-Gennan', as it dealt with West Germany and West Berlin as well) 
Working Group, the catalyst for the creation of which was the arrest by the GDR 
authorities of two independent GDR peace activists and of an END activist (and 
the release of the latter); and a Czechoslovak Task Group, set up in 1983. There 
were two specifically West European working groups: a French Working Group, 
set up in1985, and a Netherlands/Belgium Working Group. 
49 Memo, 'Lateral Committee - Churches', undated (but obviously 1981). 
50 Stephen Tunnicliffe, memo, 'END Churches Lateral Committee - Its Purpose and Alms', 
January 1983. 
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Disputes over Structure and Resources 
The organizational motor of the new END initiative was the BRPF, an already 
existing organization with significant resources - offices and a printing press - to 
draw on, and with an address which people could contact for further information. ý I 
It was the Russell Foundation, as we have seen, that had convened the two 
meetings at which drafts of the Appeal were discussed, and which announced and 
promoted the press conference at which the Appeal was launched. The Foundation 
did the main work of circulating the Appeal, in Britain and abroad, for signatures 
52 (which were still arriving at the BRPF in late 1982) . The BRPF also convened 
another supporters' meeting on 29 June, and took and distributed minutes of the 
Steering Committee meetings and of the 29 June meeting. The Foundation played 
the key role in the organization of the public launch meeting on 10 July at Central 
Hall. Amongst other things, he says, the BRPF produced END "banners and flags" 
which were then distributed to the anti-cruise missile demonstration on 15 June 
organized by the Labour Party (the first such mass demonstration of the new 
mobilization): "we mined that demo from end to end .... we were trying to 
promote [the] Central Hall meeting ... and we 
did. ý953 The Foundation also played 
a key role in printing and disseminating END ideas in print. In the Spring the 
Russell Press had printed Protest and Survive; and in September it brought out 
Coates's pamphlet European Nuclear Disannament. In July the BRPF produced 
the first issue of what would become the main regular English-language source of 
information about the West European peace movements between 1980 and 1982, 
the END Bulletin. 
Yet from an early stage in END's life an increasingly bitter dispute between 
two groupings in the organizations, the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 
'Nottingham', and those associated with the END office in London and the 
51 Edward Thompson, 'Light on Dark Places, or: Some notes on Bread- and- Butter Matters greatly 
Beneath the Interest of END Committee Members who Follow Higher Things', internal 
memorandum, 24 June 1982. (Though he stressed that individual leading activists also paid a high 
proportion of postal, phone and travel costs out of their own pockets). See also Stephen Bodington, 
'Reflections on various END papers: a plea for some realism', internal memorandum, 15 August 
1982. END Archive. 
52 Stuart Holland and Tony Simpson, 'Editorial', END Bulletin 11,1982,2 
51 Interview with Ken Coates. 
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Thompsons -'London'. This dispute - which assumed an increasingly large place 
in the work of at least the founders of END - had three, linked, causes: political 
and personal differences, and disagreements about structure and the use of 
resources. 54 The political aspects centred on differences between the two groups' 
strategic priorities: the BRPF was most interested in bringing political parties into 
the campaign and on doing so above all at a European conference of movements 
and parties; it felt increasingly that the rest of END was not giving this strategy 
enough support. 'London', by contrast, was interested above all in developing 
relations amongst movements. I look at these differences in chapters 5 and 6. The 
personal aspects consisted of the apparent lack of trust, and growing antipathy, 
between some END activists in the respective groupings. While in the early days of 
END there was, in E. P. Thompson's words, "goodwill between all parties" (and, in 
Coates's account, "very harmonious relationships between the half dozen people 
who had prepared the END Appeal'955 ), by 1982-83 there was a high level of 
anger and bitterness in internal memos and letters. One is struck by the sharp and 
aggressive tone of the exchanges - these would have made it that much more 
difficult to settle political and organizational differences. Mary Kaldor later 
speculated that because both Coates and Thompson - the key figures in the 
respective groups - had "their upbringing on the old left" they "were into fights 
56 and factions and political control" . 
The disagreements over resources and organization were rooted in two 
different conceptions of the desirable structure and function of END. The Russell 
Foundation wanted END to be relatively informal and ad hoc. Stuart Holland MP, 
writing in late 1982 for the BRPF and "some members" of the Coordinating 
Committee, said that END should be (or remain) a "broad front of forces on a 
'4This has prompted Amitabh Mattoo to argue, with regard to the question whether or not END 
should have become a national membership organization, that the founders of END would have 
anyway been incapable of running such an organization: "factionalism within END" in 1980-82, 
he writes, "diminish[es] the significance of END's claim that it never sought to compete with 
CND: the fact was that it never was in a position to do so. " Mattoo, 'The Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament', 79-80. 
55 Letter to author.. 
16 Interview with Mary Kaldor. 
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confederal basis ofjoint agreement". 57 He was thus opposed to the 
constitutionalisation process set in train by the restructuring group; he wanted, 
instead, to retain the "existing constitution" - Bruce Kent's proposal on END's 
'interior structure' of May 1981. The BRPF opposed the new constitution as it 
centralised power in the Coordinating Committee by making the CC the only 
legitimate policy-making body; the CC would become, Holland argued, a "central 
committee" with a "federal role". The "whole drift and weight" of the proposed 
new constitution, in Greendale and Topham's view, was to "establish [the CC as ]a 
central, authoritarian policy-making body" which would have "no accountability to 
anyone". The draft constitution, they claimed, compared badly with "the 
constitution of even the most conservative and authoritarian of British Trade 
Unions"58 
Critics of the BRPF, by contrast - though they were not all necessarily in 
favour of a new constitution - were exercised precisely by what the Foundation 
might have regarded as its 'autonomy', but what for some of them at least was its 
lack of accountability, above all perhaps with regard to the management of finances 
and to the running of END's main publication, the END Bulletin. Edward 
Thompson's criticisms of END's poor management were directed at the CC in 
general, and at individuals on it (including staff members) who he thought had 
contributed to what he sees as END's disorganization. 59 But it is clear that, in his 
view, a particular obstacle to the more professional running of END was the 
unaccountable way the BRPF operated. He referred to a general problem: that, by 
57 In his introduction to 'The Choice before END Supporters'. The insert contains Bruce Kent's 
'Notes'; a draft of the proposed new constitution' ; and amendments to the draft from the chairman 
and secretary of the END Trade Union Lateral Committee. It was sent out in the END Bulletin in 
advance of the special supporters' conference on 23 October 1982. 
58 'The Choice', 3. 
" An example of what he saw as END activists' badfinancial management undermining the work 
of END concerned the 'loss' of E20,000 in 1982. In 1981-82 END's chief US fundralser was 
prepared to commit himself to raising the equivalent of E20,000 for END from US donors, for the 
twelve-month period beginning in March 1982. For a variety of reasons - which included leading 
END figures being overworked, their unwillingness, or inability, to devolve tasks, possibly the 
absence of anyone to whom tasks could be devolved, perhaps the general lack of clarity about who 
was responsible for what - meant (in Thompson's account) that END did not do the administrative 
work required by the US fundraiser. As a result the fundraiser withdrew his commitment. END had 
passed up an opportunity to have someone else raise E20,000 for its campaigning work. Thompson, 
'Light on Dark Places'. 
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the autumn of 1981 the BRPF had almost stopped reporting to the CC on its END 
work . 
60 A more specific problem - which Thompson had regarded as such already 
by the end of 1980 61 _ was that the BRPF, as one of two END 'centres' and with its 
own bank account, did not consult properly with the rest of END about the money 
it received or raised for, or spent on, END campaigning. 62 Two events particularly 
irked Thompson (and his wife). In May 198 1, the economist Joan Robinson 
donated lecture fees of $10,000 to END. She sent this to BRPF, which spent the 
money on its END activities. But, Thompson argued, the money was intended for 
all END's work, including (but not just) BRPF )S. 63 In October 198 1, the BR. PF 
issued an independent appeal for funds to pay for a planned meeting in Rome of 
European signatories of the END Appeal (see Chapter 5). This appeal was widely 
circulated at the huge demonstration in London in October 198 1, and also, 
according to Thompson, to END Bulletin readers, and to former donors. 64 This was, 
for the Thompsons, the straw that broke the camel's work: it undermined, in E. P. 
Thompson's account, the attempts underway since Summer 1981 to make END's 
work more accountable and professional (which would have included closing down 
65 
the BRPF's END account) . After a 
lengthy discussion (or argument) at the 
November 1981 CC the Thompsons withdrew from the CC. This withdrawal - 
which, as we shall see (Chapter 5), BRPF people interpreted as an attack on the 
Foundation's political priorities - was an important marker in the deterioration of 
END-BRPF relations. 
Other leading CC members also felt the BRPF was not accountable enough. 
"What BRPF does in aid of the cause [of European nuclear disarmament] is not 
always ordered, endorsed or approved" by END, wrote Dan Smith. 66 This lack of 
60 Thompson, 'Light on Dark Places'. 
61 See November 1980 letters. 
62 See Nov 1980 letters and 'Light' 
63 'Light'; See Coates on this in interview; Important enough for DT to refer to ti 20 years later. 
64 Thompson, 'Light'. 
65 
Ibid. 
66 Dan Smith, 'Memo on END/BRPF sort out promised last November', 27 January 1982, END 
archive. 
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accountability affected finances as well as, he suggests, policy-making more 
generally. 67 Later Mary Kaldor described the Russell Foundation as "utterly 
opaque". 68 
The END Bulletin also became a source of sharp disagreement between 
'London' and 'Nottingham' in the summer of 1982 - as, by now, probably any 
issue would have - and for two reasons. First, because the BRPF - which owned 
and published the Bulletin - was losing money on its production and asked the CC 
to cover its losses (which the CC did); secondly, because the two BRPF editors of 
the Bulletin, Tony Simpson and Stuart Holland, faced with what they thought was 
Mary Kaldor's inappropriate plan for its content, rejected her proposals and 
produced an issue according to their own, very different, content-plan. The 
September 1982 issue was entirely devoted to the what the BRPF considered to be 
the most significant event of the END campaign to date: the successful holding, in 
July 1982, of the first END Convention. For Dan Smith, END's defacto chairman, 
the "sudden request for financial support" and the editorial "'repossession... of the 
Bulletin "demonstrate [d] the difficulties for END if it does not own its journal". 
Indeed, this arrangement now seemed to him to be "utterly impossible". It would 
be better if the END CC owned the Bulletin. 69 However, the BRPF decided not to 
pass the Bulletin over to END. In December 1982, the CC launched own magazine, 
the END Journal. 
The acceptance by the October 1982 supporters' conference of the need for 
a new constitution, and the Bullethi crisis, together with continuing political 
differences - the holding of the Convention made the BR-PF feel even more 
justified that its focus on a European conference had been right and the rest of 
END's lack of support for it reprehensible - was the effective point at which END 
and BRPF split. In the summer of 1983, before the END supporters' conference 
67 See also two memos by Stephen Tunnicliffe: 'Comments on Dan Smith's memo on relations 
between END and BRPF', 16 February 1982; and 'Memorandum to the C. C. on 30th July, 1982', 
28 July 1982. Both are in the END archive. 
"' Interview with Mary Kaldor. 
69 Letters and memos from Mary Kaldor and Stephen Tunnicliffe make the same point: Mary 
Kaldor to Ken Coates, 26 July 1982 and 3 September 1982-, Stephen Tunnicliffe's memos of 16 
February 1982 and 28 July 1982. END archive. 
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which finally agreed the new constitution, the BRPF formally withdrew from the 
Co-ordinating Committee. Given the existence of a "representative international 
committee for European Nuclear Disarmament" (the 'Liaison Committee' largely 
responsible for preparing the END Conventions), they wrote, and of "a variety of 
other international co-ordinating mechanisms grouping both general and particular 
interests; and given the existence, in the UK, of CND and other 'specialist 
bodies"', the BRPF could not see that a "structured British organisation" of the 
kind envisaged would have "any particular function". 70 
The separation of the BRPF and END, and the adoption of a new 
constitution by END, mark the end of a period of increasingly bitter argument and 
- partly because of this - the beginning of a period in which decision-making 
processes in the organization are more transparent. 
After 1982 
The organizational and resource disputes in END were particularly bitter in 1981 
and 1982. However, tensions over the acquisition, management and allocation of 
resources were a feature of END's activity until its demise. Perhaps the most 
evident persistent theme in internal discussions is that of financial crisis. In the 
period 1983-89, for example, a constant theme - and the source of some tension - 
within END was the amount of money that was being spent on the END Journal, 
given that about 50 per cent of the magazine's expenditure was 'subsidized' - that 
is, the Journal cost an average of E30,000 to produce per year, only made about 
f 15,000 per year in sales, and had the rest of its expenditure covered by money 
raised by END. (There was also tension about how the money that END Journal 
did have for promotion of the magazine was spent. ) Overall, however, there was an 
agreement - indicated not least by the fact that the magazine was published until 
there was no money left to finance it (Spring 1989) - that END should continue to 
publish the Journal as an important part of the END campaign. 
70 Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 'Statement by the Russell Foundation on the proposed 
change of character of the British European Nuclear Disarmament Co-ordinating Committee', 
undated, END archive. 
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Resources (Partly) Outside the Peace Movement 
British END was also able to draw on resources outside, or partly outside, the 
peace movement, and in varying degrees sympathetic to the movement - or at least 
to END. (Because of the informal nature of END's campaigning it is sometimes 
hard to distinguish between someone who was an END activist and someone who 
was sympathetic to END's aims but only provided advice. ) 
Some of these resources were not essential for END's work, but arguably 
they made it easier, either because they were available at little or no cost, or 
because they were convenient. With many other parts of the peace movement (and, 
indeed, other 'radical' organizations) 'national' END was able to make free use in 
the evenings of the meeting rooms in County Hall, the headquarters of the Greater 
London Council (until 1986, when the GLC was abolished): some meetings of the 
Coordinating Committee took place at County Hall, as did the 1982 Supporters' 
Conference and the launch in 1983 of END's Special Report, Turkey. - Peace on 
Trial. It also benefited from GLC funding, as in 1985/6, when, with the help of 
GLC money, it printed 10,000 copies of a leaflet as part a campaign-cum-network 
co-organized by END, the North Atlantic Network. Throughout the 1980s, from 
the first big meeting in March 1980 to the end of 1989 (October CC), END 
supporters met in one of two buildings in central London owned by the Quakers: 
Friends' Meeting House and the Friends' International Centre; it also met 
occasionally in the nearby Catholic International Centre. 
In the mid- to late 1980s, the then END fundraiser, Jeanette Buirski, drew 
on her contacts in advertising and design to produce a range of products - badges, 
postcards, t-shirts, and posters - that aimed to present END as slightly more 
younger and snappier group than its 'image' suggested it was. 
Other resources were more important, as they would have been hard to find 
elsewhere. The Merlin Press, founded and run by Martin Eve, who had left the 
Communist Party with the Thompsons in 1956 and was Edward Thompson's 
principal publisher, published and distributed END pamphlets in the early and mid- 
1980s (see above under 'Publications); Martin Eve brought a fund of publishing 
experience to the END campaign which was essential for a part of the END 
campaign to be possible. 
88 
END's East European work was helped by the knowledge of a variety of 
British and exiled East European supporters of independent groups in CEE/SU and, 
in general, experts on various aspects of the East. Jan Kavan, the founder and head 
of the small Czechoslovak exile 'press agency', the Palach Press, was one of the 
main sources of information in Britain about the work of human rights and other 
independent activists in Czechoslovakia. The Palach Press published, among other 
things, the statements in translation of the human rights grouping Charter 77 and 
the monthly bulletin of VONS, the Committee for the Defence of the Unjustly 
Prosecuted. Kavan was in frequent telephone contact with Charter 77 activists. 
Sympathetic to the END campaign, Kavan helped organize both trips by British 
END activists to Czechoslovakia, and the dissemination in Britain and elsewhere of 
the many Charter 77 texts - the official ones as well as those by individuals - and 
on the peace issue. As we shall see in Chapter 6, in the West arguably the most 
influential exchange of ideas between Western peace activists and independent 
activists in the East was that, from 1981 to 1985, between Charter 77 signatories 
and IKV, British END and a few other Western peace groups. The impact of the 
Charter ideas is in part due to the strength of the ideas themselves; but there is a 
case to be made that, in Britain at least, it is due to the fact that the Palach Press 
determinedly 'pushed' the Charter 77 texts into the peace movement. 
Individuals sympathetic to END also offered their help and advice, 
sometimes as members of Task/Working Groups, others at more of a distance: 
these included the political philosopher Steven Lukes and the political scientist 
April Carter, who had academic links to opposition intellectuals in CEE/SU; Paul 
Oestreicher, the International Secretary of the British Council of Churches and, 
later, Canon of Coventry Cathedral, who had long-standing ties with the Protestant 
Churches in the GDR (and in West Germany); and Zdena Tomin, a former 
spokesperson of Charter 77 who, with her family, had lived in exile in the UK. 
CND as a Resource for END 
CND's huge national network - local and regional groups and a central 
bureaucratic and decision-making apparatus - was also a campaigning resource for 
END in various ways. British END's ability to make use of CND as a resourcewas 
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partly made possible by the fact that END was closely intertwined with CND. In 
addition to END activists writing END-ish articles in Sanity, and thus reaching a 
wide peace movement audience, END was able to promote some of its work to 
local groups in the pages of Campaign!; and, in the form of paid advertisements, to 
CND members or sympathizers in the pages of Sanity. 
END was also able to use local peace groups as a way to spread its 
message. The END archives show that many local peace activists wrote to END 
throughout the decade for information about peace movements or sympathetic 
groups in East and West Europe. They used END as a resource; simultaneously 
END used them as a way to disseminate its information. Local groups also 
provided platforms for END speakers, as we have seen. 
END also used the local groups network as away to both spread its message 
by selling its products. In 1983 and 1984, it distributed through local group 
mailings. around 75,000 leaflets each time advertising the END Journal. It could 
not afford to have these leaflets distributed in magazines and journals (such as 
Sanity or the New Statesman); the CND local groups mailings therefore provided 
an almost-free resource which compensated for END's lack of money 
By the end of 1989 END had, in organizational and resources terms, become very 
small: membership was falling, the END Journal had had to close in the Spring for 
lack of funds, and the organizing secretary was made redundant. It was, as we shall 
see (Chapter 6), involved in lively dialogue and cooperation with forces in CEE/SU 
- these were, in many cases, about to play a central role in their countries' 'velvet 
revolutions'. Yet END, heavily reliant as it was on fund-raised money for its 
survival, shrank as this money dried up. Soon afterwards it would close, with many 
of its activists going into European Dialogue, the British branch of a new, post- 
Cold War pan-European initiative, Helsinki Citizens' Assembly. 
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Chapter 4 
END in the British Peace Movement 
In Britain, END supporters were active mainly in the peace movement, 
within which they tried above all to influence CND 
I have already argued (Chapter 3) that CND, the 'peak' 
organization in the British peace movement of the 1980s, was a resource 
for END. Acting as a kind of pressure or ginger group in the movement, 
and above all on and within CND, END supporters promoted an END 
approach within CND. Their aim was notjust to get CND activists to think 
of their campaign as having international ramifications, or of being 
influenced by events abroad (others in CND did this, too, not all of whom 
were sympathetic to END) but specifically to think of CND as being part 
both of a West European movement and of an actual or potential 'trans- 
continental movement' that embraced the Soviet bloc, too, and which 
opposed both sides of the nuclear anns race and the Cold War. Here I 
analyse in detail the END-CND relationship: the intertwining of END 
with CND, and the cooperation between the two organizations; the tension 
in certain areas; and the ways in which END tried to 'END'-ize CND. 
In order to be able to do this I must first outline the chief characteristics of 
CND. 
CND: members, structure, frame 
Founded in February 1958, CND enjoyed widespread support - and, 
arguably, had some influence on defence debates and British political 
culture -in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It then went into decline until, 
by 1977, it had 2618 national members. In the 1980s CND had two tiers: 
'national' CND and the local groups. The national structure was very much 
like that of a political party. ' CND had a national individual membership. 
1 Byme, The Campaigrifor Nuclear Disarmament, 82. 
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This grew steadily, reflecting the fact that CND was the main beneficiary 
of the growing opposition to the government's and US/NATO nuclear 
weapons policies: 4287 in 1979; and, approximately, 9000 in 1980,20,000 
in 198 1. and 50,000 in 1982; and 110,000 at the end of 1984.2 There was 
an annual conference, attended by individual members, delegates of local 
CND groups or other peace groups affiliated to CND, representatives of 
34 
affiliated organizations, delegates of CND specialist sections , as well as 
by representatives of CND's regions and 'nations'. 5 This conference made 
"[o]verall policy", and elected both CND's officers (chairperson, treasurer, 
and 4 vice-chairpersons) as well as 20 members of the CND National 
Council (or 'Council ). 6 National Council, which met quarterly, consisted 
of these 20 members, 80 elected by the regions and nations, CND's 
officers, one representative from each of the specialist sections, as well as 
six representatives of Youth CND. Council elected CND's National 
Executive, which met monthly, and its nine specialist committees, 7 which 
did the same. CND had a large paid staff at its headquarters in London. 
Elected National Council members and staff together produced, among 
other things, CND's publications: the monthly magazine Sanity, the 
monthly campaigning newsletter for local groups, Campaign!, as well as 
the many leaflets, pamphlets, booklets and books which helped spread the 
CND message. 
The other tier of CND consisted of the myriad local groups 
throughout Britain and Northern Ireland. In 1979 there were 150 CND 
groups; in 1980,300; and in 1981- roughly - 700; in 1982,1000. The 
' For CND membership figures 1977 and 1979-82 see Minnion and Bolsover, eds, The 
CND Story, 150. For end-1984 figures, see 'CND Conference 1984', Sanity, January, 
1985,4. 
3 For example, Scientists against Nuclear Arms (SANA). 
4 Such as Green CND and Labour CND. 
5 Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland. 
6 CND: How it Works, CND Publications, undated. 
7 These committees included, in 1983: Publications, Projects, International, Press and PR, 
and Parliamentary and Elections. CND Council meeting papers, 16-17 April 1983. END 
Archive. 
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number of "'affiliated organisations" went up from 724 in 1979 to roughly 
1000 in 1982.8 According to national CND, by 1984 local group 
membership stood at around 200,000 - about two times that of national 
membership. 9 
CND's aims are outlined in the CND constitution. This document 
defines all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - indeed, all weapons - 
as a threat. (The constitution is 'even-handed' in its opposition to WMD 
wherever they are: it does not, for example, state that one country's nuclear 
weapons are less dangerous than another's. ) Its solution to the problem 
posed by all these weapon is, first and foremost, unilateral nuclear 
disarmament by Britain; the assumption is that this can help create a 
foreign policy for Britain that could, in turn, produce much broader 
("worldwide") disarmament. The agent of the solution is, of course, at least 
in part, CND itself. 10 
CND in the 1980s was a coalition. II Maguire has argued that CND 
had three main, overlapping, "constituencies", distinguished above all by 
the tactics and strategies they advocated. The "Labour Movement Left" 
believed that to win CND had to win over the Labour Party and trade 
unions; it thus wanted to CND to prioritise putting pressure on and working 
within the labour movement. The "New Movement Left" emphasized 
Minnion and Bolsover, eds, The CND Story, 150. 
Though, of course, many local group members were also national members. 
10 The constitution states that: 
The aim of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is the unilateral abandonment by 
Britain of Nuclear weapons, nuclear bases and nuclear alliances as a prerequisite for a 
British foreign policy which has the worldwide abolition of nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons leading to general and complete disarmament as its prime objective. 
The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is opposed to the manufacture, stockpiling, 
testing, use and threatened use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by any 
country, and the policies of any country or group of countries which make nuclear war 
more likely, or which hinder progress towards a world without weapons of mass 
destruction. 
II As many of the contributors to its 25 th anniversary book, The CND Story, recognized, 
implicitly or explicitly. See, above all, the introduction and chapters 4,5,7, and 8. 
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resisting military and political authorities, above all physically, and thus 
focused on non-violent direct action as a campaign tactic. The "Mainstream 
Centrist" current stressed the importance of wining over Churches, the 
professions, the centre parties, and shaping public opinion; its preferred 
tactics were education, lobbying, and demonstrations. 12 Paul Byme has 
identified "sub-groups" within CND, each of which had what one might 
today call its 'red lines': non-negotiable principles. 13 These various parts of 
CND - as in any coalition - disagreed on various issues; I shall look at 
some of these below. Yet on a range of issues there was fundamental 
agreement: most importantly, on campaigning for unilateral nuclear 
disarmament by Britain, either tout court or in steps, or on unilateral non- 
deployment of weapons systems. 
In the period 1979-83/84, CND's focus was on preventing the 
deployment of cruise missiles and of the Trident missile system, as well as 
on opposing the government's civil defence plans. CND identified cruise 
and Trident missiles, as well as civil defence exercises, as part of a larger 
problem: the nuclear arms race in general, and, above all, the (alleged) 
trend in US nuclear weapons strategy towards warfighting. Cruise missiles 
(with Pershing 11 missiles, scheduled to be deployed in West Germany) 
above all were thought to be a component of such a strategy. (As was civil 
defence: a country's being prepared to survive a nuclear attack made it 
more likely that the same country would launch one. ) 
The emphasis on specific missiles (and on civil defence) in this 
period is reflected in the names of some of the groups that sprang up in 
1980 - for example, the Campaign Against the Oxfordshire Missiles 
(Campaign ATOM); East Anglia Campaign Against the Missiles; Newbury 
Campaign Against the Missiles; the Scottish Anti-Trident Campaign; in the 
campaigns conducted by CND - for example, the 500,000-strong petition 
against the deployment of cruise and Pershing 11 in Western Europe, 
handed in at Downing Street on 14 February 1981; the campaigns against 
12 Maguire, 'New Social Movements and Old Political Institutions', 97. 
" Byrne, The Campaignfor Nuclear Disarmament, 128. 
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the government's two civil defence exercises, Square Leg (September 
1980), and Hard Rock (scheduled for September 1982); and the mass 
protest at and around Greenham Common airbase at Easter 1983. It was 
also evident in the resolutions passed at the annual conference. The 1982 
conference, for example, passed "overwhelmingly" a resolution stating that 
it was "essential that CND's major effort next year, in particular, should be 
directed against the Cruise missile programme" (and advocated "serious .. 
. consider[ation]" of civil disobedience as a means of opposing the 
programme); and another that stated that the "campaign against Cruise 
missiles should be a main focus of activity during the year in which they 
are to be deployed, whilst the anti-Trident campaign ... should be widened 
[from Scotland] to the rest of Britain. 904 In this period there was no 
significant dissent within CND, or the broader the British peace movement, 
that opposition to these missile systems and to civil defence were 
campaigning priorities. 
After the defeat represented by the re-election of a Conservative 
government in 1983 and the deployment of cruise missiles from 1983, 
there was vigorous debate within CND about what its campaigning focus 
should be. It finally settled, in 1985, on the 'Basic Case', an education 
campaign that made the argument not against specific nuclear weapons 
systems but for complete unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain. 
As suggested above, there were, however, sometimes sharp 
disagreements, or frame disputes, within CND. END supporters were 
involved in some of the fiercest debates. Before analysing these I shall 
examine the relationship between END and CND. 
END: intertwined with CND 
END was, in various ways, intertwined with CND. Not only, as we have 
seen in Chapter 2, was CND one of the organizations that, in E. P. 
14 "Overwhelmingly" is from author's notes made at 1982 CND conference. Resolutions 
(9 and II respectively) in 'Final Agenda' of 1983 CND Annual Conference. CND 
Archive, LSE. 
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Thompson's words, "played a central part" in the launching of END. 15 
END founders also played a role in launching the new movement. In 1980 
various END founders were in demand as speakers at local peace group 
meetings and rallies, 16 none more so than Edward Thompson. In May and 
June Thompson addressed large meetings in Bristol and Nottingham as 
well as a "number of smaller meetings". On 7 June 700-800 people heard 
him speak in Bradford. He was the main speaker at 'national' END's big 
public launch meeting in London, at the Central Hall on 10 July. He 
addressed a 700-strong END rally in Newcastle at the end of August. 17 His 
"public meetings up and down the country launched many a local group", 
Hinton recalls. 18 He was the main speaker at the first massive CND 
demonstration of the new peace movement, in Trafalgar Square on 26 
October 1980. This prominence continued up to 1983: he was the main 
speaker at the national 1981 and 1983 rallies as well as at myriad local 
group meetings. In Thompson the peace activist END and CND were 
intimately linked. As in others': Dan Smith recalls that "from my point of 
view, [in 1980] there wasn't really that much difference [between END and 
CND]. If St Albans against the Missiles asks you to speak, you don't 
distinguish between END and CND". 19 
This intertwining of the END strand in the new British peace 
movement and CND was also evident at the local level. I have described in 
Chapter 3 how some peace activists set up explicitly END groups in 1980 
as well as later in the decade. END groups cooperated closely with CND 
and other groups. West Yorkshire END groups promoted the idea of a 
'Trans-Pennine Anti-War March' for Easter 1981 both at the regional CND, 
AGM and within West Yorkshire END; the march's co-ordinating 
committee was made up mainly of members of Hebden Bridge END; and 
15 'Thinking About the New Movement', END Bulletin 1,1980,13. 
16 Interviews with Dan Smith (5 August 2003) and Mary Kaldor (20 June 2002). 
17 'Support for Poland', END Bulletin 2,1980,20. 
18 Hinton, Protests & Visions, 184. 
" Interview with Dan Smith. 
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the march itself was made up of peace campaigners from END, CND and 
other peace groups. 20 In some cases, END groups simply merged with 
CND groups. In August 1980 Nottingham END combined with a small 
CND group founded in January to form Nottingham for Nuclear 
Disarmament (NND). NND's "'minimum' policy statement" combined 
elements of both END's and CND's programme: "Nottingham for Nuclear 
Disarmament is opposed to all nuclear weapons, East or West"; "we want 
Britain to renounce possession of such weapons and to close all nuclear 
weapons bases"; and NND "see[s] a nuclear weapons free Britain as an 
essential step towards a nuclear weapons free Europe and the world and the 
end of nuclear alliances". 21 
In many cases the programme of an END group was very similar to 
that of a CND group. Hull END, for example, was planning to launch its 
campaign with a public meeting with the left-wing Labour MP Bob Cryer; 
to put on a public meeting with Edward Thompson in February 1981; to 
organize a public campaign to "expose the pretensions and falsities" of 
local civil defence plans; and to investigate military research being 
conducted at Hull University. (And Hull END, as a CND affiliate, 
regularly submitted resolutions to CND Annual Conference . 
22) Sheffield 
END, for its part, organized a 'Week of Action' in October 1980, during 
which 'The War Game' was shown each night, a mock civil defence shelter 
was erected, and, on the last evening, a public meeting was held at which 
Mary Kaldor, Dan Smith, and Phil Asquith of Lucas Aerospace spoke. And 
NND had on its agenda for autumn 1980 a fund-raising concert starring 
Peggy Seeger and Ewen MacColl; a day of action and disseminating 
20 Graham Carey, 'Easter 198 1', END Bulletin 4, February 1981,15; 'Around the 
Camapign', Sanity 198 1,1, February-March, 15; West Yorkshire END correspondence 
and other documents: END Archive. 
2' Ann Kestenbaum, 'Nottingham for Nuclear Disarmament', END Bulletin 3,1980, 
19-20. 
22 Other END groups were not affiliated to CND (for instance, London END). 
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information in Nottingham; and organizing a 'Peace Train' to take 600 
supporters to the CND rally in London in October. 
These activities might have been those of peace groups which did 
not have the name 'END'. Though the END frame, as expressed in the 
END Appeal, was different to that of CND, this did not for the most part 
translate into radically different campaigning agendas on the ground. 
Moreover, local CND/peace groups 'supported' or (after mid- 19 8 5, when 
British END became a membership organization) were affiliated to END. 
In addition, as we saw in Chapter 3, local CND groups hosted END events 
(for example, the 1983 Autumn 'Five Nations' meetings, at which speakers 
from the five cruise/Pershing deployment countries spoke at public 
meetings around Britain; and the Autumn 1984 'Beyond the Blocs' 
meetings, at which exiles from CEE/SU and END and other West 
European peace activists spoke at similar meetings about the Cold War and 
the East-West politics of the movement). At local/regional level CND and 
END groups were part of the same movement networks. 
It is therefore not surprising that most END supporters were also 
members of CND. The 1982 END survey reveals that 74 per cent of END 
supporters were "paid-up members of national CND"23 ; 85 per cent 
belonged to a local disarmament group other than END. (Such a group 
need not have been, but very likely was, affiliated to national CND. ) And 
67 per cent of END supporters said they would be members of END and 
CND if END became a national membership organization. 
At the same time, activists participated simultaneously in the 
leaderships of both organizations - in McCarthy and Zald's terminology, 
the two organizations had overlapping 'board' memberships. 24 These 
activists included: 
- Dan Smith, a founder of END, a former CND national organizer (1973-4) 
and general secretary (1975-6), and a member of its National Council. 
From 1980 to 1984 he was active in both British END (he was a member of 
23 Eighty-seven per cent of whom had joined since 1979. 
2,1 Zald and McCarthy, 'Social Movement Industries', 170. 
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the Coordinating Committee until 1984, and British END chairperson in 
1982) and CND (he was a member of CND National Council from 198 1). 
From 1984 he concentrated his peace work in CND. (He was a CND vice- 
chair in 1984-87. ) 
- Meg Beresford, END's first organizing secretary (June 1981 to November 
1983), who was a founding member of Campaign Atom/Oxford CND in 
1980, a leading member of CND's National Council (1981-1984), and 
CND's General Secretary from 1984 to 1989. 
- James Hinton, in 1980 a founding member of Leamington END and a 
member of the END Coordinating Committee from 1980 to 1982, who was 
a member of CND National Council from 1981 to 1987 and the 
'linkperson' (that is, chairperson) of the important Projects Committee for 
much of the same period. He was a key figure in the CND leadership. 
- Julian Harber, a founder of West Yorkshire END in 1980 and an active 
member of it until 1985, and chairperson of END in 1983, who was a 
member of North West Regional CND from 1981 to 1987, a delegate of the 
region to CND National Council from 1983 to 1987, and a member of 
International Committee from 1983 to 1987. 
- Barbara Einhorn, a member of the END CC, and active in the END 
Women's Lateral Committee and in its German Working Group, who sat, 
as a co-opted member, on CND's International Committee from 1985 to 
1987. 
- Sheena Phillips, who sat on END's Coordinating Committee from 1983 
to 1985, was a member of the END Journal editorial collective, and was 
CND's Information Officer in the late 1980s; 
- Ben Webb, who, as a deputy editor of the END Journal from 1987 to 
1989, helped shape the magazine's content, and then did the same for 
CND's Sanity ftom 1989 to 1991; and 
- Edward Thompson, co-founder of END, who was a vice-president of 
CND (an honorary post) from 1981 and who sat on CND's National 
Council in 1983 and on its International Committee (1983-85 and 1987. ) 
(Thompson, of course, was 'involved' in CND in innumerable other ways: 
as the author of books and articles for peace movement, left, and broader 
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audiences, and as a speaker at CND and other peace movement rallies and 
festivals. ) 
In addition, activists who had begun in CND structures became 
involved in END. CND's General Secretary, Bruce Kent, for example, was 
one of the founders and a member of the original END 'Committee of 
Seven' (Chapters 2 and 3). Kent remained on the END Coordinating 
Committee until 1983, when he resigned because of work pressure. Kent 
was chainnan of CND from 1977 to 1979 and its General Secretary from 
1979 to 1985. Jane Mayes, the linkperson of the International Committee 
from 1981 to 1989, became END chairperson in 1989 (and was actively 
involved with the END Convention process from 1982); and Stephen 
Brown, CND's International Worker from 1985 to 1989, was an active 
member of END's German Working Group. 
National END and CND also cooperated in a range of actions and 
po icies. For example, both Sanity and Campaign! regularly opened their 
pages to articles by END activists or to advertisements or other infon-nation 
about END publications and campaigns; and CND activists published in 
the END Journal; from the end of 1982 to early 1984 the END office took 
up two rooms in one of the CND buildings in Finsbury Park in north 
London; Christian CND, one of CND's most active sections, had a 
representative on the END Churches Lateral Committee; and there was, 
until CND appointed an international worker in 1984, a "tacit agreement" 
between the two organizations about "task specialization": CND would 
concentrate on the British campaign while END would "represent the 
British movement abroad". 25 
The links between END and CND were formalized at various 
points: in 1983, for instance, Hugh Court (of Lewes CND), who replaced 
Bruce Kent as CND representative on the END CC, wrote reports of the 
CC's meetings for the CND International Committee. From 1985, the IC 
and the CC exchanged minutes. 
25 Hinton, Protests and Visions, 188. On task specialization see Zald and McCarthy, 
'Social Movement Industries', 170. 
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This cooperation was, arguably, aided by the fact that END was not 
competing with CND for external resources; or, to be more precise, that 
END was not threatening to attract resources that would otherwise have 
gone to CND. END ceded 'defeat' to, or withdrew from such competition 
over resources with, CND when END's founders decided not to make it a 
national membership organization. 
END supporters being in CND; END groups affiliating to CND, 
and CND groups supporting/affiliating to END; END groups participating 
in CND decision-making structures; CND groups hosting END events; 
campaigners being simultaneously active in both British END and CND, 
and/or moving between them; formal ties in the shape, for example, of 
exchanges of minutes of key committees: all this indicates not only how 
densely intertwined END was with CND, but also that the bulk of END 
supporters, at least, regarded British END and CND as complementary 
organizations, working broadly towards the same goals. Most would 
probably have agred with Edward Thompson's sentiment, expressed in an 
article in Sanity: "END ... does not contradict the aims of 
CND, but 
extends these aims to the whole continent. . each of us needs the other". 
26 
Influencing CND 
Nevertheless, END and CND were separate entities, and ENDers were 
trying to promote a distinct approach within the movement and above all 
CND; that is, they were actively trying to 'extend' (or even, in one case, to 
'constrict') CND's frame. They were doing this specifically by - as any 
pressure group would - trying to shape CND's agenda; to influence CND's 
discursive position; and to shape CND's behaviour. 
27 Byrne describes past 
and present END supporters - he calls them "internationalists" - as one of 
the sub-groups within CND. 28 It is not, of course, always easy to show 
26 E. P. Thompson, 'Eurozone Reality', Sanity, 1981,5, OctoberiNovember, 22. 
27 See Keck and Sikki nk, A ctivists Beyond Borders, 25. 
28 Byrne, The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, II 3ff. 
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influence. The fact that x advocates y, and z does y, does not mean that z 
does y because x has advocated it. Nevertheless, as we shall see, there is 
plausible evidence that END supporters did try to and, at least up to a 
point, actually did influence CND. They did so in two broad ways. On the 
one hand, by disseminating END ideas, both in their own and others' 
publications and at public meetings and rallies, and by conducting 
campaigns: all of these activities aimed to persuade peace campaigners to 
frame the nuclear weapons problem in END terms. 
On the other hand, at the national level they participated in certain 
key broad policy debates - frame disputes, when CND activists disagreed 
about campaign priorities. They also tried to shape the policy work of 
National Council and, more narrowly, of particular committees - and, 
above all, of the International Committee. 
Policy debates 
The frame disputes in CND in which END supporters took sides and tried 
to shape the direction of the CND campaign took place amongst the most 
active activists: those who came to CND conferences, or were members of 
CND Council, or were senior figures in CND and/or END. They involved 
at least in part - as one would expect - attitudes within CND, and CND's 
official position, towards the superpowers. Before looking at them I will 
consider briefly some evidence regarding these attitudes. 
The only survey of CND members which asked questions about 
attitudes towards the Soviet Union - the autumn 1985 Nias /Byrne survey 
- asked the question "Who do you think bears the main responsibility for 
the arms race in recent years? ". 53 per cent answered the "USA", and 42 
per cent the "USA & USSR equally,,. 29 (Byrne does not say what the 
remaining 5% said; Nias categorizes them as "Don't knows. According to 
Byrne, only one person answered the "USSR"; Nias does not give a 
29 Peter Nias, 'CND National Membership Survey 1985', June 1986, unpublished. Byrne 
analyses the results in The Campaignfor Nuclear Disarmarnen. t 
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percentage for this answer. ) 30 The question and its answers are quite crude. 
It would have been possible for someone to regard the USA as the main 
driver of the nuclear arms race and to see the superpowers as jointly 
responsible for the Cold War as a whole. Or, the view that the USA bore 
main responsibility for the arms race could have been held by someone 
who was sympathetic or by someone who was hostile to the Soviet system. 
These figures do not explain underlying attitudes to the superpowers. 
Nevertheless, the figures do indicate that more CND members thought the 
USA bore greater responsibility for the arms race than did the USA and 
USSR together (and almost none thought the USSR more responsible). 
The Nias/Byme survey also asked whether or not respondents 
thought CND "should ... campaign more actively than it already does 
against the nuclear weapons policies" of the USA and the USSR. Seventy- 
four per cent said 'yes' to the USA question, 69 per cent 'yes' to the USSR 
question. Byrne interprets this as meaning that "one [cannot] assume that 
activists (or indeed the less active) were more interested in campaigning 
against American rather than Soviet nuclear weapons policy": these figures 
show that "an overwhelming majority thought that CND should campaign 
more actively against the nuclear strategy of both super-powers". 31 Byme 
implies (rightly) that these answers suggest a basic 'non-alignment' 
amongst the respondents. However, they do not tell us whether or not the 
respondents thought CND should campaign as actively against Soviet as 
against US nuclear weapons; one can only speculate about this. 
The views recorded in the Nias/Byrne survey were mainly those of 
passive CND members. 32 Amitabh Mattoo, by contrast, conducted a 
"detailed examination" of the records of 41 peace groups founded in 1980: 
one can cautiously assume that, since such materials would have been 
30 There are some minor discrepancies between Nias's and Byrne's respective 
presentations of these figures. 
31 Only forty-four percent of the respondents ý, vere members of local groups; only just 
over one quarter of these were active members. See Byrne, The Campaignfor Nuclear 
Disarmament, 75. 
32 Byrne, ibid., 69-70. 
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created by active members, the attitudes revealed would have been those of 
activists. On the basis of these records, Mattoo categorizes 30 peace groups 
as both "Anti-US" and "Anti-SU", while only 11 were "Anti-US" and 
"Silent about SU". 
33 
In addition, James Hinton has argued that, that the "great majority 
of CND activists agreed that Russia bore some share of responsibility for 
keeping the Cold War going, and that it was vital for the new movement to 
be unaligned with either superpower". However, "many peace activists 
were reluctant to break altogether ftom the view that American imperialism 
- not the Cold War itself - was the main threat to world peace. , 
34 
These accounts -a survey of national CND members (some of 
whom were also local group members), an examination of local group 
records, and the analysis (cum-recollections and impressions) of a leading 
CND activist - do not provide identical evidence. But they do suggest that 
non-alignment, in the sense of being strongly opposed to Soviet weapons 
as well as to US weapons (though not as strongly), was an important 
characteristic of CND. The form and themes of some of CND's 
demonstrations indicates this non-alignment. One of the slogans of the 
1981 demonstration - reproduced on some of the official placards - was 
'No Cruise! No Trident! No SS20s! '. In June 1983 CND organized a 
'human chain' between the Soviet and US embassies in London. The 1984 
national demonstration, on 26 October, on the theme 'The human race, not 
the arrns race', went past the US and Soviet embassies to a rally. Similarly, 
the 1983 conference passed a resolution that, among other things stated that 
the "movement for nuclear disarmament has to be built equally within both 
power blocs, and unreservedly condemns all attempts to restrict freedom of 
speech and assembly for peace groups and disarmament groups whether in 
Eastern Europe or in Western Europe" and "condemn[ed]" both NATO's 
33 Mattoo, 'The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament', 63. 
34 Hinton, Protests & Visions, 184-87. 
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new weapons [cruise and Pershing 11] as well as the "Soviet announcement 
of new weapons deployments in Europe and the Western Atlantic". 35 
Yet these accounts also point to 'anti-Americanism' being a 
significant element in the CND campaign - as we shall see below. In the 
strategic frame disputes within CND in which END supporters were 
involved the tensions between these attitudes and those associated with 
END are reflected. END supporters were trying, among other things, to 
propagate, explicitly or implicitly, an END perspective on the superpowers: 
that is, that the USA and the Soviet Union, with their respective alliances, 
shared responsibility for the nuclear arms race and the Cold War. One such 
dispute concerned whether or not CND should campaign for (as opposed to 
just being formally in favour of) British withdrawal from NATO; another 
whether or not CND should campaign more strongly against Soviet nuclear 
weapons; and a third CND's campaign focus after cruise deployment: 
should it include an East-West nuclear weapons freeze? 
Withdrawalfrom NATO 
One of CND's constitutional aims was the "unilateral abandonment by 
Britain of... nuclear alliances". 36 However, the evidence suggests CND 
activists and passive members were divided about the priority of 
withdrawal from NATO as a campaigning issue. Only 43 per cent of the 
respondents to the 1985 Nias/Byme survey thought that Britain should 
leave NATO; and only 18 per cent ranked "Withdrawal from NATO" as 
the "most important" of six possible campaigning areas (it came bottom of 
the liSt. ). 37 The "otherwise united" 1982 conference was "split right down 
the middle" on the issue: 38 it voted by a small majority to instruct National 
Council "to campaign for British withdrawal from the NATO nuclear 
35 See TND's East-West Policy', CND International Briefing Paper, undated, END 
Archive. 
36 CND constitution. 
37 Nias, 'CND National Membership Survey 1985'. 
38 Conference report, Sanity, December 1982,28. 
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alliance". This suggest that, while passive members - at least in 1985 - 
may have not regarded such a campaign as very important, a significant 
number of activists did. 
CND activists argued repeatedly, and often fiercely, about British 
withdrawal from NATO. Yet, despite the support within CND for 
withdrawing from NATO, expressed in the 1982 national conference vote, 
CND never did campaign strongly for it. (Though it did stimulate some 
debate within the movement by publishing both information about NATO, 
and arguments for and against withdrawal, as well as for Britain remaining 
within NATO but working to make it non-nuclear. ) There is some evidence 
to suggest that leading CND figures associated with END played a part in 
ensuring that CND did not make NATO withdrawal a priority; they did so, 
with others, by deliberately not implementing conference policy. While one 
activist grouping within CND, centred on Labour CND, 39 wanted CND to 
prioritise the campaign for withdrawal from NATO; two others, in the 
leadership, blocked attempts to do this: one consisted of leading CNDers 
with close ties to the Labour Party (for example Joan Ruddock, chairperson 
from 1981 to 1985), who opposed this prioritisation largely on pragmatic 
grounds - that is, because they knew it would be electorally unpopular. 
The other grouping was made up of those leadership figures 
associated with END - what Byrne calls the "internationalist" school. 
40 
The active support given by some in CND to NATO withdrawal as a 
campaigning issue was not shared by most END activists. The argument 
that often, implicitly or explicitly, backed up calls for British withdrawal 
from NATO and for CND to campaign on the issue - namely, that the 
NATO and or the USA were much more or even solely to blame for the 
39 But including others hostile to the Trotskyism or quasi-Trotskylsm of Labour CND, 
such as former CND Chair and Communist Party member John Cox. (See his speech to 
the 1982 conference, 'Never Water Down Our Moral Message', Sanitj,, December 1982, 
29. ) 
40 For this three-part typology, see Byme The Campaignfor Nuclear Disarmament, 
113-117. 
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arm s rac e-J arred with the END analysi S. 41 The END view ftirther implied 
that withdrawal from NATO was not, alone, of key importance; it would 
be important only as part of a reciprocal process of bloc dissolution. In 
addition, END activists referred to the importance of keeping in line with 
the campaigning priorities of other West European movements or leading 
movement organizations as a reason not to headline the issue: in the 
Netherlands, West Germany, Italy, and Norway, they argued, movements 
were not arguing for their respective states to withdraw from NATO. 
Campaigning against Soviet Nuclear Weapons 
Whether or not to campaign for British withdrawal from NATO was a 
frequent source of strong disagreement within CND. Whether or not to 
campaign against Soviet nuclear weapons, or the Soviet Union's role in the 
arms race, was much less so; yet, when it was debated, it gave rise to fierce 
controversy. 
As we have seen, CND expressed opposition to the Soviet Union 
usually as part of an attack on both superpowers. The only public action 
organized by national CND that was directed solely against Soviet nuclear 
weapons was the protest against Soviet 'counter-measures' - the 
deployments of SS-s, -22s and -23s in 'response' to the first deployments 
of cruise missiles in the West - in London on 8 December 1984.42 After 
leafleting the public, the demonstrators handed giant Christmas cards 
which stated CND's opposition to the Soviet missiles at the Soviet, 
Czechoslovak, and GDR embassies (the GDR and Czechoslovakia were 
the intended recipients of the missiles); at the same time individual activists 
'posted' their own cards, each addressed to an official organization or 
private citizen in one of the three countries, into giant post boxes. This was 
41 One of the hard-left candidates at the 1985 CND conference for the post of CND Chair, 
Joy Hurcombe, the Chair of Labour CND, stated that the United States was entirely to 
blame for the nuclear arms race. Jamie Dettmer et al, TND to Campaign on "Basic 
Case"', END Journal 19, December 1985-January 1986,8. 
42 CND Executive proposed such an action/actions in a January 1984 document 'Forward 
Planning, A Framework for 1984'. Campaign No. 27 (January 1984), 2. 
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part of Operation Christmas Card, CND's 'detente from below' campaign, 
which was an initiative of END supporters in CND. The event included a 
torchlight procession through central London and ended with a short rally 
near the GDR embassy in Belgravia. 43 
This protest caused some controversy within CND. At the 1984 
CND conference Shipley CND (a stronghold of pro-Soviet opinion) 44 , 
submitted an emergency resolution (for which it got at least 25 signatures) 
calling on the conference to cancel the demonstration "in view of the 
decision of the Soviet Union to agree to new talks with the U. S. 
government without conditions, and in order to assist in the generation of a 
climate for agreement". Nevertheless, the action took place, albeit on a 
45 
modest scale . By contrast, the one attempt to make more 
forceful 
campaigning against Soviet nuclear weapons official policy, produced 
fierce controversy and ended in effective defeat. A resolution at the 1984 
national conference that called on CND to "campaign vigorously against 
Soviet nuclear weapons and policies" (whilst, among other things, "taking 
care to avoid cold-war rhetoric") was, after prolonged debate, not voted on. 
To do so, CND chairperson Joan Ruddock said, would cause 
"divisiveness"; 46 she would also have feared that that a formal vote would 
result in defeat for the resolution and a public relations disaster for CND. 
END supporters were centrally involved in this attempt to change 
CND policy. Unlike in the NATO debate, they were 'movers', not 
6resisters': some of the resolutions parts of which eventually became the 
motion debated at the conference were submitted by groups or regions 
sympathetic to (or with key activists sympathetic to) END: Campaign 
Atom/Oxford CND, Lewes CND, Battersea CND, West Region CND. 
Some of the speakers for the motion were also END supporters or 
43 See Campaign No. 37, November 1984,12-13. 
44 Its best-known member was Vic Allen. He later proudly admitted to having reported to 
the GDR Embassy on the discussions within CND. 
45 The author participated in this event and recalls that the rally was small: a few hundred 
strong at most. 
4b See Paul Brown, 'CND Ducks Call for Hardline on Russia', Guardian 
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sympathizers: Rip Bulkeley, Edward Thompson, and Dan Plesch. 47 By 
contrast with the NATO-withdrawal issue, however, this time the END 
6perspective' was on the losing side. 
The fate of this resolution can be interpreted as a "victory" for the 
64 48 pro-Soviet lobby" in CND . 
However, certain qualifications need to be 
entered. First, as one of the sponsors of the resolution noted, this 'victory' 
was at least in part due to the better organizational skills of the opponents 
of the resolution: they had 'mobilised' for the conference for months in 
advance - and were thus present in greater numbers than at previous 
conferences; and at the conference they made skilful use of "factional 
organisation and ... procedural 
devices", something which they had leamt 
in their "long years in the wilderness of the authoritarian left". 49 At the 
same time, the "wording of the resolution had been careless, giving an 
unnecessary ... 
impression of absolute negativity towards Soviet foreign 
policy as a whole": this had made it impossible for those people who were 
"not against a non-aligned stance for CND as such", but who did not accept 
an apparent stance of "blanket hostility" towards the USSR - and who 
thought campaigning against NATO missiles was the priority - to vote for 
the resolution. 50 In other words, poor planning on the part of the 
resolution's sponsors, and skilful use of CND's structures and procedures 
on the part of its opponents, were two of the reasons the motion was not 
voted on. Nevertheless, the whole affair highlighted - publicly at least 
51_ 
some significant matters about CND. Not only did the fact that some CND 
47 The author was one of these activists. 
48 See Mattoo, 'The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament', 219-220. 
49 Rip Bulkeley, 'Free, Free CND! A draft pamphlet on the need for CND to keep to a 
politically independent and non-aligned position with respect to Soviet nuclear weapons, 
and on the ways we need to organise to ensure this. ' n. d.. END Archive. The reference is 
to Communist and Trotskyist groupings in CND. 
50 Rip Bulkeley, 'The Barr Hall Meeting, 8-12-84' (a report of an informal discussion 
amongst about 30 activists immediately after the CND action of that day). Unpublished. 
END archive. 
5' The print media (predictably) devoted much attention to this event. 
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groups had felt it necessary to submit a resolution calling on CND to 
campaign more forcefully against Soviet nuclear weapons indicate that the 
organization as a whole had been relatively quiet about these weapons (as 
it had). The debate itself revealed that the spectrum of views within the 
campaign included strong opposition to CND's criticizing the Soviet Union 
sharply, if at all. Finally, the debate showed that Trotskyists and strongly 
pro-Soviet Communists could, when necessary, be mobilised to defeat a 
clear anti-Soviet position. 
To Campaign for a Freeze? 
From the outset, the question whether or not CND should campaign for a 
Freeze was controversial (and made more so by the fact that it was not 
always clear if a unilateral freeze by Britain was meant or a bilateral 
freeze by both superpowers or, indeed, blocs. ) In April 1983, National 
Council endorsed a resolution that called for a unilateral freeze by Britain 
on "nuclear weapons systems, testing and deployment" and declared 
52 
support for a bilateral freeze on "SS-20s, Cruise, Pershing-2 and Trident" . 
CND activists associated with END were amongst those who advocated 
CND's calling for a freeze. The official debate about the 'way forward' for 
CND after the first deployment of the cruise missiles in late 1983 - 
following the re-election of a Conservative government in June of that year 
- was kicked off in November 1983 by Dan Smith in Sanity. Arguing for a 
combination of "urgency" with "patience", he outlined the "signposts" that 
the movement needed: an "independent British nuclear freeze", which 
would mean not introducing the Trident missile system nor any more cruise 
missiles, nor the Tornado bomber; a "campaign against the US nuclear 
bases", which would entail, inter alia, getting rid of the cruise missiles 
already deployed; supporting the "bilateral US-Soviet freeze"; and, 
because the "strategic goal of the disarmament movements must be the 
dissolution of the blocs and a nuclear-free Europe ... giv[ing] more 
prominence to the campaign for a nuclear-free Europe". The last two 
52 John Cox, 'Which "Freeze"T, Sanity, February 1984,9. 
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elements would entail expressing opposition to Soviet as well as NATO 
nuclear weapons. Smith's reasons for advocating this framework included 
appealing to as wide a constituency as possible while continuing to express 
44 radicalism", and "facilitat[ing] international cooperation among the 
disarmament movements". 53 Julian Harber - at that point Chair of END - 
writing in the END Journal, argued that "the broadest possible coalition 
against cruise and Trident and for a nuclear freeze" had to be constructed; 
such a coalition would have to include unilateralists and those opposed to 
it; and one of its aims would be to promote cooperation with movements 
54 
abroad . Mary Kaldor, in a letter to Sanity, backed up the call for a freeze 
"on development and production of all nuclear weapons" and combined 
this with one for the "withdrawal of all nuclear weapons on foreign 
territory". She described this as multilateral because it applied to all 
nuclear weapons states, but achievable by independent steps. She, too, 
promoted her proposal as a way connecting the British movement with 
movements abroad: "European and North American peace movements" 
needed "anew common platform". 55 Later that year, another leading 
CNDer with links to END, James Hinton, repeated the call for a unilateral 
freeze on "deployment, production, research" in an article that called for a 
campaign for a non-nuclear defence policy that would appeal to both 
centrist and Labour voters. 56 
Arguments for and against CND adopting the freeze were made by 
others, too, in the pages of Sanity. But the demand had effectively been 
defeated already at the 1983 annual conference. Scottish CND submitted a 
resolution to the conference that called for a "unilateral freeze campaign in 
Britain" as a "step towards" unilateral nuclear disarmament, asked National 
Council to make cancellation of the Trident programme part of this 
53 Dan Smith, 'Oct. 22: Where Will you BeT, Sanity, November 1983,25 & 27. 
54 Julian Harber, 'Tory Fudge Sweetens Bomb', END Journal 5, August-September 
1983,17. 
55 Mary Kaldor, 'Independent Steps', Sanity, December 1983,36. 
56 James Hinton, 'No Longer Just Hoping For Miracles', Sanity, October 1984,10. 
campaign, and declared support for a bi- or multilateral freeze. 57 However, 
after a sometimes angry debate, the resolution was narrowly defeated. 
Here, as elsewhere, the basic argument was that, by adopting the Freeze 
demand, CND would 'dilute' its message. The proposal was not submitted 
again to an annual conference. 
In the end, the campaign decided to focus on British unilateral 
nuclear disarmament as such - the 'Basic Case'. Launched in April 1986, 
the Basic Case campaign was, in its use of advertising techniques, more 
sophisticated than previous campaigns; but its focus on British nuclear 
weapons indicated the lack of influence of internationalist - let alone END- 
tinged internationalist - arguments in CND. 58 Here, too, END's influence 
was minimal. 
International Committee and National Council 
END supporters were present on various committees of CND. But, with 
regard to the formulation of CND's international policy, the key body on 
which they sat was the International Committee. Though the IC dealt with 
the whole range of CND's international contacts, its international work fell 
into three main areas: membership of the two main fora of the non-aligned 
Western peace movement, the END Convention 'process' and the IPCC; 
and a "process of dialogue" with official peace councils in the EaSt. 59 This 
dialogue took the form of relations with official peace committees and with 
defence and foreign policy experts at official research institutes in the 
Soviet Union, either in bilateral meetings, or in multilateral fora such as the 
conferences organized by the Greek peace organization KEADEA. The 
centrality of the 'dialogue' with official bodies is reflected in the the fact 
that the sections on East-West contacts in the available minutes of 
57 Resolution 2 1, Final Agenda, CND Annual Conference 1983. END Archive. 
58 See Elena Lieven, 'Selling Independent Nuclear Disarmament', Sanity, April 1986, 
14-15; John Milner, CND's Autumn Campaign: Britain's Bomb', Sanity, September 
1986,8.; Hinton, Protests & Visions, 188 & 193-194. 
59 See 'Introducing CND's International Work', CND International Briefing Paper, 
undated, END archive. 
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International Committee meetings deal mainly with contacts with the peace 
committees. 60 Nevertheless, the relations with the peace committees did not 
entail identifying with the committees. The official CND 'Guidelines on 
East-West Contracts' were based on the 'non-aligned' 1983 CND 
conference resolution (see above); they specify clearly, for example, that in 
meetings with official bodies CND members should "express CND's 
policy on all relevant matters" and should "express CND's support for 
peace activists and peace rights in all countries"; they are reasonably 
positive about CND having relations with unofficial groups; and they state 
clearly CND's support for "peace rights". 61 
CND's interest in talking to unofficial groups in CEE/SU was not 
just rhetorical. On the 1985 and 1987 visits to the Soviet Union, CND 
delegations met (or tried to meet) members of the independent peace 
group, the Moscow Trust Group (see chapter 6); the CND observers at the 
1983 World Peace Council conference in Prague met Charter 77 
signatories (see below), and CND sent an official reply to Charter 77's 
1985 Prague Appeal; the link person and international worker met 
independent activists during a visit to Hungary at the end of 1986; 62 and the 
IC sent the international worker to the peace and human rights seminar in 
Warsaw in May 1987 organized by Freedom and Peace. 63 On the other 
hand, CND never became deeply involved in the dialogue between 
Western peace groups and independent activists in the East; CND activists 
did not see this relationship as a central part of their campaign (see Chapter 
60 In his July 1986 report the IC worker wrote : "As usual, there has been a substantial 
amount of time devoted to East/West contacts (mostly, however, of the official sort)". 
The official CND 'Guidelines on East-West Contracts' (agreed by the CND Executive 
in June 1985) deal first, and with fewer qualifications, with "discussions with official 
movements" and then with "discussions with unofficial and autonomous peace groups". 
END archive. 
61 Indeed, the Guidelines indicates that CND was non-aligned. 
62 See 'Back from the USSR', Sanity, December 1985,34-39. 
6' He was refused a visa by the Polish authonities. 
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6 64 ). And while, as indicated, CND did use the restrictive concept 'peace 
rights' to speak out in defence of some peace activists in CEE/SU (and 
Turkey) who were being harassed by their regimes, it was careful to avoid 
addressing the question of human right abuses as such, let alone the lack of 
democracy, in CEE/SU. 
What role, if any, did END supporters on the IC and elsewhere play 
in influencing CND's Ostpolitik? END supporters in CND served on the IC 
on and off from its foundation in 198 1, as either National Council or co- 
opted members. Some END supporters certainly felt it was important to 
have an END presence on the IC: it was needed to counteract the influence 
of activists too sympathetic to the CEE/SU regimes. "Most of the people. . 
. 
interested in the IC", Dan Smith recalls, wanted to "link up to official 
peace committees" in CEE/SU. It was therefore crucial that CND's 
international policy would remain in reasonable hands; specifically, this 
meant having as 'linkperson'-someone who did not share this view. 65 Julian 
Harber has stated that he joined the IC in order to counteract the influence 
of the "wrong people". 66 Other END supporters at various points on the IC 
included (as I have indicated above): Edward Thompson, Dan Smith, Paul 
Oestreicher, Barbara Einhorn, Julian Harber, and Gerard Holden (an END 
staff member and Soviet specialist in 1982-83). Dan Smith has argued that 
Jane Mayes - whose selection as IC linkperson he backed - in 
collaboration, after 1984, with the CND International Worker, Stephen 
Brown, made sure that the IC did not "link up" with official peace 
committees. Jane Mayes has argued that, by being on the IC, END 
supporters not only "inspired CND to be more internationalist", but also 
helped to keep it "OK" - it prevented CND from being "hijacked". She 
also remembers that there were frequent arguments on the IC over policy 
64 James Hinton recalls that, for CND activists, "resisting American cruise missiles was 
both more tangible and less problematic than seeking alliances with dissident forces in the 
East". Protest and Visions, 186 
" interview with Dan Smith. 
66 Interview xvith Julian Harber. 
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towards CEE/SU. 67 (The hostility some members of the IC displayed 
towards an END-influenced approach to East-West affairs, and towards 
Thompson, lends weight to the assertions that END supporters had some 
influence within CND. 68 ) 
Arguably, the outcome of a high-profile event in CND's relations 
with officialdom and independent groups in the East was influenced by 
END supporters. In 1983 there was sharp debate was about whether or not 
CND should attend the World Peace Council-organized 'Assembly for Life 
and Peace, Against Nuclear War' in Prague in June 1983, and, if so, with 
what status. On the IC and at the National Council Edward Thompson 
proposed a boycott, arguing that, since that this would be a pro-Soviet 
event, there would not only be no benefit to, but, indeed, significant 
disadvantages for CND in attending it. CND's opponents at home would 
use attendance, with whatever status, as a stick with which to beat CND; 
and CND's presence would hurt peace movement relations with 
independent groups in the East. 69 Other, 'pro-Soviet', members of the IC 
advocated full attendance. Bruce Kent, by contrast, suggested sending 
observers: not only because the Soviet Union was making the most 
constructive disarmament proposals, but also because attending the 
Assembly would be an important 'bridge-building' exercise between East 
and West of the sort CND to which was committed . 
70 This proposal was 
finally agreed after a sharp debate at National Council, in which some 
67 Interview with Jane Mayes, 17 December 2002. 
68 See the internal memo by George Hutchinson - 'CND and Dissident Peace Groups in 
Socialist Countries', June 1983 - in which he says that he is gravely concerned that CND 
is being pressured into pursuing close relations with independent peace groups in the 
CEE/SU; and the memo by Vic Allen - untitled, 7 November 1984 - in which he accuses 
END supporters in CND - he names Thompson and Jane Mayes - of being engaged in 
an "anti-Soviet crusade" for the sake of which they are ready to "sacrifice the unity of the 
peace movement". END Archive. 
69 'The Prague Peace Assembly: Some Problems', memo for END and CND, 9 March 
1983, CND 
archive. 
70 'Notes on Edward Thompson's Prague Peace Assembly Memo of 9.3.83', undated, 
CND archive. 
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delegates not on the IC also argued in favour of full attendance. TNvo 
leading Council members (John Bloomfield, a Czech speaker and member 
of the IC; and Roger Spiller, a vice-chair) attended the Assembly as 
observers. They also had three meetings with signatories of Charter 77. 
(Significantly, the meetings were highlighted in the prominent report of the 
visit in Sanity 71 .) In other words, the policy decision taken can be seen as a 
compromise between an END and a 'pro-Soviet' position. 
One could argue that CND's participation in both the IPCC and the 
END Convention process was also partly the result of END supporters 
being active in the CND leadership, both on the IC and elsewhere. Some 
leading CND activists, including Bruce Kent, were at times unsympathetic 
to the IPCC and/or the END Convention process; 72 indeed, according to 
Thompson, Kent tried to have CND pull out of both. Critics of END in the 
CND leadership - which, according to Thompson, included CND Chair 
Joan Ruddock - had, he argued, been held in check by the influence of 
END supporters; while the most hostile people, such as Vic Allen, had 
73 been neutralised . The commitment of some 
in the CND leadership at least 
to the END Convention process was made clear by CND being the main 
organizer of the 1987 END Convention, which took place in Coventry. 74 
At the same time, however, CND's relative lack of internationalism, or at 
least the reticence many in CND felt towards END, is also reflected in the 
fact that, though CND was involved in the END Convention process, there 
were still significant activists in the leadership who were unenthusiastic 
about it. The evaluation of the Coventry Convention by members of the 
preparatory committee and CND staff members indicates that CND 
" Jon Bloomfield and Roger Spiller, 'Why We Went and What We Did', Sanity, August 
1983,6-7. One British delegate more sympathetic to the World Peace Council reported 
that the "British delegation" [of which the CND observers were not a part] "unanimously 
condemned Bloomfield and Spiller's "divisive activities in spending most of their time 
[with] .... Charter 
77 signatories". Douglas Peroni, ' Observers of What? ', Letter, Sanity, 
September 1983,36. 
72 See interview with Jane Mayes. 
73 E. P. Thompson, Letter to Paul Anderson, 10 March 1985, END Archive. 
"' See interview with Dan Smith. 
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Council's support for the event was "lukewarm" and it "wasn't a full- 
fledged CND project"; as a result, CND did not "mobilise effectively for 
the Convention either in groups or in Specialist Sections. 75 
The evidence suggests that END supporters both failed and 
succeeded in promoting END ideas within national CND and so shape the 
content of national CND's campaigning. 76 On the one hand, where they 
were arguing against other tendencies within CND in public debate - at the 
annual conference or in the pages of Sanity -they were unsuccessful. END 
supporters were on the losing side in the NATO debate, in the Soviet 
nuclear weapons and policies debate, and in the discussion about the 
campaigning priorities for CND after 1983. Here it was evident that the 
END approach was just one amongst many in CND, and by no means the 
dominant one. On the other hand, END supporters were more influential in 
the national committees and councils of CND. Arguably they helped stop 
campaigning for British withdrawal from NATO becoming a CND priority. 
In addition, they helped CND maintain what Dan Smith has called a 
4reasonable' position in East-West relations: maintaining a dialogue with 
official bodies - without identifying with them - while keeping up contacts 
with independent groups, and, at the same time, remaining actively 
involved in the non-aligned networks of the Western peace movement. 
They were able to do so partly because they sat on right committee - the IC 
- and/or on other leading bodies; and partly because of the general 
influence of END within the CND leadership. Dan Smith has argued that 
the fact that there were people on the National Council and the Executive 
Committee who were "happy and supportive" for Jane Mayes and Stephen 
Brown to act as they did is a "product of the END influence in a much 
75 'Evaluation of END Convention - by members of BPC and staff who were involved in 
preparation and at Coventry'. END Archive. 
76 CND and END cooperated easily on campaigns or other activities restricted to the 
West. For example, both were members of the North Atlantic Network, the IC co-funded 
a fact-finding visit to West Germany by two END activists in mid- 1985; and in December 
1986 an IC member and an END activist went on a joint fact-finding visit to France. This 
cooperation on Western matters was symbolized by the regular exchange of papers 
between the IC worker and the END worker (see above) and by the decision to run joint 
France and Netherlands/Belgian working groups. 
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77 
more general way" . 
Similarly, the fate of two CND figures in their 
attempts to assume top posts in the organization reflects the way in which 
the posts were filled: one in private, the other in front of activists. Meg 
Beresford became General Secretary in May 1985 after an interview and 
appointment process. Dan Smith, by contrast, was defeated in his attempt 
to succeed Joan Ruddock as Chair of CND at the 1985 annual conference; 
here the various currents of CND activists hostile to END were able to vote 
to keep him out. 78 
Yet CND never became internationalist in the way that END was: 
its main dialogue partners in the East were always official bodies. This is 
not surprising. CND was a large organization made up, as indicated above, 
of many different currents and ideological views; the only common 
denominator was opposition to nuclear weapons and demands for their 
unilateral removal from (or non-deployment in) Britain. Not only would it 
have made sense to most activists in such an organization to regard as the 
important interlocutors the regimes in the East, as it was the regimes that 
would bring about nuclear disarmament. There were also many people who 
were ideologically opposed to CND getting too close to independent 
79 
groups. 
77 Interview. 
78 See Seamus Milne, CND's Successor story', The Guardian, 15 May 1985; Dettmer et 
al, TND to Campaign on "Basic Case"', 8-9. 
'9 See a memo by Bruce Kent to the IC of 25 May 1987, in which he criticizes the IC's 
decision not to send a representative to a meeting in Prague on 12 April, organized by the 
Czechoslovak Peace Committee, which brought together organizations from six of the 
seven 'deployment countries' - Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, West German, 
the GDR, and Czechoslovakia - plus the Soviet Union but did agree to send a 
representative to the international seminar in Warsaw organized by the independent group 
Freedom and Peace (WiP) (see Chapter 6). Attending the WiP event was, he implied, not 
a priority for CND as WIP was - he claimed - both catholic and nationalist and made 
democratization in Central Europe a condition of disarmament in the region; while the 
Czechoslovak meeting was, as nuclear disarmament was most CND's members' first 
concem. 
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Chapter 5 
Campaigning across Western Europe 
In 1980, at the same time as they were trying to bring to life an END 
campaign in the UK, END activists were beginning to develop links with 
existing forces, or help create new ones, in 'Western Europe" - political 
parties, trade unions, multilateral peace movement institutions and 
networks, and individual peace groups and activists in other countries. 
Above all from the summer of 1980, there was a flurry of transnational 
networking: activists' meetings; peace research seminars; marches and 
demonstrations; and discussions about a European conference involving 
political parties as well as movements. Many of these events were 
organized, or co-organized, by British END. In all this, we can see - as 
with the launching of END - how the groups and networks with which 
END activists were already in contact helped these new links to flourish. 
Out of this networking grew new institutions that helped unite the Western 
peace movement. Yet, at the same time, we can also identify different 
approaches in campaigning between the Russell Foundation and other parts 
of END which gave rise to increasingly tense 'frame disputes' within END 
and added to the fractious arguments over finances and organization. 
Peace Researcher Conferences 
Both Mary Kaldor and Dan Smith were part of an international network of 
peace researchers, and from early summer 1980 used these contacts to 
organize a conference on the theme of nuclear disarmament in Europe. 
Mary Kaldor, for example, disseminated the END 'idea' to social 
democratic politicians and peace researchers on a trip to Scandinavia in 
1 Understood here as a political, not a geographical, area. Some of what was (and is) 
defined as being part of the 'West' or in 'Western Europe' was to the east of some of the 
'East' or 'Eastern Europe': all of Greece, much of Sweden and Austria, and some of 
Norway and West Germany. 
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2 May 1980 . Originally planned to take place at the University of Sussex, 
where Mary Kaldor was based, the event - the "END Research 
Conference" - was eventually run at the left-wing Transnational Institute 
in Amsterdam in May 198 1. The conference indicated some of the 
strengths of British END: its activists were able to draw together a group of 
"alternative" experts on defence and foreign policy who together provided 
not just valuable information in these fields for campaigners (and others), 
nor just critiques of existing superpower and alliance policies, but also 
proposals for alternatives to the status quo. The conference became, in its 
"discussions ... more of a political consultation than a meeting of 
3 
researchers', Kaldor and Smith reported . Out of the conference came a 
book, Disarming Europe, which disseminated the content of the seminar to 
a wider peace movement audience. The next peace researchers' meeting 
took place in Milan on 18-20 December, this time organized by END in 
conjunction with the Italian League for the Rights and Freedoms of Peoples 
and the Lombardy Metalworkers' Union. Like the last one, this conference 
covered both existing "problems' - Spain's impending entry into NATO, 
and battlefield nuclear weapons, for example - as well as 'solutions' such 
as nuclear-free zones in the Balkans and in the Iberian peninsula and the 
conversion of arms industries. The participants also discussed at length the 
implications for the peace movements, and the movements' proper 
responses to, President's "Zero Option" proposal and the imposition of 
4 
martial law in Poland . 
Activists' meetings 
From the summer of 1980, British END activists were organizing meetings 
that aimed to bring together movement activists from across Western 
2 See Mary Kaldor 'Memorandum' to Ken Coates, 28 May 1980. END archive. 
' Mary KaIdor and Dan Smith, 'END Peace Researchers, Amsterdam', END Bulletin 6, 
Autumn 1981,16. 
4 Mary Kaldor and Dan Smith, 'END Researchers, Milan', END Bulletin 8, Spring 1982, 
22-23. 
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Europe. The first such meeting, which took place at the Pax Christi centre 
in London in September 1980, was "initiated" by the ICDP. 5 It brought 
together representatives of peace groups in France, West Germany, 
Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, and the UK. Over two days 
they discussed the goal of nuclear disarmament in Europe and the strategy 
for achieving it, and exchanged reports of peace campaigns in the countries 
represented. A British activist reported that the "early reaction of 
participants was generally that they would consider an all-European 
campaign". 6 This interest was confirmed by the enthusiastic response to a 
second activists' conference, also initiated by ICDP and hosted by the West 
German peace group DFGNK, which took place in Frankfurt on 7-8 March 
1981: here, "over 60 representatives of European peace and disarmament 
movements ... from ... as far away as Helsinki, Dublin, and Rome" met 
to discuss, amongst other things, the Copenhagen to Paris march and the 
Brussels demonstration in 1981 , future actions, and East-West relations. 
7 
The next international activists' meeting - in Copenhagen on 5-6 
September 1981 - was not organized, in part or whole, by END or one of 
its affiliated organizations in Britain but by the Dutch Interchurch Peace 
Council (IKV) and the Danish group Nej til Atomvaben. The participants 
at this meeting agreed to set up a "European Information Centre" at the 
IKV in The Hague. This was the International Communication and 
Coordination Centre, or IPCC, under whose auspices non-aligned Western 
peace groups met regularly until 1989 to discuss strategy. These groups 
8 
met next in Antwerp on 7-8 December 1981. UnliketheEND 
Convention Liaison Committee, the IPCC's members were only (non- 
5 E. P. Thompson, 'Proposals for Discussion', END Bulletin 5, Summer 1981,9. 
6 Tony Simpson, 'Peace Activists Convene in London', END Bulletin 3,1980,20. 
7 Tony Simpson, 'The END Consultative Meeting in Frankfurt', END Bulletin 5, Summer 
1981, 
19. 
' Stephen Tunnicliffe, 'Copenhagen Peace Conference, Copenhagen 5-6 September', 
END Bulletin 7, Winter 1981/82,17; Meg Beresford, 'Activists' Gathering, Antwerp', 
END Bulletin 8, Spring 1982,23; END CC minutes, 8 October 198 1. 
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aligned) peace organizations; it contained no political parties. Its function, 
again unlike the Convention, was precisely to discuss, and plan campaigns 
and strategies for the West European peace movement. 
First Steps Towards a European Conference 
Perhaps the most significant steps in transnational networking were those 
taken by END founders with the aim of bringing together not just 
movement but parties as well in what was known at the beginning as a 
European conference. This gave rise by 1981 to the END Convention 
process, the largest transnational institution of the West European peace 
movements. 
Ken Coates was mooting a "European conference" in his round 
robin letters in March and April 1980 to those people invited to meetings to 
discuss the draft END Appeal. 9 In the early stages of the planning for this 
conference links between British END activists and social democratic and 
communist figures and parties throughout Western Europe played an 
important role in getting the process off the ground. Some of these existed 
already; others were established for the first time. Ken Coates was liaising 
in early summer 1980 with, among others, the leading Spanish socialist 
Fernando Claudin, about a European conference. On 9-11 February 198 1, 
two political research institutes associated with the Spanish Socialist Party 
(PSOE) and the Communist Party (PCE), respectively - the Pablo Yglesias 
Foundation and FundaciOn de Investigaciones Marxistas - organized a 
conference in Madrid on Security, Co-operation and Human Rights. It was 
attended by, amongst others, representatives of socialist and Communist 
parties of Western Europe, as well as by a range of left-wing think-tanks 
and institutes concerned with security and disarmament - amongst them 
the Russell Foundation itself, the West German SPD's Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation and the French Institut Socialiste des Etudes et Recherches. 
Though not an END event, the conference had as a "key item" on its 
agenda "[p]roposals for furthering the issue of a European nuclear free 
' Letters dated 28 March 1980 and 17 April 1980, END archive. See Chapter 2. 
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zone. 10 Ken Coates, Stuart Holland MP and Mary Kaldor, in the words of a 
contemporaneous END report, "presented the case for END in all the main 
workshops'; and "received much encouraging support". " 
At this conference the Luciana Castellina, then an MEP with the 
independent Italian left-win party, PDUP (Democratic Party of Proletarian 
Unity), became involved in the discussions about a conference. Out of this 
meeting, in one account, came a decision to hold an "initial planning 
session in Bologna in August 1980"; 12 and this, in turn, produced the 
decision to organize the first broad international consultation on a 
European conference in Rome - the "Rome Consultation" - on 10/ 11 
November 198 1, to which some or all of the signatories of the "Russell 
Appeal" were invited. 13 70 people came, "representing between them most 
of the main forces and groups involved in the emergent new peace 
movement". 14 The Rome meeting was the formal beginning of what some 
later labelled the END Convention process. It took the decision to hold a 
major conference in the summer of 1982 that would bring together 
supporters of the END Appeal; and it appointed a "provisional liaison 
committee" to decide on the date, location, and agenda of the conference. 15 
This was the birth of the END Liaison Committee (LC). The meeting also 
mandated an organizing committee of three people to "make proposals 
10 'Madrid Conference', END Papers 1, Winter 1981-82,115. 
" Quoted from the "account of END activities" produced for internal circulation (not 
clearly dated; probably written 12 May 1981). See also Coates, Listeningfor Peace, END 
Papers Special 2, Nottingham: Spokesman, n. d.; Talking Peace: The Inside Story of the 
European Nuclear Disarmantent Conventions, agenor 97, p6riodique bi-mensuel, Juin- 
Juillet 1986; European Nuclear Disan-nament Steering Committee minutes, 4 June 1980; 
minutes of the END meeting of 29 June 1980; minutes of the 'Committee of 7', 18 
November 1980; minutes of the END Coordinating Committee, 10 March 1981; and 
'Madrid Report'. 
12 Talking Peace, 7. 
13 There is a discrepancy between the account in Talking Peace, where this claim is made, 
and the minutes of the END CC on 12/13 September 198 1, which state that only "some of 
the signatories to the END Appeal" were invited to the Rome meeting. 
14 Talking Peace, 8 
15 'The Rome Consultation', END Papers 1, Winter 198182,117. 
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about where the Convention should be held and how it should be 
organised". 16 These were Ken Coates, Luciana Castellina, and John 
Lambert of the agenor group in Brussels: "a recognition of the group's 
expertise in running multi-language European-level meetings aimed at 
overcoming the barriers to communication". 17 Meeting for the first time in 
December 1981, the Liaison Committee agreed to hold the first Convention 
in Brussels in July 1982, timed thus so as to coincide with the second 
United Nations Special Session of Disarmament. 18 
The list of participants at the Rome consultation indicates the 
geographical and political breadth of support for the END Appeal at this 
point - or at least for its central call for a European Nuclear Weapons Free 
Zone - and suggests the extent of the network which the work of END 
activists in Britain, and others, was helping to create. 19 Supporters from 
Italy, Britain, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, West Germany, 
Ireland, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, Hungary, Spain, 
and Greece were present. They included members of a range of peace 
organizations, large and small: from Holland, the Inter-Church Peace 
Council and Women for Peace; British CND; END (UK); Irish CND; the 
Finnish Peace Committee and the Committee of 100; from Belgium the 
Comite National d"Action pour la Paix et le Developpernent (CNAPD), the 
Vlaams Aktiekomitee tegen Atoomwapens (VAKA) and the Union Belge 
pour la Defense de la Paix (UBDP); Nej til Atomvaben in Denmark; Nei til 
Atomva'pen in Norway; from Italy Pax Christi; from France the 
Mouvement pour le Desarmement, la Paix et la Libert6, CODENE, and the 
Mouvement pour une Alternative Non-violente; from West Germany the 
Russell Initiative in Bremen and from West Berlin the Arbeitskreis 
16 
Talking Peace, 9. 
17 Ibid. 
18 See Ken Coates, 'After the Demo's [sic] ...... Forward to the 
END Convention', END 
Bulletin 8, Spring 1982,19. 
'9 For list of participants see 'The Rome Consultation', 116-117; and Jordan, 'European 
Nuclear Disarmament', 48-49. 
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Atomwaffenfreies Europa; from Switzerland 'Atomwaffen Nein' and the 
Swiss Peace Council; and from Austria, the Pugwash Group and 
Osterreichische Hochschiilerschaft. 
The political parties represented included, from Italy, the 
Communist Party (PCI), the PDUP, the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), the 
Radical Party, and the Christian Democrats (DC); from Belgium, the 
Socialist Party (PSB); the Dutch Labour Party (PvDA); from Britain, the 
Labour Party; from Greece, the socialist party, PASOK; the West Gen-nan 
Greens; and the Spanish socialists (PSOE). There were members of the 
three Italian trade union confederations present, and the British National 
Union of Mineworkers. 20 
The Convention 'Process' 
The 'Convention process', then, had two main components: the END 
Liaison Committee (LC), which met every two to three months between 
Conventions, and was attended by anywhere between 30 and 100 
representatives of various organizations; " and the annual Conventions 
themselves. After the Brussels Convention in 1982, Conventions were held 
in West Berlin (1983); Perugia (1984); Amsterdam (1985); Paris/Evry 
(1986); Coventry (1987); Lund, Sweden (1988); and Vittoria, Basque 
Country/Spain (1989). The first held after the collapse of (most of) the 
Communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 was in Helsinki and Tallin 
(1990); the next was in Moscow (199 1); and the process ended with a final 
Convention in Brussels in 1992. 
The END Liaison Committee 
The Liaison Committee was - with regard to the social and political forces 
represented on it - the broadest forum in the West European peace 
20 It is not clear whether any of these parties and trade union bodies were represented 
officially, or whether all members of them who were in Rome were present in a personal 
capacity, as was the case with Liaison Committee meetings (see below). There were also 
notable absences in Rome. Perhaps most significant are those from West Germany: none 
of the large West German peace organizations were present; nor was the SPD. 
21 Attendance figures to be confirmed. 
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movement. The sole criterion for participation in it was support for the 
END Appeal; there was no formal membership. 22 While most people at LC 
meetings were there in a personal capacity - they were not mandated -a 
large part of the West European peace movement was represented on the 
Liaison Committee (certainly at the larger meetings). Talking Peace, the 
'insider' account of the early part of the Convention process', claims that, 
on it, "people from all the range of forces involved in the peace movements 
- competing political parties, established movements - as often as not from 
organisations that would not otherwise have sat at the same table - came to 
work together in solidarity and mutual confidence". 23 This, in fact, is not 
quite true. While many 'grassroots' campaigners took part in the 
Conventions themselves, what one might call the direct action wing of the 
peace movement - in Britain, for example the network of women activists 
centred on the peace camp at Greenham Common - was not represented on 
the Liaison Committee. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that it would have 
wanted to have been: sitting for two days around a table negotiating 
compromises with, amongst others, politicians and trade unionists, was a 
style of campaigning in which peace campers were not terribly interested. 
The Liaison Committee, in other words, brought together groups and 
organizations - or individuals in them - organized along more traditional 
lines. 
Nevertheless, the range of forces represented on the Liaison 
Committee was broad: not only the non-aligned peace groups in the IPCC 
network, but also many left-wing parties - eurocommunist, socialist, labour 
and social democratic, as well as Green and 'left-altemative'- as well as 
trade unionists. The reason they were able to work together - most of the 
time - was because of the Liaison 
Committee's limited remit. The LC did 
not speak for the (West) European peace movement, nor 
did it try to 
22 Minutes of Liaison Committee meeting, 17- 18 September 
1982, Item 5: "Participation 
in the Liaison Committee is based on adoption of the 
END Appeal". 
2' Talking Peace, 5-6. 
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organize it. its job was simply to help arrange the next Convention. 24 The 
LC was in charge of the programme of the next Convention; the Bertrand 
Russell Peace Foundation took and sent out minutes of each meeting and 
sent out invitations; an 'international coordination' - usually based in 
offices in the European Parliament in Brussels - also did some of the 
organizing work; and organizing committees made up of local and national 
peace groups in the relevant country took care of most of the practical 
arrangements on the ground. Local and regional councils often provided 
financial and infrastructural support. 25 
The disparate and informal nature of the LC's make-up meant that 
its decisions had to be reached by consensus. This meant that, in principle a 
member of a small organization - British END for example - had the same 
power in the decision-making process (ultimately, the power of veto) as a 
member of a much larger one, such as CND; or that any minority could 
block the majority's wishes. According to Talking Peace, however, in the 
search for consensus, 'those who were clearly in a minority [were] simply 
26 
asked to allow a decision to go ahead' . 
The Conventions 
The Conventions attracted between 800 and 2500 participants: in the 
1980s, the largest was that held in West Berlin in May 1983; the smallest in 
Evry, outside Paris. The Conventions were not policy-making or 
resolution-passing bodies. They were conceived of as a continuing "forum 
for discussion", in which activists in peace groups, political parties, trade 
unions, and other organizations that broadly supported the aims of the END 
Appeal could address a wide range (very wide, as we shall see) of issues 
related to the Western peace movement's campaign. 
27 The Convention 
24 Talking Peace, 6&8, and Jordan, 'European Nuclear Disarmament', 50 
25 Jordan,. 49-50. 
21 Talking Peace, p. 9. 
27 Minutes of the Liaison Committee meeting, 17-18 September 1982, item 3: "It was 
understood ... that the 
[Berlin] Convention would remain within its originally conceived 
framework, a forum for discussion". "The Conventions', Ken Coates wrote 
later, "were 
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(and the 'process' as a whole) was a new phenomenon, outside existing 
organizational frameworks. 28 A British peace activist wrote, in 1982, 
during the preparations for the Brussels Convention, that up to that point 
that there had been two kinds of meetings at European level of peace 
movement activists: on the one hand, the big demonstrations of 198 1, in 
which "substantial numbers of activists" could participate but were unable 
to "engage in any serious discussions, sharing of experience, forward 
planning"; and, on the other - referring to the activists' meetings in 
Frankfurt in March 1981, Copenhagen September 1981 and Antwerp 
December 1981 (see above) - the meetings of "small numbers of leaders 
in more or less successful joint consultation". "The essential novelty of the 
Convention", he wrote, "is that it is designed to enable a significant 
number of peace movement activists to engage in detailed and purposeful 
discussions with one another". 29 
The decision about where to locate most Conventions were shaped 
in part by political considerations: Perugia, in Italy, for example, was 
chosen for the 1984 Convention partly in order to focus activists' attention 
both on issues relevant to the Mediterranean area and on North-South 
issues. 
The structure and content of each Convention, large or small, 
reflected the diversity of the participants' interests and backgrounds: while 
most Conventions were organized thematically, under the broad thematic 
headings scores - sometimes hundreds - of workshops and meetings took 
place. Alongside these, activists in similar professions or social categories 
met in 'affinity' workshops to discuss and coordinate their particular 
created as forums ... [v]ery 
deliberately, we resolved not to agree resolutions or seek 
binding mandates. " (Listeningfor Peace, 11). 
However, at the Brussels Convention, the Liaison Committee did send an "END 
delegation" to "make contact with the Israeli Peace Movement" [this was in the context of 
the war in, and the Israeli invasion of, Lebanon]. That is, it acted as a single body. (Ken 
Coates, "What Are the Lessons of the First European Nuclear Disarmament Convention? ", 
internal memorandum, 2 September 1982,2. END Archive. ) 
28 Talking Peace, 2. 
29 James Hinton, "European Convention: Thoughts Arising from Brussels Meeting 
19/2/82", 2-1 February 1981. END Archive. 
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approaches to END-style peace campaigning: for example, teachers, 
doctors, trade unionists, and scientists. These were part of the system of 
'lateral groups' initiated by the founders in Britain . 
30 Women-only 
workshops were a feature of many Conventions. The huge number of 
themes and workshops at each Convention gave rise to the description of 
the Conventions as "bazaars" (which was sometimes a complaint). 
The Conventions played a key role not only in strengthening but 
also in creating the networks that constituted the transnational peace 
movement. A movement consists not just of networks; it consists of 
networks of groups and individuals with some kind of common identity. 
That so many activists could meet and debate at Conventions indicates that 
they, at least, had much in common. But within this common identity there 
were also tensions. The Conventions and the Liaison Committee meetings 
provided a forum in which these tensions could be aired and debated, but 
not necessarily resolved. Arguably, too, the 'Convention process' - by 
regularly bringing together representatives of different strands of opinion - 
actually heightened these tensions. 
Opinions within the END current diverged over various, and 
sometimes overlapping, issues. Some were peculiar to specific 
Conventions: in 1989, for example, profound differences over Basque 
politics played a role in the Convention. One, however, occurred at almost 
every Convention up to the end of the Cold War: the movement's 
relationship with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This was the one 
subject in relation to which the Liaison Committee's style of decision- 
making did not work - consensus could not be found - and which indeed, 
was the cause of the major crises in the Convention process. In fact, this 
issue came to dominate Conventions from 1983.1 look at this aspect of the 
Convention in detail the next Hcapter. 
The decision to hold the first Convention in the Belgian capital, 
Brussels, the site of NATO headquarters, was made not, it seems, for 
political reasons - as a way of symbolically confronting the Western 
See "For a Nuclear-Free Zone in all Europe", 3. 
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military alliance - but on pragmatic grounds: 
31 Brussels was the only place 
where the organizers could be certain that the necessary admin'strative 
skills and "practical backup" - including, importantly, interpretation 
facilities - were available. 
32 In short, resources decided the location of this 
Convention. According to the agenor account, the organizations "grouping 
the French-speaking and Flemish-speaking peace movements" provided 
"invaluable practical assistance" during the Convention itself It was not, 
however, they who provided the bulk of this help; they had originally been 
"unconvinced about the desirability of holding a Convention in Brussels'. 33 
Rather, it was the agenor group that undertook the practical organizing of 
the Convention. Luciana Castellina's office in the European Parliament, 
where two agenor members were working as parliamentary staff for her 
and other MEPs, was the organizational hub of the Convention planning 
process. 
The Convention, on 2-4 July, attracted about a thousand people 
from 25 countries. 34 They met in large plenaries and listened to debates - 
but mainly they gathered in 'affinity' and 'thematic' workshops. The list of 
workshops and of workshop organizers gives some idea of the breadth of 
the networks involved. 
Affinity workshops: 
scientists (CERN group, Geneva); 
doctors (Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons); 
nuclear-free towns (Lydia Merrill, UK); 
women for peace; 
soldiers (Dutch soldiers VVDM); 
conscientious objectors (Dutch conscientious objectors); 
31 Talking Peace, pp. 9& 12. The European Parliament buildings contained interpretation 
facilities. Other sites considered had included Strasbourg, Basel, and Vienna. 
32 Talking Peace, 15-16. 
33 lbid 
34 Talking Peace, 17; Paulo Gentiloni, 'Green, Red and Rainbow-coloured', END Bulletin 
11, 
1982,5. 
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- parliamentarians (Euro-MPs for Nuclear Disarmament); 
- trade unions (Tony Topham, END); 
- churches (END Churches lateral committee); 
- peace movement activists (VAKA: Flemish Anti-Nuclear Arms 
Group); 
- peace educators (Nigel Young, UK). 
Thematic workshops: 
- opposing missile sites (Comiso Committee); 
- nuclear-free zones (Finnish Peace Committee); 
- nuclear disarmament and the Gennan question (Working group 
for a nuclear-weapons free Europe, Berlin); 
- East-West Relations after Poland (UBPD, Belgium); 
- State of Negotiations - UN, Geneva, etc (Silvia Boba, CGIL, 
Rome); 
French and British nuclear forces (CODENE, France); 
Civil and military nukes (Landelijk Energie Comm., Netherlands); 
Defence alternatives (International War Resisters, CNAPD, 
Belgium); 
- Unilateral disarmament (Pacifist Socialist Party, Netherlands); 
- Biological and chemical weapons (Sean Murphy, Open 
University, UK); 
- Disarmament and the economy (Odd Andreassen, Norway); 
- Disarmament and the Tbird World (Charling Tao/Christoph 
Wetterich, CERN). 
Looking back four years later, the co-organizers, agenor, wrote that 
the Brussels Convention had "turned out more successful than anyone had 
dared to hope". 35 It had succeeded, in agetior's view, above all because it 
35 Talking Peace, 17. 
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brought together activists from most, if not all, parts of the peace 
movement, and had thus helped campaigners to begin to understand the 
differences between the movements. In agenor's account, the peace 
movements of northern Europe, for example, began to "accept the key role 
of political parties', including communists, in the emerging movements in 
Italy, Greece, and Spain. In a contemporaneous report, an Italian 
participant wrote that, at a conference that was simultaneously a "scientific 
conference and a concourse of activists .. all the participants had seen and 
learned something. " The movement "had found in Brussels a great seat of 
direct communication". 36 One of the organizers of the peace education 
"affinity" workshop, Dr Nigel Young of the School of Peace Studies at 
Bradford University, described the Convention as a "success - and an 
important building block for Berlin. It marks a new stage for END. , 37 The 
report of the scientists' affinity workshop states that the workshop "has 
made what we feel is a major step towards European co-operation": ... an 
agreement ... to build ... a confederation of European scientists' 
organisations and of individual scientists working for nuclear disarmament, 
38 
underpinned by an information network" . 
Ken Coates, the main original moving force behind the Convention, 
saw the Convention as having been successful in a number of ways: it 
brought together a "powerful coalition of political forces" [that is, parties]; 
there was a "remarkable turnout from peace movements and social 
organizations", with closer links being established between, for example, 
scientists, trade unionists, peace educators, as well as between peace 
campers and "nuclear weapon site protesters ... Comiso 
[the proposed 
deployment site, in Sicily, for Italy's share of cruise missiles] has become a 
continental key-word". In short, the "END Convention has succeeded in 
assembling all the main currents of European thought" which had first 
signed the END Appeal. He regards it as extremely important that the - 
36 Gentiloni, 'Green, Red and Rain bow-c oI oured', 9. 
37 Nigel Young, letter to Convention organizers, 8 July 1982. END Archive. 
38 'END Convention ... Workshop Round-Up', 
13. 
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successful - Convention took place at the same time that the UN Second 
Special Session on Disarmament was meeting in New York - "only to 
produce a virtually nul result". 39 Coates also stresses the importance of the 
sending of an "END delegation to Israel" and of an "END mission" to 
Japan. 40 For Coates, then, the Convention has been a striking success: a 
vindication of the Appeal and of the original decision to organize a 
European conference. 41 
However, there were criticisms, too, of the Convention, which 
reflected some of the arguments within British END about the Convention 
(see below). One British participant wrote in a report for his local CND 
group that "there was a fair amount of disappointment at the fact that 
politicians had such a prominent role"; he saw the expression of this 
disappointment as part of debate that "ran through the whole convention", 
namely about whether to "work for change through some of the established 
institutions (eg, socialist parties, T[rade] [U]nions)" or whether to "work at 
developing the movement at grassroots level and not to run the risk of 
being used and having our aims distorted by these institutions". 42 A West 
German who had also participated in the Liaison Committee, Michaela von 
Freyhold, said that what she "disliked" about the Convention was "too 
much preoccupation with big names ... it's good [the VIPs] ... came, but 
instead of [their] giving public statements it would have been more 
interesting if we ... [could have] ... ask[ed] them ... about what they are 
,, 43 
actually doing, about the possibilities and limits of their influence. 
Nevertheless, assessed in terms of the aims set out by the initiators 
of the 'Convention process', the Brussels Convention was a success: it 
39 Coates, "What Are the LessonsT, passim. 
40 See footnote 27. 
41 More positive reactions to the Convention - from Danish, German, Norwegian, and 
British participants - are in Fagerholt, Dagmar, et al, Untitled [Comments on END 
Convention], Brussels, END Bulletin 11,1982,6 & 8. 
" Patrick Burke, draft report on Convention for Battersea CND newsletter, undated. 
Author's archive. 
43 Michaela von Freyhold, 'Let Me Say What I Liked', END Bulletin 11,1982,6. 
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brought together representatives of many (though not all) non-aligned parts 
of the West European peace movement; and, in the Liaison Committee, it 
established a forum, unique in the peace movement, in which these parts 
could meet regularly and lay the groundwork for a cooperation. 
A second Convention, with West Berlin as its venue, was mooted in 
late 198 1; by the END Liaison Committee meeting on 15 June 1982, 
preparations for it in West Berlin were underway. 44 The Liaison Committee 
then met four times (every two months) before the Convention itself- 
September (Brussels); November (Brussels), January (West Berlin); and 
March (Brussels). As with the organizing of the Brussels Convention, 
additional preparatory work was done by an International Secretariat and 
by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation (BRPF) in Nottingham. In West 
Berlin itself, the organizing work was carried out by a Gennan secretariat; 
its members - from the city itself as well as from West Germany - were the 
Working Group for a Nuclear-Free Europe (Arbeitskreis Atomwaffenfreies 
Europa - AAK), the West Berlin grouping which had made the original 
proposal to hold the Convention in West Berlin, as well as representatives 
of Women for Peace, the Greens, the Berlin Alternative List, the Federal 
Association of Citizens Initiatives, the 'Russell-Initiatives', the youth 
branch of the German Trade Union Federation, the Humanist Union, and of 
the left wing of the SPD. 45 A German Advisory Council was also 
established, on which sat some of the West German left-wing great and 
good. 
The Berlin Convention took place on 9-14 May 1983.46 2500 
people attended it, 47 about 2.5 times as many as were in Brussels. As at 
44 See LC minutes, 15 June 1982, item 1. [Possible discrepancy between agenor account, 
which says decision to hold EC in WB taken immediately after Brussels, with the date and 
location to be chosen in September; and the 15/6/82 LC mm, which suggest momentum 
for WB so strong by then decision effectively already taken. ] 
45 See Jordan, 'European Nuclear Disarmament', 176, and Talking Peace, 18ff 
46Known as such, even though it took place in West Berlin. 
47 "The Berlin Convention - an Evaluation", END Papers 7, Spring 1984, Nottingham, 
Russell Press Ltd., p. 115. 
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Brussels, the programme of the Convention gives an idea of the breadth of 
the participants' concerns, as well as of the depth of their engagement with 
issues related to nuclear disarmament. Four 'hearings', on 9-11 May, at 
which 'experts' addressed campaigners, preceded the Convention proper: 
these were on the "significance of revolutionary developments in arms 
technology" and in the "arms economy"; the "crisis of arms control 
negotiations"; the "Palme-Report concept of common security"; and on 
64 48 alternative European peace and security policies" . 
The "experts' 
included US defence analysts Bill Arkin and Fred Kaplan; the US 
economist Seymour Melman; and the peace researchers Hylke Tromp 
(from Holland) and Jan Oberg (Norway) . 
49 This concern to inform 
themselves with the help of experts was not peculiar to participants in this 
Convention. Though 'hearings' of this sort were not repeated at future 
Conventions, specialists in many fields attended many of the other 
Conventions. Indeed, many of them were campaigners themselves. 50 
However, the "hearings' were by no means welcomed uncritically. One 
report comments on how their "size and format, with experts addressing 
the rest, helped to induce passivity in the listeners". 51 
The Convention proper was divided into six main fora and 
accompanying workshops: 'Nato's Arms Deployments and Strategies for 
Resistance'; 'Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones in Europe'; 'The Two German 
States -A Nuclear-Free Zone? '; 'Political Significance of Disarmament in 
East- and West-Europe'; 'Social, Economic and Ecological Costs of the 
Arms Race'; and 'Towards a New Internationalism - Peace Movement and 
the Third World'. There was also a 'Women's Programme'; 'affinity 
48 END Convention 'Manual' 6-23. END Archive. 
49 Patrick Burke's report on the Convention in 'A Meeting of Minds', 24. 
'0 Peace researchers, defence analysts, peace research institutes were an important part of 
the Western peace movement. There was a marked autodidactic tendency in military and 
strategic affairs amongst peace activists. 
51 Patrick Burke's report, in 'A Meeting of Minds'. 
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workshops'; 52 national and regional fora; 53 and a 'special workshop' on the 
(nuclear state and the restriction of civil rights' . 
54 But while "the general 
aim of the programme was [as in Brussels] to permit discussion of every 
, 55 theme of interest to the peace movement" certain themes attracted most 
attention: the campaign against cruise and Pershing 11 missiles; the peace 
movement's East-West relations as a whole; and the 'German question' in 
56 7 
particular. Of these, the first was the theme of the opening plenary. 5 The 
latter two provoked considerable controversy, stimulating public 
disagreements, written and spoken, between conference participants and 
non-participants - as, indeed, they had in the Convention planning process 
since the Brussels Convention. 
Organizers of and participants in the Berlin Convention considered 
it to have been a success. The Liaison Committee decided that it wanted to 
organize a 3rd Convention, this time in Italy. As a tactic for promoting 
dialogue amongst West European peace movements - for bringing together 
activists in peace groups, political parties, trade unions, and churches - the 
Berlin Convention seemed to have fulfilled the aims of the Convention 
process's initiators. 
52 Which, as in Brussels, brought together activists with common interests, professional 
and otherwise: medical workers; women; soldiers; psychologists; conscientious Objectors; 
parliamentarians; churchgoers; scientists; writers; peace educators; trade unionists; and 
people concerned with "peace publications'. See Convention 'Manual', 57-58. 
53 On, for example the "Pacific peace movement, especialy Japan", the "role of neutral and 
non-aligned states in Europe", and the .... Freeze" campaign in the USA". See Convention 
'Manual', 60-62. 
54 Convention 'Manual', 59. 
" Talking Peace, 19. 
56 Paulo Gentiloni, " Speaking for All of Europe", END Papers 8, Winter 1983-84, pp. 9- 
12; Gerhard Jordan, pp. 176-180; Talking Peace, pp. 19-2 1; Stephen Tunnicliffe et al, 
"A Meeting of Minds', END Journal 4, pp. 4-5,24. 
57 However, while, as one participant noted, the "Convention, like the one the previous 
year, spent a good deal of time discussing ways of resisting the installation of the 
Euromissiles' (Gentiloni, p. 7. ), another regretted the fact that the Euromissiles were 
"primarily discussed in relation to forms of action". "There were no workshops on the 
Geneva talks', the author notes, "and much more could have been made out of the 
presence of the leaders of the US freeze campaign" 
(Unsigned comment, "A Meeting of 
Minds', END Journal 4,. 5. ) 
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Subsequent Conventions followed the pattern established before 
and at Brussels and West Berlin. The Perugia Convention in July 1984 
was, in response to criticisms of the size of West Berlin's, half the size of 
its predecessor. 1200 participants gathered to discuss and debate under 
three headings, one for each day of the Convention: 'movement strategy' 
(including the campaign against deployments; the relevance of nuclear-free 
zones); 'security in the Mediterranean' (including the militarisation of the 
region, the conflict in the Middle East, and nuclear-weapons-free zones); 
and 'dialogue' (with peace movements in the soviet bloc, in North America 
and the Pacific, as well as peace and liberation movements in the Third 
World). Yet, despite these thematic breadth the Convention was dominated 
by one issue, relations with independent groups and 'officials' in CEE/SU. 
The July 1985 Convention in Amsterdam took place in the only 
deployment country that had not yet decided to accept its quota of cruise 
missiles. The Convention, attended again by about 1200 activists, was thus 
in part an opportunity to offer support to the Dutch peace movement. 
Discussions again took place under three main headings, each with sub- 
themes covered in workshops and plenaries: 'East-West (which included 
'peace and security'; the 'division of Europe'; and 'disarmament'); 
'West-West' (including opposition to deployments and the Strategic 
Defence Initiative, nuclear-weapons free zones, and the relationship 
between political parties and movements); and 'North-South' (including 
the Middle East conflict, nuclear proliferation, and underdevelopment as a 
source of conflicts). 
The wide number of topics available for discussion at Amsterdam 
produced a desire for a smaller, more focussed Convention the following 
year. This, at tvry, outside Paris, in June 1986, was restricted to about 700 
people and focussed on West European Security. For the first time since 
Brussels, East-West politics played a minor role. 
In July 1987, the final Convention to be held in a deployment 
country took place. About 1000 activists gathered in Coventry to debate 
glasnost and perestroika, British defence policy, European identity, 
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unilateral disarmament, and 'detente from below'. Here, again, East-West 
controversy dominated the Convention. 
In late June and early July 1988, the first Convention to take place 
in a neutral country took place. Lund, in Sweden, hosted 1200 
campaigners. The themes of the Convention - the mood of which, 
following the INF Treaty and because of the Gorbachev reforms, was 
optimistic - were 'new opportunities for detente', 'd6tente and the third 
world', the role of trade unions in peace campaigning', new tasks for the 
peace movements, and the arms race as an obstacle to detente and how to 
overcome it'. 
July 1989 saw the second Convention in southern Europe, when 
1200 activists gathered in Vitoria in the Basque Country in Spain. The 
themes of the Convention were the North-South relationship, 
disarmament in Europe, peace in the Mediterranean region, and the 
implications of the '1992' for the future of Europe. 
The July 1990 Convention, the first since the 'velvet revolutions', 
took place, symbolically, in Helsinki, capital of a neutral country, and 
Tallinn, Estonia, in the liberalising Soviet Union. This time activists 
discussed under five headings: the future of the peace movement; the 
upheavals in Central-Eastern Europe; the militarisation of societies; the 
relationship between individuals, nationalities and states; and the global 
dimensions of peace. 
The final two Conventions, in Moscow in 1991 and Brussels in 
1992, marked the gradual collapse of the END process, as many of the 
original participants in it had shifted their allegiance to the new Helsinki 
Citizens' Assembly (HCA), a pan-European network of groups and 
individuals founded by participants in the dialogue between Western peace 
groups and Eastern independent groups. 
Frame Disputes in British END 
The END Conventions arguably became, by the end of the West Berlin 
Convention at the latest, accepted landmarks in the landscape of the West 
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European peace movement, at least for those activists committed to 
transnational networking. This should not conceal the fact, however, that, 
when the Convention process was in its embryonic stage, and for a year or 
so after its 'birth' in Rome in November 198 1, there were, in British END, 
sharp disputes about the wisdom of organizing a pan-European campaign 
in this way. These disputes were rooted in increasingly marked 'frame 
disputes' over which of two basic approaches END should prioritise for 
achieving the goals outlined in the END Appeal. Two key founders of 
END, Ken Coates and Edward Thompson, respectively, represented most 
clearly the two positions. The strategic frame disputes combined with 
disagreements over organizational matters as well as with personal 
differences -discussed in Chapter 3 -to bring about a split within END. 
They are thus part of the story of British END. But they also are part of the 
story about the difficulties involved in creating a transnational alliance. 
Coates's - and the BRPF's - main interest was, as we have seen, in 
organizing a European conference in which both established institutions - 
political parties, trade unions, and religious "forces' - which supported the 
Appeal and peace activists would come together to help build an alliance to 
campaign for a European nuclear-free zone. Thompson was most interested 
in stimulating a 'grassroots', peace movement activity. His internal memo 
'END - the Next Steps: a Discussion Paper', written in April 1980 (before 
the launch of the Appeal), and reprinted in the first END Bulletiti, indicates 
that he was thinking most (though not exclusively) about how to stimulate 
activity outside the political sphere. 
58 Other CC members, too, emphasized 
developing a European campaign in a variety of ways and not just through 
a European conference. 
In the editorial comment that accompanies the END Appeal in the 
first issue of the END Bulletiti, by contrast - from its style very likely 
written by Coates - the conference is presented as a key mechanism 
for 
promoting the END campaign: a "European conference ... will 
be 
58 E. P. Thompson, 'Thinking about the New Movement'. 
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organized" in "the coming months" to "develop and co-ordinate the 
campaign"; the "decentralised activity" which the Appeal's backers favour 
- the work of "lateral committees' - is nevertheless seen as "all .. 
conduc[ing] ... to the preparations of the European Conference". 
59 
The differences in political and strategic emphasis between Coates 
(and the BRPF) and Thompson are most evident in the memos each submit 
to the END CC's 'strategy meeting' in September 198 1. Most of 
Thompson's memo is devoted to the organization of END; but that part 
which deals with political developments in Western Europe or in East- 
West relations focuses heavily on movements: the "rapid growth" of the 
West German peace movement, in "political terms the outstanding 
development of the past five months"; the West European peace movement 
intervening as a "Third Negotiator" in the US-Soviet arms talks; the need 
for END to press forward with its "positive demands" for "de- structuring 
the Cold War or re-making and re-unifying European culture"; and the 
vexed question of a consultation amongst West European peace groups. 
Though he pays attention to the fortunes of political parties (for example, 
the possible coming to power of PASOK in the forthcoming elections in 
Greece), his focus is overwhelmingly on peace movements as distinct 
forces capable of intervening in national political processes and in inter- 
state (and inter-bloc) relations. 60 
Coates, by contrast, emphasizes the role of political parties. He 
wants the "central preoccupation" of the meeting to be the "development of 
a European forum (or convention), linking all those European forces 
interested in continental nuclear disarmament". He lists those forces, and it 
is striking that most of them are political parties and other institutions such 
as trade unions and Churches: in Britain, "an important part of the Labour 
Party ... some nationalists ... some 
liberals ... many Christians and 
unattached professional people", as well as a "big potential trade union 
response"; in "Europe" [sic], "at least .. the 
independent-minded socialists 
59 'For a Nuclear-Free Zone in all Europe', END Bulletin 1,1980,3. 
60 E. P. Thompson, 'END at September 1981', 27 August 1981, END archive. 
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(including PASOK), the churches in Northern Europe, the 
Eurocommunists, the ecologists and associated independent radicals, the 
small parties of the independent left (PDUP, PSU in France, Pacifist 
Socialists in Holland)". He does not mention peace movements that exist 
independently of political parties. Instead he writes that "[s]ometimes" the 
"political forces" he has listed have "constituted formal peace movements, 
and sometimes they are in the process of so doing"; and he mentions the 
"various very small pacifist groups (WRI) or rather isolated peace 
groupings which include numbers of very committed people". He also 
refers to the "mass public opinion" of "neutral or non-aligned nations ... 
which shares our views". He does not mention, in these comments, the 
emerging peace movement in West Germany, or the active Dutch peace 
movement, or indeed the British peace movement, the growth of none of 
which can be ascribed simply to the work of political parties or churches 
(or trade unions). 
By the summer of 1982, the BRPF have come to regard - even 
more firmly after what they regard as the extremely successful first END 
Convention - the "Convention process" as the single most important 
strategy for achieving the goal of European nuclear disarmament; they 
think END should put all, or most, of its weight behind it. The editorial in 
END Bulletin 11, written by a BRPF employee, Tony Simpson, and Stuart 
Holland MR, who was close to the Russell Foundation, states that the "new 
movement for European Nuclear Disarmament ... came 
live and kicking 
into the world at the beginning of July 1982, with the successful 
convocation, in Brussels, of its first representative conference"; the 
previous two-and-a half years are described as a period of "long gestation 
and some birth pains'. By implication, before the Brussels Convention, no 
61 European movement existed . 
The success represented by the Brussels Convention and the 
continuing work of the Liaison Committee makes it easy for Coates to 
decide what the priority should be for all those working for European 
61 Stuart Holland and Tony Simpson, Editorial, END Bulletin 11,1982,2. 
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nuclear disarmament. "We have no hesitation in proposing", he writes, 
"that this [preparing for the 1983 West Berlin Convention] should be the 
central core of activity and commitment until May 1983 ,. 62 "In BRPF's 
perception", writes Dan Smith in July 1982, "the focus for work now is the 
Liaison Committee which prepared the Brussels Convention and which 
will continue as the international preparatory committee for the Berlin 
Convention". 63 
There is, however, a clear difference of opinion about campaigning 
priorities amongst members of the END CC, BRPF and non-BRPF, as 
comments by some of its members make clear. Dan Smith: "Despite ... 
the importance of the Convention process, I regard this as but one element 
of END's work of taking the politics and strategy of the ... END Appeal to 
every possible comer of Europe and North America". 64 In a letter to Ken 
Coates, Mary Kaldor writes: "Although I think the Convention is very 
important, I think there are lots of other important things happening too. -65 
The different attitudes towards the Convention amongst members 
of the CC become an important element in the END-BRPF dispute. 
Indeed, what the BRPF regards as the insufficient backing given by other 
parts of END to the Convention is a key source of its anger with the CC. 
Dan Smith notes that "there is anger and disappointment at what [the 
BRPPF] ... regards as END's 
low level of commitment, financial and 
,, 66 otherwise, to the Convention [in Brussels, July 1982] . The BRPF wanted 
E10,000 from END towards the costs of putting on the Convention, which, 
it argued, END had earlier agreed to produce; END donated E2,500.67 Ken 
62 Coates, untitled memo, 2 September 1982. 
63 Dan Smith, 'Notes on the meeting'. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Mary Kaldor, letter to Ken Coates, 3 September 1982. 
66 Dan Smith, "Notes on the meeting". 
67 For details of this argument see CC minutes, 7 Apr, ] and 5 May 1982; Stephen 
Tunnicliffe's "Memorandum to the C. C. on 30 July 1982", 28 July 1982; Smith, "Notes 
on the meeting"; Ken Fleet's letter to Meg Beresford, 10 September 1982; 
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Coates, in a memo circulated in September 1982, complains of the 
inadequate coverage in some issues of the Bulletin given to the Convention 
process; and objects specifically to the editor, Mary Kaldor's, content- 
proposal for the first issue of the Bulletin after the Convention, which 
would, in BRPF's view, have given quite inadequate coverage of the 
Convention. 68 (The other two editors - both BRPFers - Stuart Holland MP 
and Tony Simpson, vetoed this proposal and prepared an issue devoted 
entirely to the Convention. ) 
Further, the BRPF regards the Liaison Committee, which played a 
key role in organizing the Convention, as more "END-ish", because more 
European, than British END. Coates writes that the fact that the Liaison 
Committee "has agreed to remain in being to prepare for [the 1983] Berlin 
[Convention]" shows that "END is now a fully European organization". He 
describes the CC as the "London Committee" and refers to END in Britain 
as "London END": END in Britain, in his view, is a small regional 
organization overshadowed by the END Liaison Committee. Dan Smith 
reports that "Ken Coates has taken to referring to the Liaison Committee as 
'European END"'. 
The BRPF's anger at the rest of END over the Convention, then, is 
rooted in the Foundation's belief that it is not receiving adequate support 
for (or indeed that leading END-ers are actively opposing) what is the 
most, perhaps the only, successful strategy in place for achieving nuclear 
disarmament in Europe. Whether or not the BRPF were right to claim that 
END CC members were as strongly opposed to the Convention as they 
claimed is hard to say. The documents in the END archive suggest they 
were not. Rather, END CC members were concerned, on the one hand, 
about the BRPF's lack of accountability while, on the other, though they 
disagreed with the Russell Foundation about the relative importance of the 
Convention, they were not actively opposed to it. But the BRPF people 
68 Only one page, according to Coates. Ken Coates, untitled memo, 2 September 1982, 
END archive. At first sight, Coates's complaint doesn"t make sense: two of the three 
editors of the Bulletin were BRPF supporters. 
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certainly appear to have believed that END CC members were vigorously 
opposed to the Convention. 
These disagreements within END over organization, finances, and 
strategy (exacerbated by personal differences) culminated, as we have seen 
(Chapter 3), in the Russell Foundation withdrawing from British END. 
From that point on, the BRPF was able to concentrate on END Convention, 
while END, though it participated in the Convention process, was also able 
to press forward with its peace movement networking, both in Western 
Europe, and, as we shall see in the next chapter, between East and West. 
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Chapter 6 
East-West Dialogue 
Part 1: British END's East-West Relations 
In the West, END supporters were trying to link up peace groups and 
individual activists and to promote the notion of a pan-European 
movement. In relation to Central-Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 
END supporters - with some other Western peace groups - became 
engaged in something more ambitious, delicate and complex: trying to 
initiate and sustain a dialogue with independent groups whose world views 
were shaped by quite a different social system, while pursuing relations 
with often very suspicious, sometimes hostile, regimes. In this chapter I 
analyse British END's bilateral relations with Central Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union; then its involvement in the two multilateral fora, the 
END Convention process and the European Network for East-West 
Dialogue, in which a significant part of the END 'current's East-West 
work was conducted; and, finally, I consider the internal difficulties British 
END encountered in trying to extend the transnational alliance into the 
Soviet bloc. 
Political Opportunities and Constraints 
Relations between British END (and other Western peace groups) and the 
regimes in CEE/SU consisted mainly of the specific relationship with the 
regimes' 'peace committees'. 
' The peace committees' function was to help 
mobilize their own populations in support of the 'peace' (foreign and 
defence policies) of their states; to act as the respective state's main 
interlocutor with West European and other foreign peace groups and 
I British END's bilateral contacts were largely limited to peace committees in the Soviet 
Union, the GDR, and Hungary. It also had contacts with these and other peace committees 
in 'multilateral' fora such as the END Convention. 
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movements; and, specifically in the 1980s, to try to ensure that Western 
peace movements campaigned in support of the Soviet bloc's policies. The 
peace committees were members of the Helsinki-based World Peace 
Council, established at the second World Peace Congress in Warsaw in 
1950. The peace committees' tasks, as official descriptions of the 
committees make clear, flowed naturally from the committees' being in 
agreement with their states' foreign and defence policies. The GDR Peace 
Council, for example, was officially described as "the embodiment of the 
desire for peace of the people of the GDR in accordance with the peace 
policies of the socialist state"2 ; while the Soviet Peace Committee (SPQ 
described the 'peace movement' that it was set up to co-ordinate as 
functioning in a state the "key principle" of whose "international activity" 
was "the struggle for a just and democratic peace". This distinguished the 
peace movement in the Soviet Union from the "anti-war" movements in 
capitalist and developing countries'. 3 
The regimes however - of which the peace committees were 
relatively small parts - were not just interlocutors for Western peace 
groups. They also helped create the 'objective' political opportunities and 
constraints - both enduring and changing - that faced END's (and other 
Western groups') transcontinental work. I will first consider these 
opportunities and constraints. 
The enduring 'objective' POS, one could argue, consisted of the 
structure of the political system itself. that is, the fact that these were one- 
party states, in which the ruling parties, in principle, had a monopoly of 
public activity within their own borders. 
4 Access to policy-makers for 
domestic independent - unapproved - groups was impossible; 
for foreign 
2 Kleines Politisches W&terbuch, Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1983,4th edition, 277. 
The Soviet Peace Movement, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1984. 
4 Of course, there were significant exceptions to this rule: the Roman 
Catholic Church in 
Poland, and, to a much lesser extent, the Protestant Church in the GDR, enjoyed a 
degree 
of autonomy from the state. They could use this autonomy to create a 
'space' in which 
Polish and East German citizens, respectively, could organize politically, and in other 
respects. 
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groups only through few, prescribed, channels. Any activity conducted by 
domestic non-state bodies - or not sanctioned by the state - was, in 
principle, necessarily oppositional: it posed a direct challenge to the 
legitimacy of the ruling party. By entering into a dialogue with 
independent groups in the CEE/SU, END and other Western groups Nvere, 
unavoidably, if indirectly, also posing a challenge to the legitimacy of the 
regimes. Engaging with independent groups meant challenging the status 
quo in the Soviet bloc. Arguably, the regimes recognized all this; this is 
why they cracked down, sometimes very harshly, on the small domestic 
independent groups and often tried to hinder contacts between these 
groups and foreign peace groups. 
At the same time, arguably, there were international pressures 
acting on CEE/SU regimes that gave rise to a more open political 
opportunity structure than might otherwise have existed. Gillian Wylie, in 
her study of the relations between British END and Freedom and Peace 
(WiP) in Poland, argues that already in the 1970s changes in the 
"contemporary international system" were "opening opportunity 
structures for social movements in international affairs". 5 The most 
important such change in Europe was the Cooperation on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, which culminated in the signing of the Final Act, 
the Helsinki Accords of 1975. The Accords had three 'baskets'. Basket 
one, which dealt with security issues, committed the signatories to 
recognizing the inviolability of borders in Europe; in other words, to 
accepting the de facto post-Second World War status quo. Basket two 
dealt with economic matters, such as trade. Basket three, meanwhile, 
committed the signatories to recognizing a wide range of (Western, 
liberal) civil and political rights. 
There are various ways, one could argue, in which the Helsinki 
Accords (and the third basket above all) created the conditions for 'trans- 
bloc' dialogue. First, as Wylie writes, they provided "legitimacy to those 
groups calling for respect for human rights in state socialist states". This, 
5 Wyl I e, 'Creating Alternative Visions', 129. 
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in turn, stimulated the formation of groups that wanted to monitor their 
regimes' compliance with the Helsinki Accords. In Czechoslovakia, for 
example, they prompted human rights activists to frame their work in 
terms of holding their regime to its support for two human rights 
covenants which had been "reiterated at Helsinki in 1975"; the result was 
the human rights group Charter 77.6 In other words, one could argue that 
the Helsinki Accords had helped bring these groups into existence; some 
of these groups later entered into a dialogue with the Western peace 
movement; therefore the Helsinki Accords indirectly helped make this 
dialogue possible. Secondly, one might argue that the signing of the 
Helsinki Accords, and the general process of detente of which it was a 
part (which included the treaties signed between West Germany and 
Soviet bloc states) created, in the form of official agreements, better 
conditions of East-West travel, from which the Western peace 
movements could benefit. These included, for example, the regularization 
of travel from West Berlin to East Berlin; or the accreditation of West 
German journalists in East Berlin by the East German government - some 
of these journalists carried documents between independent activists in 
the GDR and Western peace activists. Similarly, some West German 
MdBs, including Petra Kelly of the Greens, took large quantities of 
material across the border to GDR activists. 
Nevertheless, their 'own' activists the regimes could, and did, 
harass in a variety of ways: by expelling them from their employment and 
giving them menial jobs instead; by refusing them (or their children) 
places at university; by using physical violence; by arresting, detaining 
and even imprisoning them; even by expelling them from the country. 
This, in some cases, affected the ability of these activists to organize, and, 
for those interested in so doing, to pursue the relationship with Western 
peace groups. Foreign activists the regimes could, and did, keep out of 
their countries by refusing them entry visas; on some occasions they 
6, Charter 77 Declaration', in Vdclav Have] et al, The Poiver of the Powerless, London: 
Hutchinson, 1985, '717. 
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deported them. The regimes also could, and did, try directly to undermine, 
in various ways, the work of Western peace groups it disliked: either by 
attacking them publicly (see below: the Zhukov letter) or even by having 
their spies in these groups (see below: END GDRJGerman Group). There 
were, however, variations in the regimes' responses to their own 
independent and to foreign peace groups varied, both over time, and from 
country to country: they could expand and contract the political 
opportunities available for domestic groups to organize; and they could be 
more or less open to Western groups. This was the changing 'objective' 
POS that faced groups trying to develop cross-bloc contacts. 
One can, with regard to some of these countries, establish a 
correlation between a country's 'political opportunity structure' and the 
nature of END's relationship with that country's regime: the more 
restricted these opportunities, the more tense, even confrontational, the 
relationship; the more 'liberal' the system, the more relaxed the 
relationship with the authorities. Similarly, one can - more obviously - in 
some cases posit a cause-and-effect relationship between the political 
opportunity structure, with regard to both domestic and foreign groups, 
and the degree of contact between 'civil society' actors in East and West: 
the more 'liberal' the regime, the greater the degree of contact between 
these actors; the less liberal, the less contact. 
With regard to the Soviet Union, for example, in 1980-86 - the 
period in much of which relations between the Soviet Union and the West 
were tense, the Soviet Union's foreign policies stagnated, and the 
opportunities for domestic groups to organize were limited 7- the 
relationship with officialdom was largely confrontational, and the 
opportunities for dialogue with independent forces severely limited. In 
this period, the Soviet Peace Committee had a very antagonistic attitude 
towards END and other sections of the non-aligned Western peace 
movement. The first, public, and most extreme, display of this attitude 
was an open letter from the SPC president Yuri Zhukov to Western peace 
' See Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War, 137-45 & 244. 
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movements in December 1982. Taking aim at the new END Convention 
process, Zhukov, accused the "Movement for European Nuclear 
Disarmament", and specifically the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, of 
trying to split the growing "anti- war movement" in East and West. 
"Soviet public organizations" working for peace, he wrote, were ready to 
help prepare the END Convention in West Berlin in May 1983, but such 
co-operation was impossible because of the Convention organizers' 
political platform, the END Appeal. This "foist[ed] on others" the false 
notion that both blocs have "equal responsibility" [sic] for the arms race. 
He then, more extremely, stated that the END "movement" and the BRPF 
were consciously working in the interests of the USA and its allies: the 
claim about "equal responsibility" was being made in order to 
"disorientat[e] ..., 
demobilis[e] ..., and undermine[e] the anti-war 
movement and to conceal and justify an aggressive militarist policy of the 
USA and NATO". 8 
In the same period, from 1982-87, the Soviet regime dealt 
harshly with the small independent Soviet peace groups - including the 
best known in the West, the Moscow Trust Group (The Moscow Group 
for Establishing Trust Between the USSR and the USA). Members of the 
Trust Group were, among other things, imprisoned and detained in 
psychiatric wards, for activities that included "disseminating anti-Soviet 
propaganda", 9 taking part in vigils 10 , or collecting signatures 
for the Trust 
Group's first document. " As a result, the MTG remained a tiny group for 
much of its existence. The regime also occasionally prevented Western 
' 'The Zhukov File', END Bulletin 12,1983,14. See also See Edward Thompson, 'Bumpy 
But Beneficial', END Journal 8, April-May 1984,27, an account of a tense meeting on 
6-9 February in Athens of non-aligned Western groups and peace committees hosted by 
the Greek peace organization KEADEA; 'The Problem of Unity of the Peace 
Movements', a speech by Yuri Zhukov at a meeting on 5 October 1984 in Helsinki 
convened by the World Peace Council; and Mary Kaldor, 'Report on Soviet Tnp, May 
25- 
31,1987'. (Zhukov and Kaldor documents in END Archive. ) 
' 'Documents Condemn Trust Group', END Journal 7, December 1983-January 1984,7. 
10 'Moscow Trust Group Faces Continuing Harassment', END Journal 20, February- 
March 1986,6. 
'Moscow Group Is Still Going Strong', END Journal 14, February-March 1985,29 
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peace activists either from entering the country or from meeting members 
of the Moscow Trust Group. 12 The hostile attitude of the SPC persisted 
until 1986 when, with a change of leadership, the SPC identified itself 
with the developing reform process in the Soviet Union, and displayed a 
much more welcoming attitude to END. In May 1987, British END 
visited Moscow as official guests of the SPC and met a wide range of 
official bodies and unofficial activists. ' 3 At home, the regime's attitude to 
the Trust Group became more tolerant, too, with - coincident with the 
signing of the INF Treaty - members of the group were allowed to 
participate in a prime-time Soviet television programme. 14 
The GDR regime also pursued relatively 'exclusive' policies 
towards both foreign and its own independent groups - though for the 
whole decade. At various points it placed entry bans on Western peace 
activists, including British END activists John Sandford, Lynne Jones, 
Mary Kaldor, and Barbara Einhorn. In addition, Einhorn was arrested and 
detained for four days in December 1983 after she had met the 
independent women peace activists, including Bdrbel Bohley and Ulrike 
Poppe. The Stasi further tried to undermine END by having at least one 
spy (an 'unofficial employee' or Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter) in END's 
GDR/Geman Working Group. The opportunities for GDR citizens to 
organize were also severely restricted. The regime cracked down on 
independent activity, including on the 'Swords into Ploughshares' 
activists in 1982, and, in 1983, Women for Peace and peace activists in 
Jena. Members of the Peace and Human Rights Initiative (IFM), founded 
in 1985, were subject to regular, low-level harassment, which included 
receiving hoax mail and having front-door locks glued shut. ' 5 In January 
" For example, the KGB prevented a CND delegation from taking part in a seminar 
organized by members of the Trust Group. 'Back from the USSR', Sanity, December 
1985,35. 
13 'END in Moscow', Special Section, END Journal 28/29, Summer 1987,7-13. 
14 'Trust Group Changes Name', END Journal 28-29, Summer 1987,6; Jonathan Steele, 
'Trust Group - As Seen on TV', END Journal 32, February-March 1988,16. 
15 Personal communication to author by Werner Fischer of the IFM. 
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1988, the regime arrested about 70 independent peace, ecology and 
human rights activists, as well as would-be emigres, in the wake of a 
demonstration by about 100 people at the 17 January official rally 
honouring Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. Those arrested included 
leading IFM members who had not taken part in the demonstration; under 
severe pressure from the authorities, the IFM members agreed to leave the 
GDR temporarily. (Two returned 6 months later. ) At the same time, for 
much of the decade, the GDR Peace Council was suspicious of, and 
sometimes hostile to, British END. 
The relatively liberal nature of the Hungarian regime, by 
contrast, 16 was reflected in the more relaxed relationship between British 
END and other non-aligned Western peace groups and the Hungarian 
Peace Council (HPC). The HPC, for example, signalled its rejection of the 
invitation to attend the 1983 Berlin Convention with a letter to the LC that 
struck a much more conciliatory tone than had Yuri Zhukov's letter of the 
previous December, indicating where, in its view, it and West European 
peace movements had "common positions"- for example, on the issue of 
nuclear-free zones in Europe. 17 In 1987, the HPC signed the END Appeal 
(though reserving the right to take an "autonomous" position on various 
aspects of the Appeal) and later that year took part in an independent 
international seminar in Budapest on the Gorbachev reforms co-organized 
by the European Network for East-West Dialogue and independent 
Hungarian activists and attended by Western peace activists. 18 (See 
below). The Hungarian regime also helped create opportunities for 
independent activity at home and almost always let Western activists into 
the country and allowed them to stay when there. Peace activists from the 
West visited the country regularly until 1989. The most conspicuous 
" See Rudolf L. T6k6s, Hungary's Negotiated Revolution: , Economic Reform, 
Social 
Change, and Political Succession, 1957-1990, Cambridge University Presss, 1996, 
passini. 
17 Ilona Sebestyen and Bama Sarkadi Nagy, 'A Letter to the Convention', END Papers 6, 
Winter 1983-84,1984,88-90. 
" 'Hungarian Meeting a Success', END Journal 3 1, December 1987-January 1988,8. 
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example of the regime's power to allow or prevent independent activity 
came in 1982-83 in relation to the new independent Peace Group for 
Dialogue (PGD), which was founded in 2 September 1982. 
From mid- 1982 to early 1983 the regime actively created 
opportunities for the PGD to organize, and for foreign peace activists to 
meet them publicly: in late November Mary Kaldor of END and Mient- 
Jan Faber of the IKV addressed a 150-odd strong audience, most of them 
PGD supporters, on the premises of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences; 
19 two days later, the PGD held its own first public meeting, on Peace 
Council premises: 300-400 people heard four PGD members present their 
views on the need to end the Cold War and the importance of creating a 
nuclear-free Europe; in December, PGD published a pamphlet entitled 
'We want Dialogue! '; in January 1983 the first issue of a journal, 
Dialogus; in February, the group held another public meeting, again on 
the premises of the Peace Council; in April, PGD a national conference; 
and, on 7 May, the movement achieved one of its biggest successes, when 
- with the permission of the Peace Council - about 400 PGD supporters, 
with their own banners, took part in an official Peace Council march. 
However, from December 1982, the regime had also begun to restrict 
opportunities for independent action. In January 1983, the Party daily 
published articles implicitly aimed at PGD, one stating that the 
government's adherence to peace polices made an "independent" peace 
movement impossible and that any "oppositional" or "anti-government" 
peace movement would not be tolerated; 20 in February, two PGD 
members were refused visas for a visit to Greece, where they were to take 
part in a conference on nuclear-weapons-free zones; in May PGD 
members were refused visas for a trip to the second END Convention 
West Berlin; in April Dialogue members were summoned by heads of 
university departments and party secretaries for a "'a good talking to"'; in 
19 Bill Lomax, "The Dialogue Breaks Down, Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, 7,1, 
Winter 1984,4. 
20 Ferenc K6szegi quoted in E. P. Thompson memo 19 January 1983. 
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May three members were summoned to a (friendly) meeting at the 
Ministry of Interior to discuss their activities; in June group members 
were prevented from joining an [official] peace march in Komarom, in 
Czechoslovakia, and from participating in the World Peace Council 
congress in Prague; and then, in July, in a crackdown which led to a crisis 
and the 'dissolution' of the PGD the police broke up an international 
peace camp planned by PGD members and deported thirteen Western 
peace campaigners, including Greenham Common women, who had 
wanted to attend it. 21 
In Czechoslovakia, the regimes's attitude to Western peace activists 
was often hostile: in June 1983, just before the 'Prague Assembly for Peace 
and Life, Against Nuclear War, ' a peace conference organized by the pro- 
Soviet World Peace Council, the Czechoslovak Communist Party 
circulated a document to activists and functionaries which described END 
("active mainly in Great Britain") as "the organisation with explicit anti- 
communist and anti-Soviet function"; a charge that was repeated a year 
later in an article in the newspaper Rude Pravo, which attacked Edward 
Thompson in particular and END general for trying to "weaken and 
paralyse anti-war efforts" and to "influence the peace movement according 
to Washington's ideas"22 . In June 1988 the regime 
broke up a peace 
seminar in Prague hosted by Charter 77 and the NMS and expelled the 34 
foreign peace activists attending it. 23 In Czechoslovakia, however, a 
correlation between this 'exclusive' attitude and END's relationship with 
officialdom cannot be established as, for the almost the whole decade, no 
such relationship existed. The regime, like that of the GDR, also severely 
curtailed opportunities for independent organization. Charter 77 
signatories, from the founding of the group in 1977, and other independent 
21 Mlkl6s Haraszti, 'Dialogue - Two Years of Hungary's Independent Peace Movement', 
Across Frontiers, 1,3&4, Winter-Spring 1985,34. 
2' 'Who's Paying the Piper? ', END Journal 9 April-May 1984,9; 'Trust Group 
Members Defends Thompson', END Journal 12, October-November 1984,7. 
" 'Wclcome to Bad News', END Journal 36, October 1988-January 1989,17. 
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activists were regularly physically intimidated, arrested and imprisoned, 
and pressured into leaving the country. These included Ladislav Lis, the 
Charter 77 signatory (and in 1982 one of the three spokespeople) who 
played a key role in promoting Charter 77's side of the dialogue with the 
Western peace movement, 24 who was sentenced in 1983 to 14 months in 
prison and three years of 'protective supervision' for distributing Charter 
77 literature; and in 1984 to a further three months in prison for allegedly 
breaking the conditions of the supervision. He remained under 'protective 
supervision' until June 1987. In August and September 1986 the 
Czechoslovak authorities arrested the seven officers of, and another leading 
activist in, the Jazz Section, since its foundation in 1971 a focus for 
independent cultural activity in Czechoslovakia and, since 1983, a signatory 
of the END Appeal. Two of those arrested were sentenced in 1987 for 10 and 
16 months respectively on charges of 'illicit trading'. 25 In 1988 the authorities 
arrested, and later sentenced, four members of a new independent peace 
group, the Independent Peace Association - Initiative for a Demilitarised 
Society (NMS), and, in January 1989, two more leading NMS activists as 
26 
well one in another peace group, the John Lennon Peace Club . 
In the case of Poland, for much of the decade, political 
opportunities were, unlike in the Soviet Union, the GDR or 
Czechoslovakia, often favourable to transnational dialogue with 
independent groups. Not only in 1980-81, in Solidarity's first legal 
period, but also between 1983 and 1989, when the regime rarely denied 
visas to END supporters wanting to visit Poland; as a result, they did 
regularly - on average 3-4 times a year - and met a wide range of 
independent activists. (Two exceptions highlight this rule: the regime 
denied visas to a Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation peace-cum-trade 
24 See Jan Kavan, 'Lis Appeal', END Journal 6, October-November 1983,4 
25 'Free Jazz', Letter, END Journal 4, June-July 1983,28; 'Jazz Section Suppressed' 
END Journal 25, December 1986-January 1987,3--4; 'Jazz Section Latest', END 
Journal 27, May-June 1987,4. 
2b See Pat Hunt, 'Cracks in the Ice', END Journal 37,1989,23; and END Czechoslovakia 
Petition, [untitled], END Journal 37,1989,24-25., 
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union delegation to Poland in September 1980; 27 and to Mary Kaldor and 
Mark Thompson, respectively the editor and a deputy editor of the END 
Journal, and Stephen Brown, CND's International Worker, when they 
tried to attend an international seminar in Warsaw, organized by WiP, in 
May 1987. ) In addition, with the exception of the martial law period 
(December 1981-July 1983), and the partial exception of the period up 
to early 1985, there were independent activists willing and in a position to 
meet Western peace campaigners. END had no relationship with the 
Peace Committee until 1987, when, in the context of a slow liberalisation 
of Polish society (and when British END activists knew their relationship 
with independent forces was strong enough not to be undermined by their 
meeting the peace officials) an END activist attended a seminar organized 
by the Committee. 
How important were the presence or absence of political 
opportunities in Soviet bloc countries in determining whether or not a 
non-confrontational relationship with regimes and a dialogue with 
independent forces could develop? Obviously, if all the regimes in the 
East had been extremely hostile to the non-aligned Western peace 
movement no relationship with them would have been possible. Similarly, 
if the regimes had been as repressive as, for example, that of Romania, the 
possibility for citizens to organize independently would not have existed 
in any CEE/SU country, and there would have been no pan-European 
contact. One can assume that a minimal willingness on the part of the 
regimes to deal with the non-aligned Western peace movement, as well as 
a minimal amount of freedom at home, and opportunities for Westerners 
to enter CEE countries and the Soviet Union were all conditions of 
significant East-West 'dialogue' at any level taking place. Yet this only 
partly explains the extent of the contacts with independent groups; and it 
does not explain the content of the dialogue with them, nor of the 
relationship with state bodies. To do this one has also to examine 
27 , Russell Commission to Poland', END Bulletin 3,1980,18-19. 
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- both how END activists (and other Western peace groups) 
ftamed these opportunities and the regimes, and the independent groups, 
and what strategies flowed from these framings; and 
- the stance independent activists adopted towards Western peace 
groups. 
A Twin-Track Policy 
We have already seen (Chapter 2) how the founders of END both framed 
the world pessimistically and yet proposed, in an optimistic voice, the 
creation of a "transcontinental movement". 'Mainstream' END policy in 
its East-West relations, grounded in the basic END frame, was to pursue 
a 'twin-track' approach: dialogue and cooperation with independent 
activists while maintaining relations with the regimes. This reflected the 
view that a condition of nuclear disarmament taking place and of the Cold 
War ending was pressure on governments and regimes 'from below', both 
in East and West; but that peace activists - who were, after all, trying to 
change the foreign and defence policies of governments - also had to try to 
influence governments and regimes directly. In addition, END supporters 
felt they might be able to help create 'space' for independent activists by 
pleading their case with the authorities - and, if necessary, actively 
defending them against harassment. 
This dual approach was, as indicated in Chapter 2, one of three 
broad approaches to East-West relations that activists in the West 
European END 'current' pursued, each of which could be defended in 
terms of the END 'frame'. I look below (Part 11) at how these approaches 
were manifested in the END Convention process. 
Even within British END the precise attitudes towards, and the 
policies pursued with regard to, both independent forces and official bodies 
in the East varied. In the early days of British END, when the relationship 
with CEE/SU was just getting off the ground, there were disagreements 
over the organization's East European strategy, among both supporters and 
'leaders'. At the first national END Supporters' Conference (May 198 1), 
for example, the discussion at the 'International Dimensions' workshop, 
157 
which focussed on the "the question of how to foster relations with Eastern 
Europe", produced three views on this matter: some stressed the 
"importance of reinforcing links with official Peace Councils - especially 
by encouraging their members to visit Britain and discuss with us here". 
Others "pointed to the danger that the pursuit of such contacts would 
discredit END with dissident opinion in the East"; and all agreed that the 
"development of lateral links was the best way of approaching the mass of 
people who were neither officials nor dissidents - though this was easier to 
pursue among doctors, scientists and academics than at the trade union 
28 level" . The minutes of the British END Coordinating Committee strategy 
meeting of 12/13 September 1981 record a similar lack of consensus about 
who to approach in the East: "peace councils, dissidents, academics, youth 
organisations, women's groups, churches, and 'semi-official circles 11 . 
29 In 
the run-up to this meeting, one leading activist, Fred Hasson, wrote in an 
internal document (after stating that it was a "waste of time" contacting 
66official peace councils in USSR, East Germany, etc. ") that "dissident 
signatories to the [END] appeal will not help in any constructive or 
positive way". He advocated, as an alternative, establishing contacts with 
official "Youth and Student organisations in countries such as East 
Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria", and cited support for such a 
strategy by the Italian Communist Party's youth wing - "they confirmed 
that this would be a logical progression for our movement, they said they 
could help through their international network". This seems to suggest a 
preference for cautious dialogue with bodies that, while not oppositional, 
might be prepared to discuss ideas to which more conservative ruling 
forces are deaf. 30 At the same time, however, Edward Thompson wrote that 
this was the time for END to "bring forward" its "positive demands": "de- 
structuring the Cold War or re-making and re-unifying European culture". 
2' James Hinton, 'END National Supporters Conference', END Bulletin 6, Autumn 198 1, 
18. 
29 Minutes of END Committee, 12/13 September 1981, Coventry. 
30 Fred Hasson, 'Some thought on END', 5.9.81. END Archive. 
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And this would mean that the "lateral and East-West strategies of END 
have to be activated and embodied in actual events, conferences, cross- 
European marches ... and multiple relations which press steadily (but not 
in adventurist or provocative ways) for greater East-West communications 
and for at least a sketchy mutual understanding between the peace 
movement of the West and the movement for civil rights &c in the East". 31 
This echoed the hope he expressed in Beyond the Cold War - delivered as 
a lecture shortly after this - that the "movement for peace in the West and 
for freedom in the East" might recognize "each other as natural allies. 32 
At one point, there was even a handful of people in British END 
who were hostile to the pursuit of relations with independent forces in the 
East (or at least in the Soviet Union) and advocated, if only by implication, 
closer relations with official bodies. Pieta Monks argued in the END 
Journal in 1983 that the "preoccupation of some activists within [British] 
END with the issue of human rights [in the Soviet Union] is potentially 
more dangerous and divisive to the British peace movement than anything 
Michael Heseltine or President Reagan could dream up" and was 
"increasing the hostility and mistrust between the Soviet government and 
END". ENDers should not assume, she suggested, that the SPC was not 
representative of the Soviet population. 33 By contrast, others in END 
advocated not pursuing contacts with official bodies at all: for John Keane 
the "balanced diplomacy" strategy was "highly implausible", in part 
because it contradicted the "explicit privileging of citizens-based peace 
99 34 negotiations outlined in the [END Appeal] . 
1 E. P. Thompson, 'END at September 198 1'. END Archive. 
32 Thompson, Beyond the Cold War, 33. 
33 Pieta Monks,, 'D6tente or Cold War From BelowT, END Journal 5, August- 
September 1983,8. 
34 John Keane, 'Civil Society and the Peace Movement in Britain', Thesis Eleven, No. 8, 
1984,19; and 'Balanced Diplomacy? Or a Third, European Way?, paper submitted to 17 
March 1984 END 'Quarterly' (END Archive). 
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In the end, though, what emerged out of discussion within END 
was a broad commitment, subscribed to by most END supporters, to the 
twin-track approach 
Relations with Officials 
British END attempted to develop a relationship with the SPC in the early 
1980s. The hostile attitude of the SPC, expressed in the Zhukov letter of 
December 1982 (see above), made this impossible. An END-SPC 
meeting in London in 1984 was characterised, Mary Kaldor later recalled, 
by a "horrible discussion". 35 This stormy relationship lasted, as indicated 
above, until 1986, when the SPC adopted a more friendly attitude. 
British END activists had, as indicated, little or no bilateral contact 
with either the Czechoslovak Peace Council or the Polish Peace Council. 
The foriner stance reflected a view that the committee was ftindamentally 
tainted by its association with a regime that itself - having been installed 
in the 'normalization' of the country after the suppression of the Prague 
Spring - fundamentally lacked legitimacy; 
36 the latter a view that, given 
the strength of 'civil society', this body both had little or no legitimacy and 
little significance; and the fact that, had such contact been established, 
dialogue with independent groups would have been difficult if not 
impossible. This stance only changed in 1987 when, as we have seen, and 
when British END had a strong relationship with independent forces. 
By contrast, END activists maintained bilateral relations with 
4officials' in the GDR for most of the decade. These relations included two 
meetings with the Peace Council in 1984; with representatives of the main 
women's magazine, Rir Dich, in 1982 and 1983; with the official women's 
organization, the Demokratischer Frauenbund Deutschlands (DFD), in 
1983; as well as meetings with officials from the GDR embassy in London 
(for example, in 1985 and 1988), at which the participants discussed, 
among other things, GDR foreign and defence policy and the policies of 
35 Mary Kaldor, 'Report on Soviet Trip, May 25-31,1987'. END Archive. 
36 See 'Minutes of the Czech Task Group Meeting: 27th April 1984'. 
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CND and END. 37 At the same time, the newsletter of the GDR group, GDR 
Peace News (later Borderlines), gave regular coverage to foreign and 
defence policy statements of the GDR regime. One member of the GDR 
Working Group advocated cooperation with and better understanding of 
the Peace Council. In 1986 he argued for a (positive) "reassessment" of the 
GDR Peace Council "in pursuit of common aims shared by Western peace 
movements and all those genuinely working for peace in the GDR" ; 38 and 
stated that "co-operation and dialogue with the Peace Council and other 
officials and experts are necessary and desirable for both them and us in the 
overriding cause of trust-building and peace-making". 39 These policies and 
views reflected a more sympathetic attitude to the GDR regime than that of 
other END activists to, say, the Polish and Czechoslovak regimes, as well 
as the belief that - while the dialogue with independent groups was still of 
key importance - the GDR regime had an important role to play in 
bringing about the aims of the peace movement. 
Another END activist, Stephen Tunnicliffe, the co-ordinator of the 
Churches Lateral Committee, framed the relationship with CEE/SU in a 
similar way. He argued that END could do more to achieve its goals of 
ending the Cold War and the division of Europe by deliberately trying to 
collaborate with organizations that were not 'like-minded', that is, amongst 
others, with peace committeeS. 40 Tunnicliffe put this approach into practice 
by organizing, with Bishop Karoly Toth of the Hungarian Reformed 
Church and President of the Prague-based Christian Peace Conference, two 
international seminars entitled 'Theology of Peace' in September 1984 and 
December 1987. This stance was perhaps closer to that reflected in 
mainstream CND Ostpolitik. 
37 For all these see documents in END Archive. 
" John Theobald, 'A Fresh Look at the GDR Peace Council', END Journal 20, February- 
March 1986,25. 
'9 John Theobald, 'Too Late - and Not Even-Handed', Letter, END Journal 2 1, April- 
May 1986,26. 
40 Stephen Tunnicliffe, 'Memorandum to END CC, "The Future Political Direction of 
END(UK)", 28 March 1985. END Archive. 
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END activists often met members of the Hungarian Peace Council 
(HPQ when they visited Hungary; as well as, on occasion, of the 4-6-0 
Club, a group created by former members of the PGD in 1983 after the 
PGD had dissolved in 1983 and which operated under the auspices of the 
HPC. Of the 21 reports in the END archives of visits by British ENDers to 
Hungary between October 1982 and May 1989,13 record meetings - in 
addition to those with independent peace activists, members of the 
Democratic Opposition, and others - with the Hungarian Peace Council. 
This reflected in part the view that the HPC could act, as it had in the case 
of the PGD in 1982-83, to help create the conditions in which 
independent activity could develop. 
Dialogue with Independents 
However, the primary emphasis in British END was on relations with 
independent activists in the East. The 'dialogue' with these activists had a 
number of distinctive features. As new or existing groups, or individual 
activists, addressed the Western peace movement, or in some way took up 
the issue of peace, END supporters visited the groups, or wrote to them, 
and debated the possibility of cooperation across the division of Europe. 
Thus, precisely, a dialogue, an exchange of views began. This relationship 
developed - and common ground was found - but it did so unevenly, both 
over time and from country to country. In addition, END supporters 
supported and defended activists in the Soviet bloc when they were 
persecuted by the authorities for their involvement in independent peace 
work. At the same time, END supporters were trying to publicize, in its 
publications and elsewhere in the West, this dialogue and the work of the 
East European participants in it, and thus widen the constituency - for 
example, CND - involved in the dialogue. END supporters did this by 
forming country-specific working groups which monitored closely relevant 
developments in CEE/SU and disseminated information about this in 
reports, briefings, newsletters, and pamphlets. At the same time END 
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activists began to debate intensely the meaning of these new contacts 
amongst themselves. 
In this dialogue, END's size and structure was, as I have argued in 
Chapter 3, an advantage: END activists could pursue controversial policies 
without having to worry about being held accountable by a membership. It 
is worth noting, however, that END, like many other Western involved in 
this dialogue, combined smallness with being an integral part of 
international networks such as the IPCC and the END Convention process. 
Membership of these networks worked to END's advantage by giving it a 
platform and an audience which a group of its size might otherwise not 
have had. In addition, British END's smallness was, in some instances, not 
a handicap in CEE/SU either: here, some its interlocutors thought it and the 
END Convention were one, big, entity, END. 41 
The following survey highlights key developments in and features 
of this dialogue. 
A Slow Start 
The first steps in the dialogue were taken by END activists in early 1980. 
In the first 18 months or so of END's existence - from Spring 1980 to 
November 1981 - there was, in fact, little dialogue. There were various 
reasons for this. On the one hand, there were no independent peace 
initiatives in the East. On the other hand, the responses that did come from 
other independent activists were discouraging. Dorothy and Edward 
Thompson received a cool reception from human rights activists when they 
visited Prague in the summer of 1980 with the END Appeal; and the first 
public reply from a Czech activist - the pseudonymous Charter 77 
signatory 'Vaclav Racek' - to Edward Thompson was extremely negative. 
Stating that the social systems in the East are "totalitarian", and that 
totalitarianism necessarily translates into "aggression and invasion" 
" See interview with Jaroslav 
ýabata, 20 July 1998. 
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abroad, 42 he argued that the cause of peace is best served by getting rid of 
this, its main enemy; and that the peace movement should support that 
force "which is an instrument of democracy confronting totalitarianism", 
namely "the military forces of Western democracies". 43 This stance was 
not likely to find much support in END. At about the same time, in an 
interview with Edward Thompson 44 the independent Soviet writer Roy 
Medvedev - who, unlike 'Racek', was sympathetic to the END idea: he 
had signed the END Appeal - stated that the conditions both for an 
independent mobilization in the Soviet Union and for a cross-bloc 
discourse did not exist. 
In one country, however, there were, in principle, opportunities for 
dialogue; that is, the political opportunity structure was favourable: Poland. 
From August 1980 to December 198 1, a vast national movement, 
Solidarity, dominated Polish life and scores of publicly active individuals 
were available for Western peace activist to talk to. Yet END made little 
attempt to get into Polish affairs in this period, either by issuing statements 
or by visiting Poland . 
45 Some approaches were made: a 700-strong END 
public meeting in Newcastle-upon-Tyne in August 1980 sent a message of 
support to "the citizens of Gdansk and the fellow trade unionists in Poland 
now on strike", and hoped that they would eventually "join hands with us 
in a common campaign for European nuclear disarmament"; the message 
was taken to Gdansk by an END supporter, John Taylor; in September 
1980, as indicated above, a Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation 
42 E. P. Thompson and 'Vdclav Racek', 'Human Rights and Disarmament' (Letters), in E. 
P. Thompson, Zero Option, London: Merlin Press, 1982,82.. 
43 'Vdclav Racek, 'Letter from Prague', in Jan Kavan and Zdena Tomin, eds, Voicesfrom 
Prague, London: END/Palach Press Limited, 1983,16. This letter is the second the 
Thompson and post-dates the beginning of the 'positive' dialogue with Charter 77 
signatories. But I quote from it here as 'Racek' expressed the same views in the second 
letter as in the first. 
44 , East-West Dissidents -a Conversation', END Bulletin 1,1980,4-5 
45 See E. P. Thompson, 'END at September 1981', memo 27 August 1981. END Archive; 
'The Polish Debate', in The Heavy Dancers, London: Merlin Press, 1985,153. See also 
'Support for Poland', END Bulletin, 2,1980,20. 
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'commission' (Labour MP Bob Cryer, Tony Topham, a BRPF employee, 
and Dan Smith, CND Vice-chair and an END founder-member) - the 
66 purpose [of which] was to report back to labour movements and peace 
organisations on the developments on Poland" - tried to visit Poland but 
was denied visas; 46 and in July and August 1981 Lynne Jones, on the END 
Coordinating Committee as a representative of the Medical Campaign 
Against Nuclear Weapons, visited Poland and met, among others, Janusz 
Onyszkiewicz, the Solidarity spokesman. 47 In addition, END founders 
corresponded with individuals in Poland: Jozef Halbersztadt and Zygmunt 
Elbinski. 
Yet, given the opportunities for contact available in Poland, this is 
very little. What is also striking is the apparent overall lack of engagement 
with Polish issues in END circles. There are records of discussions in 
END about Poland - for example, at the Coordinating Committee meeting 
of October 1981 - and other indications that ENDers were wondering how 
to respond to events in Poland, but little else. Yet there is, for example, no 
article in the first seven issues of the END Bulletin (which cover the period 
1980-8 1) about the significance for the END project of the existence of 
Solidarity. In other words, in a country in which the political opportunities 
for dialogue are so great, END activists made next to no attempt to begin 
it. 
There are various possible explanations for END's relative lack of 
engagement with Poland in this period. In 1980-81 ENDers, like other 
West European peace activists, were extremely busy getting their own 
movement, and indeed their own organization - END had to be created 
almost from scratch - off the ground (see Chapter 2. ) They would have 
had limited resources; and one can speculate that over-worked END 
supporters might have regarded Poland as just one of a long list of crucial 
issues that needed to be addressed. But a stronger explanation for END's 
46 See 'Russell Commission to Poland'. 
" interview with Lynne Jones, 9 March 1996. 
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creticence' is perhaps how ENDers framed Poland. On the one hand, as 
Edward Tbompson later wrote, they were unwilling to -intervene" with 
arguments about defence, disarmament, and foreign policy when these 
were not only not on Solidarity's agenda, but were being kept off it by 
Solidarity because they were too sensitive. 48 On the other hand, one can 
speculate that END activists might well have been wary of a huge, 
unpredictable movement - with, indeed, no stated interest in defence and 
foreign policy - that was, by definition, provocative and destabilising. 
Another possible reason is that, for at least some early END activists, the 
"link between peace and human rights" in the Appeal - as Mary Kaldor 
later wrote - was a "formality". ENDers cared about democracy in Eastern 
Europe, but only "in a formal sense": "we [made the link] ... because we 
wanted to establish the integrity of the peace-movement". If Kaldor's 
recollection was right, one can understand how a group of activists for 
whom a commitment to connecting peace and human rights was a 
formality would not respond to a movement that showed no interest in the 
peace movement's concerns. 49 
However, Kaldor also wrote that, once having established this link, 
END activists then felt obliged to act on it. From the end of 198 1, two 
developments occurred which made it possible for ENDers to do this; both 
indicated that there were possible interlocutors in the East for the END 
strategy. First, Central-East European individuals and groups already 
active on 'political' issues began to show, partly in response to approaches 
by Western peace groups, a public interest in the Western peace 
movement. Secondly, new groups in CEE/SU were formed which took up 
the issue of peace. Western peace groups responded to both these 
developments in Eastern Europe. 
48 E. P. Thompson, 'Revolution in a cold climate', END Journal 8, February-March 
1984,25. See also author's interview with Lynne Jones, 1996 
49 Mary Kaldor, 'A Movement for Peace and Democracy', in Peter Schneider and Peter 
Thelen, 
eds, Demokratische Reforinen und Europliische Sicherheit, Bonn: Friedrich- Ebert- 
StIftung, 1989,101. 
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The Dialogue Develops 
The Soviet Union 
The first discrete peace group in the Eastern bloc (as opposed to one- or 
two-person initiatives or one-off semi-public meetings) was the Moscow 
Trust Group (MTG), founded in June 1982 with a programme of proposals 
for establishing trust above all between the peoples of the USA and the 
USSR. 50 . However, though the MTG survived the often severe 
harassment some of its members were subjected to, it remained - until the 
reform process blossomed in the Soviet Union, when the MTG became 
just one of many unofficial groups -a marginal force in Soviet society: 
Roy Medvedev's warning to Edward Thompson that the conditions both 
for an independent mobilization in the Soviet Union did not exist seemed 
to be born out. In this respect the MTG was different to the other groups 
and individuals in the Soviet bloc with which END was in dialogue, 
almost all of whom became significant actors in their countries' politics as, 
from 1987, the Communist order slowly or quickly (depending on the 
country) collapsed. Nevertheless, British END supporters maintained close 
relations with MTG members, visiting them regularly and organizing 
support campaigns when MTG members were harassed by the authorities. 
Arguably, the impetus for this - beyond the basic END aim of working 
with independent peace forces in the Soviet bloc -was, as Mary Kaldor 
wrote in 1987, that they were a "symbol of independence and autonomy"; 
that is, that they symbolised the possibility of an independent peace 
movement emerging in the Soviet Union. 51 The significant dialogue - in 
terms of its political -cum-intellectu al content and/or the possible role of 
the groups in helping to bring about social change - was with groups in 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the GDR. 
" See Jean Stead and Danielle GrUnberg, Moscow Independent Peace Group, END 
Special Report, London: Merlin/END, 1982. 
51 Kaldor, 'Report on Soviet Trip'. 
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Czechoslovakia 
With hindsight, the new phase in the dialogue between Western peace 
movements and CEE/SU independent activists can be dated to the issuino, 
on 15 November 1981, by two of the spokespersons of the Czechoslovak 
human rights group Charter 77, Dr Bedrich Placdk and Vaclav Maly, and a 
member of the Group of Charter 77 spokespersons, Jiri Hajek, of a 
'Statement on West European Peace Movements'. The exchange of ideas 
that followed - which involved, on the Czechoslovak side, not only 
Charter 77 spokespeople, but also prominent individual signatories, 
including Jiri Dienstbier, Vaclav Havel, and Jaroslav Sabata - was 
arguably one of the most influential, at least for Western activists, in the 
entire dialogue with independents in CEE/SU. Various former Western 
activists have described the exchange of views between Charter 77 and 
Western peace groups as having significantly influenced thinking in the 
Western peace movement. The fact that this was so is perhaps partly 
attributable, in the case of British END (as I have speculated in Chapter 3), 
to the fact that the texts were promoted strongly by Jan Kavan of the 
Palach Press. But there are other, much more important reasons: the 
reputation of Charter 77 in general, and of many its signatories in 
particular; the clarity and directness of most Charter 77 texts on peace; and 
the fact that they contained often quite detailed proposals, and, above all, 
the fact that most of these texts supported the idea of a dialogue between 
the Western peace movement and Charter 77 and were, to a greater or 
lesser extent, sympathetic to at least some of their Western interlocutors' 
aims. "The suspicion and near hostility with which the first approaches of 
British peace campaigners were greeted" in 1980 - exemplified by 
Racek's letters - gave way to a welcoming tone and, amongst some 
Chartists, a desire for cooperation. 52 This extending of "the hand of 
friendship" seemed partly to reflect Charter 77 signatories' feeling of 
affinity with people who, in the words of an early Charter letter to the 
52 Jan Kavan and Zdena Tomin, eds, Voicesfrom Prague, London: END/Palach Press 
Limited, 1983,5. 
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Dutch peace organization IKV, "[flike ourselves ... aim ... to build a 
movement not on the basis of existing official structures but by relying on 
, 53 the sense of responsibility of ordinary people' . 
A central theme of Charter 77 documents on peace is the 
importance of getting governments to live up to the commitments they 
have made in international treaties and, therefore, of citizens' movements 
themselves taking these treaties seriously and using governments' non-, or 
partial, compliance with them as campaigning tools. This emphasis is not 
surprising: Charter 77's human rights work was, in one sense, a 
continuous attempt to get the Czechoslovak government to adhere to the 
54 
commitments it had made when signing international treaties on rights . 
The importance of states respecting treaties as a means of 
improving both inter-state and state-society relations is central to the 
'Prague Appeal' of II March 1985. Signed not only by the three 
spokespersons but also "by a group of Charter 77 signatories representing 
a cross-section of opinion", 55 the Appeal was in this sense perhaps the 
most representative Charter 77 statement on peace. While earlier Charter 
77 documents on peace were mostly declarations, discussions of principles 
and values, or statements of general aims, the Appeal contained a specific 
'package' of proposals for how Europeans should work together to attain 
peace in a divided Europe. It presented these within a framework - the 
"Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its Final Act 
signed in Helsinki", as well as the "subsequent talks and the Final 
Document of Madrid" (the follow-up conference to Helsinki) - and with a 
clear aim: "overcom[ing] the superpower bloc structure by way of an 
alliance of free and independent nations within a democratic and self- 
governing all-European community living in friendship with nations of the 
53 'The Indivisibility of Peace: Charter 77 Documents on Peace, Freedom and 
Democracy', in Kavan and Tomin, eds, Voicesfrom Prague, 26. 
54 See 'Charter 77 Declaration', in VAclav Havel et a], The Power of the Powerless, 
London: Hutchinson, 1985,217-222. 
55 J1ri Dienstbier, Eva Kanturkova, Petruska Sustrova, Introduction, The Prague Appeal 
('Building a Peaceful Europe'), END Journal 15, April-May, 1985,34. 
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entire world". The proposals included the "creation of nuclear-free and 
neutral zones"; "renunciation of the use of force or nuclear weapons"; 
46 rapprochement" between the European Economic Community and 
COMECON; and two which the Appeal's authors described as "taboo": 
the withdrawal of the USA's and the Soviet Union's military forces from 
Europe; and giving Gennans in both states the right to decide "if or how 
they wish to unite their two states within their present frontiers [sic]". 
For many Western peace campaigners, including those in END, the 
significance of the Prague Appeal, with its strong echoes of the END 
Appeal, was that it indicated that many of the concerns of at least that 
'current' of the Western peace movement which wanted to cooperate with 
independent forces in CEE/SU were taken seriously by one of the most 
'prestigious' of those forces. 56 A mark of the influence of the Appeal in 
this current was that it provided an "important stimulus" for a further stage 
in this East-West dialogue, the drafting of the 'Helsinki 
Memorandum'. (See below. 
Arguably perhaps the most significant theme of Charter 77 
documents on peace, however, was not the responsibility of governments, 
nor indeed specific proposals for ending the division of Europe. It was, 
rather, the idea of the "indivisibility of peace" : 57 the notion that there can 
be no peace between states if there is no peace within states; peace 
involves not only "peaceful coexistence" - d6tente - between states, but 
also the elimination of "violence and injustice within states" and "respect 
by the state authorities in all countries of human and civil rights". 58 By 
implication, to campaign for the former but not the latter is both politically 
short-sighted and morally indefensible. This was, indeed, perhaps the 
single most important 'idea' tout court that came from the East; and it 
most coherent written expression came in texts produced between 1981 
and 1985 by Charter 77 signatories. 
56 The Prague Appeal was distributed at the 1985 END Convention. 
57 , The Indivisibility of Peace', 24. 
58 lbid. 
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Linking peace (between states) and internal democracy was not 
foreign to the END 'frame'. The END Appeal had not only stated that the 
Cold War entailed the erosion of 'civil rights' in East and West - and had 
thus implied that ending the Cold War would remove a profound threat to 
civil rights. It had also declared that supporters of the Appeal would 
defend the right of all citizens to take part in the East-West exchange. 
That is, END supporters would, as part of their work, uphold the rights of 
association and expression (at least of those engaged in this work). 
However, the notion of the indivisibility of peace went further: it placed 
the building of peace between states and respect for 'human rights and 
freedom' on the same footing. It made the achievement of the former 
conditional on the latter: "to guarantee peace it is necessary to eliminate 
violence and injustice within states and guarantee respect by the state 
authorities in all countries of human and civil rights". 59 The acceptance of 
this concept was, for Charter 77 (and for some other groups in CEE/SU) a 
precondition of cooperation with the Western peace movement: "we 
extend the hand of friendship across the frontiers to you who are working 
diligently for peace with dignity on our continent and throughout the 
world" (emphasis added. ) 60 
British END's participation in the dialogue with Charter 77 reflect 
its fundamental support for Charter 77 and the openness of the END 
approach to new ideas, or to new formulations of ideas implicit in the 
END approach. In Spring 1982 E. P. Thompson wrote a statement, on 
behalf of END, which accompanied the publication in END Bulletin 8 
(Spring 1982) of the November 1981 Charter 77 statement. This 
welcomed the statement and affirmed "support for its principles and our 
common conviction 'that peace and freedom are indivisible"'. 
61 END's 
letter to Charter 77 of 16 March 1984 repeated the commitment to the 
'indivisibility of peace' - "[w]e welcome and endorse [your] ... emphasis 
59 Ibid. 
60 'The Indivisibility of Peace', 27. 
61E. P. Thompson, Forexord, 'Charter 77', END Bulletin 8, Spring 1982,20. 
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on the inseparability of peace and democratic rights" - and expressed the 
view that a "genuine and lasting peace requires the "democratic 
transformation of Europe". (The use of a phrase, 'the democratic 
transfon-nation of Europe', which is a quotation from Jaroslav Sabata's 
April 1983 'Letter to EP Thompson', suggests END activists were not 
only being influenced by at least this Charter 77 signatory but that they 
saw a close link between his ideas and their work. ) In between these two 
texts END supporters visited Czechoslovakia; organized solidarity 
campaigns in support of, respectively, Charter 77 signatory Ladislav Lis 
(see above) and a Christian activist from Moravia, Jan Pukalik, detained 
for collecting signatures opposing the deployment of Soviet 'counter- 
measures' in Czechoslovakia; and publicized the dialogue. The latter they 
did in the END Bulletin, and the END Journal, and in the Special Report, 
Voicesfrom Prague, as well as in some articles in other publications. A 
key role in this work was played by the Czechoslovak Task Group, 
founded in 1983. 
However, after 1985, British END's involvement in the dialogue 
proper (that is, in the bilateral exchange of ideas) largely dried up. In 
1986-87 and 1988-89 British END activists organized support 
campaigns for, respectively, the Jazz Section and peace and human rights 
activists in Charter 77 and the Independent Peace Association; and British 
ENDers visited Czechoslovakia, both to gather information and to 
maintain contacts with independents, as well as, in February 1989, to 
attend the trials of activists. But the exchange of ideas was pursued and 
developed, on the Western side, above all by a new organization founded 
in 1984, the European Network for East-West Dialogue (see below). The 
reason for British END's non-participation in the exchange of ideas was, 
above all, the collapse of the CTG following disagreements within the 
Czechoslovak Task Group over END's relations with CEE/SU in general 
and Czechoslovakia in particular and the withdrawal from END's 
Czechoslovak work of key END activists. These disagreements, which 
ovak 
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reflected basic underlying differences in approach to East-West relations, 
I return to below (Part III). 
Hungary 
The Peace Group for Dialogue was, like the Moscow Trust Group, one of 
the first independent peace groups to emerge in the Eastern Bloc. It was 
actively sought ties with the Western peace activists. One of its founders, 
Ferenc K6szegi, explained its goals in terms that he later said reflected the 
influence of Edward Thompson's, Mary Kaldor's, amongst others', 
writings on him: 62 44 action to prevent nuclear war", for "nuclear 
catastrophe is our greatest enemy"; "total disarmament, creation of a 
nuclear-free zone in Europe, and the protest against the deployment of 
Perishing 11 [sic] and SS-20 missiles". 63 Just as for British END so for the 
new Hungarian peace movement it was crucial to stand "firmly on a pan- 
European platform"; and K6szegi quoted in its entirety and with approval 
64 the "utopian" paragraph in the END Appeal . 
The strategy for achieving this aim - as outlined by Kbszegi - was 
to campaign as an 'independent' peace movement: independent not only of 
the regime but also of the 'Democratic Opposition'. He wanted to pursue a 
'middle way'. 65 Unlike in Czechoslovakia, the GDR, or the Soviet Union, 
there was a space in Hungary for a group that campaigned publicly and 
was not sheltered by an officially recognized institution in the way that, 
for example, in the GDR, many peace and other unofficial workers took 
shelter under the umbrella of the Protestant Church; the simple fact that a 
new peace movement existed showed this. 66 
62 Interview with Ferenc K6szegi, Budapest, 9 July 1998. 
63 Ferenc Kbszegi and E. P. Thompson, The New Hungarian Peace Movement, END 
Special Report, London: END/Merlin Press Ltd, n. d [1982], 13 
64 
Ibid., 17. 
65 Interview with Kbszegi. 
6' Another early PGD activist, Istvan Szent-lvanyi, later recalled that he wanted to help 
create a peace movement that would campaign principally against Soviet nuclear weapons, 
and so 'mirror' the Western peace movement, which, in his view, emphasized opposition 
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The PGD attracted many activists and sustained - by Eastern bloc 
standards -a high level of public activity until the end of June 1983. In 
this period, Western peace activists - 'leaders' and others -visited the 
group and tried to involve its members Western peace movement fora. At 
the outset, the PGD's relations with the authorities, as we have seen, had 
positive consequences. By late October-early November 300 young people 
had joined and other groups were established outside Budapest. But the 
group dissolved as the authorities changed their stance towards it. 
Unlike with Charter 77, British END's (and other Western 
groups') relations with Dialogue consisted largely of meetings in Hungary; 
there was no detailed, written exchange of ideas and principles as there 
was with Charter 77. Indeed, with a handful of exceptions, this form of 
dialogue characterised END's dialogue with Hungarian independents as a 
whole. 67 
After the demise of the PGD, there was not again such a coherent 
and obvious interlocutor for END and other Western peace groups. END's 
ties with Hungary after this period consisted of links, cultivated in frequent 
visits to the country, with individual independent activists, including a 
leading 'oppositionist', Mikl6s Haraszti, the sociologist Ference Mislivetz, 
as well as with students at the Law College in Budapest, some of whom 
went on to form one of the new political parties of the period of transition 
from communism, FIDESZ. One of these students, Gabor Fodor, later 
stated that END and other Western peace visitors, including Mient Jan 
Faber of IKV and Dieter Esche of the European Network for East-West 
Dialogue, influenced the development of his political views. 68 At home, 
to Western nuclear weapons; and, in the condition of 'apathy' and demoralization 
following the Polish 'coup' of December 1981, attract people who were critical of the 
system but did not want to go as far as joining the 'democratic opposition'. He favoured 
close ties between this peace movement and the dissidents. However, Szent-Ivanyl went 
abroad shortly after the founding of PGD; and the group did, indeed, for its existence, try 
to pursue a 'middle way'. ) Interview with Istvdn Szent-lvdnyl, Budapest, 26 June 1998 
6' These exceptions included the novelsist Gy6rgy KonrAd's book-length essay 
AntiPolitics, an excerpt of which was published In the END Journal (see 'Going Beyond 
Yalta', END Journal 10, June-July 1984,16-19. 
c's Interview with Gabor Fodor, Budapest, 28 August 1998. 
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END's - and centrally its Hungary Working Group's, established in 1982 
- publicizing of peace-related developments in Hungary continued (from 
the starting point of an END 'Special Report' in 1982, Ference K6szegi 
and E. P. Thompson's The New Hungarian Peace Movement), with 
articles in the END Journal, the circulation of reports of visits, and 
translations of newspapers. 
Poland 
British END's relations with Poland followed the opposite pattern: after an 
unpromising start, END found an active and lively interlocutor that was 
centrally involved in its country's political life. 
As we have seen, END had not exploited the open POS in Poland 
in 1980-8 1. British END's attempt to start a dialogue after this period 
with independent Polish opinion began in July 1982, when Mary Kaldor 
signed, with IKV representatives, a joint statement with representatives of 
the coordinating office of Solidarity abroad (in Brussels). In December 
1983, Jan Minkiewicz, a representative of the office, spoke at the launch 
meeting of the END Journal; and he contributed an article on Solidarity to 
the first issue of the END Journal. 69 In 1983 activists established a 
working group to deal with British END's Polish work. Members of this 
group, like those of other working groups, visited Poland and, on their 
return, publicized what they had seen and heard in various ways: in 
internal reports, articles in the END Journal, and in a newsletter. The 
group also organized defence campaigns for harassed peace activists. 
From 1983 to 1985, British END conducted a halting dialogue with 
independent activists in Poland, principally in KOS (Committee for Social 
Self-Defence), in the form both of face-to-face meetings and written 
exchanges. The difficult nature of this dialogue was due above all - in 
contrast to the dialogue with Charter 77 - to the mismatches between the 
69 'Solidarity: a Test-Case for the Eighties', END Journal 1, December 1982- January 
1983,14-15. 
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frames of Polish oppositionists and that of END. While the 'Indivisibility 
of peace' is an implicit or explicit idea in many Polish texts in this period, 
the dominant theme is that of the main, if not the only, threat to peace 
being posed by the Soviet Union; and that Western peace groups are 
apparently unwilling to acknowledge this. At the heart of the first KOS 
letter, sent in May 1983 to the West Berlin END Convention, was an 
explanation of why the "most dangerous fonn of militarism" was that of 
the Soviet Union, whose "expansionist policy" was based on military 
blackmail and aggressive and mendacious propaganda. The August 1984 
letter to British END stated that "first task ... 
is to stop" the "expansion 
of tyranny from the East into the West", and described the allegedly 
unbalanced demands in the END Appeal as "in our eyes, a continuation of 
the spirit of Yalta and yes, of the spirit of Munich, too". Solidarity 
spokesman Janusz Onyszkiewicz, writing to Mient Jan Faber of IKV in 
1984, suggested that the peace movement's "tradition of one-sidedness" 
was indicated by, among other things, its silence about the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan; its indifference to Solidarity in its legal period; and the 
fact that a peace movement emerged not when the Soviet Union began 
deploying SS-20s but in response to the planned deployment of US 
missiles. "True, the peace movement is not as purely one-sided as it was in 
Stalinist times but even now one can get a justifiable impression that it is 
,, 70 still using double standards. 
END activists' internal reports of visits to Poland indicated that 
that these activists were as interested in listening to the Poles they met as 
they were in telling them about the Western peace movement: that they 
were not necessarily looking for people who already agreed with them, or 
who would quickly sign up to the END agenda, but for an exchange of 
views. Yet the ultimate point of this dialogue was to find common ground; 
and these reports show that there was limited agreement between British 
END and KOS. However, with the foundation of Freedom and Peace 
(Wolno§C' i Pokojj or WiP) in April 1985 British END's relationship ýN ith 
70 Letter to Mient Jan Faber 
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Poland changed. With WiP there was vigorous dialogue and co-operation, 
and, though basic differences in outlook remained, these did not prevent 
British END - and other Western peace groups - and WiP from working 
together. 
The catalyst for the foundation of WiP was the case of Marek 
Adamkiewicz, a student from Szczecin who had refused to take the 
military oath at the beginning of his (compulsory) military service. In 
addition, some of the WiP founders saw a campaign against the military 
oath as a way of mobilizing society at a point when it had become 
apathetic and the opposition was relatively quiescent and invisible. The 
campaign against the military oath became a central plank of WiTs 
platform; this was soon joined by the demand that conscientious objectors 
be allowed to do an alternative to military service; and, after the 
Chernobyl explosion in April 1986, by campaigning against environmental 
destruction. 71 
WiP had no members, but, instead, 'participants', who acted 
openly, signing documents and taking part in public actions. It was a 
highly decentralized movement, with little formal organization; and it was 
small: according to Kenney, "[e]stimates of active participants in the 
movement range from 200-500, with major circles in Krakow, Wroclaw, 
Gdansk, and large ones in Warsaw, Gorzow, and Szczecin'. 
72 What it 
lacked in size, however, it made up for in use of the media. As the only 
opposition group producing "newsworthy events', 
73 
_ above all in 
1985-87 - the fact that WiP activists got news of their actions to 
"Warsaw 
and Radio Free Europe immediately" - and therefore back to those many 
Poles who listened to RFE - meant that many more than just the relatively 
small number of bystanders knew about WiP events. 
71 Padraic Kenney, 'Framing, Political Opportunities, and Civic Mobilization in the 
Eastern European Revolutions: A Case Study of Poland's Freedom and Peace 
Movement, Mobiliýation. - An International Journal, 6,2,2001,193-210,14. The page 
numbering refers to an offprint. 
72 Ibid., 17. 
73 Ibid., 19. 
177 
Different WIP groups had their own, distinctive characters. The 
movement included people who earlier been involved in punk and 
anarchist movements, 74 former (and current) members of the nationalist 
KPN (Confederation for an Independent Poland, as well as "radical 
socialists" and "Christian Democrats". What united WiP activists was the 
"broad acceptance of overarching goals" - even though different groups 
invested them with different political emphasis; a "generally common 
culture", 75 and, of course, opposition to the regime. According to Kenney, 
WiP was "the most important new opposition movement in Eastern 
Europe since the birth of Solidarity". It "forced discussion on several 
completely new issues" and won "significant concessions from the 
communist regime". 76 Jones make a similar claim: "WiP had not only put 
anti-militarism perinanently on the Polish agenda, it had played a major 
role in the democratic transformation of Polish society. , 77 
From shortly after the founding of WiP, British END activists 
pursued contacts with WiP. 78 Western peace campaigners and WiP 
participants met frequently between 1985 and 1989: members of British 
END, IKV, CODENE, of the West German Greens, West European 
members of the European Network for East-West Dialogue, as well as 
US peace and democracy activists, were amongst those who made 
frequent visits to Poland. Travel in the other direction was much more 
difficult. However, in 1986, leading WiP activist Piotr Niemczyk came to 
Britain and met British END activists, and, in 1987, Konstanty Radziwill 
spoke at the 1987 END Convention in Coventry (see below), while other 
WiP activists were also present at this Convention. Western peace activists 
74 Lynne Jones 'The Process of Engagement in Non-Violent Collective Action', PhD 
Dissertation, University of Bath, 1995,. 221. 
75 Kenney, 'Framing', 18 
76 Kenney, A Carnival of Revolution. - Central Europe 1989, Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2002. 
77 Jones, 'The Process', 238. 
78 See Lynne Jones's travel report, Summer 1985. END Archive 
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also campaigned in support of WiP activists when the latter were being 
harassed by the authorities: most notably, in support of Niemczyk and 
Jacek Czaputowicz (another WiP founder) in 1986, and of Slowomir 
Dutkiewicz in 1987. 
WiP was, of course, above all the product of domestic, Polish, 
developments, both in its origins and in its strategy and tactics. Padraic 
Kenney argues that, while WiP (and other East European) activists who 
participated in this East-West dialogue "were united [with Western 
activists] in the struggle for peace and human rights", for the Easterners 
this struggle was "also (and perhaps above all) a means to another end: a 
free, safe and democratic future in their own countries. Each [East 
European] movement, regardless of its international ties, ultimately fought 
for freedom at home". 79 Moreover, in the dialogue with WiP, 
disagreements remained, for example over unilateral nuclear disarmament. 
Gillian Wylie has argued that British END and WiP "endorsed different 
readings of the Superpowers and thus differing assessments of the wisdom 
of unilateral disarmament". (Indeed, Lynne Jones's impression was that, 
for WiP activists, the "anti-nuclear agenda" tout court "was always 
secondary". 80) These 'differences', amongst others, Wylie continues, were 
a "source of dissonance in 'detente from below"'. 81 Yet various 
commentators have argued, and some WiP activists too, that WiP was 
influenced by the Western peace movement, and that it, in turn, influenced 
Westem peace activists. 
Lynne Jones (herself an important participant in the British 
END-WiP dialogue and one of the British peace activists who did most to 
explain WiP to a British peace movement audience) argues that "the 
influence of the Western peace movement with whom WiP were in 
contact" was evident in WiTs Declaration of Aims of November 1985 
79 Kenney, Carnival. 
80 Jones, 'The Process', 223. 
81 Wylie, CreatingAlternative Visions, 176. 
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(see above). 82 (Point 3 of this statement mentions specifically CODENE, 
IKV, and END. ) Jacek Czaputowicz's comment to an interviewer in 1987 
indicates that he, at least, thought the link with Western peace movements 
beneficial: "we need something that will help to renew Polish political 
thought and we see a source of this in the peace movement in the West". 
Arguably, this common ground consisted as much of the fonn of 
campaigning as of its content: WiP, like many Western peace groups 
favoured a practical, 'small steps' approach in its work, set relatively little 
store by grand theoretical statements, and, in some cities, had a distinctive 
spontaneous', action-oriented style. 
For British END activists, whose dialogue with WiP continued 
until 1989, a- perhaps the - high point in their (and other Western peace 
groups') relations with WiP (and the Polish opposition) was the May 1987 
independent WiP seminar in Warsaw. Held in a church, and the first event 
of its kind, 83 the seminar brought together about 50 Western peace 
activists and 200 Polish activists for three days of discussion on peace and 
human rights, ecology, and conscientious objection. For some British END 
participants the WiP seminar was an important step forward in the East- 
West dialogue. It both built on solidarity already established and provided 
a basis for intensified future cooperation. And the production of common 
statements in some of the seminar workshops suggests that they might 
have been right to think so. Mark Salter, of British END, wrote that 
everyone present "agreed that the seminar had been an extraordinary 
occasion, unprecedented in peace movement history". He did not conceal 
the differences: "whatever the differences of understanding and perception 
- 'like looking at each other through a glass wall', commented one Pole". 
But "everybody was united in a sense that the dialogue was worthwhile, 
that they wanted to continue it, and that they had found in each other 
82 Jones, 'The Process', 223. 
83 Two similar seminars were held subsequently: in Budapest in November 1987 and in 
Prague in June 1988. 
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natural allies and partners". 84 Neil Finer made a similar point: "In many 
ways, the most important thing to have come out of the all the workshops 
(and the Seminar as a whole) was the shared feeling ... that our 
movements were each other's natural talking partners, and a sense that 
whatever things still divided us, these were less important than the things 
,, 85 which united US. There was, also, he wrote, a "sense of building on an 
underlying solidarity". Lynne Jones's speculation about the future 
relationships between activists in East and West was informed by a similar 
(though cautious) optimism. In a letter to E. P. Thompson she wrote: "I 
have this extraordinary feeling of excitement - that perhaps and it is only 
perhaps - there is really a new beginning here, the possibility of really 
forming some kind of independent and effective co-operation between 
peace, human rights, ecology movements that does stretch across frontiers 
, 986 and can't be ignored . 
German Democratic Republic 
The beginnings of an unofficial peace movement in the GDR can be traced 
back to the introduction in 1978 of compulsory pre-military training in 
schools for 15 and 16-year olds. In the autumn of 1980 the Protestant 
Churches organized the first annual 'Peace Weeks', ten days of discussion 
and services focusing on the Christian conception of peace and how it 
could be realised in the contemporary world. It was in 1982, however, that 
a flurry of initiatives and events suggested that there was a growing 
willingness in the GDR to take up peace issues independently of the state. 
In January 1982 the veteran oppositionist Robert Havemann and the East 
Berlin pastor Rainer Eppelmann launched the 'Berlin Appeal'. This 
document, with - in addition to its specific proposals for the 
demilitarisation of everyday life the GDR - its call for the creation of a 
nuclear-free zone in Europe, the withdrawal of "occupation troops" from 
84 Richard Bloom, 'Provoking Peace in Poland', END Journal 28/29, Summer 1987,5. 
85 Finer, report on May 1987 trip to Poland.. 
86 Lynne Jones, 'Report Polish Trip - Warsaw WiP Seminar May 1987', 8. 
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both Germanys, and for people to have the right to discuss, and 
demonstrate about, these matters freely, echoed the END Appeal. It was 
eventually signed by more than 2000 East Germans. On 13 February 1982, 
the 37 1h anniversary of the British and US destruction of Dresden in World 
War 11,5000 young GDR citizens gathered in the Church of the Cross for 
the Dresden 'Peace Forum', an evening of lively discussion about peace 
issues (including the Berlin Appeal). Before and after the Forum, large - 
by GDR standards - numbers of young East Germans took to wearing the 
'Swords into Ploughshares' emblem, the representation of a man beating a 
sword into a ploughshare, which was based on a sculpture given by the 
Soviet Union to the United Nations. The 'Forum' and the wearing of the 
emblem, above all, seemed to indicate - certainly to Western observers - 
that there was some kind of an unofficial peace movement in the GDR. In 
October 1982, hundreds of women wrote an open letter addressed to head 
of state Erich Honecker stating their opposition to a new law allowing for 
the conscription of women. 87 
British END's relationship with independent activists in the GDR 
began, when - as in Hungary - these peace initiatives emerged in 1982. 
ENDers enthusiastically promoted the Berlin Appeal, circulating it for 
signatures and, eventually, getting it published in The Times in May 1983. 
John Sandford recalls that it was this work that brought together the 
"nucleus" of the later GDR/German Working Group. 88 From 1982 
ENDers visited the GDR: in April Ken Coates and the Labour MP Michael 
Meacher went to East Berlin to meet Robert Havemann; he died just 
before they arrived and they spent the evening with Rainer Eppelmann. 89 
Later that year END women - Jan Williams, Barbara Einhorn, and Jane 
87 Roger Woods, Opposition in the GDR Under Honecker, 1971-85, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1986; Sandford, John, The Sword and the Ploughshare. Autonomous Peace 
Initiatives in East Germany, London: Merlin Press/European Nuclear Disarmament, 1983. 
81 Sandford, 'Mutual (Mis-)Perceptions. 
89 Ken Coates and Michael Meacher, 'Sad Moment for European Peace ... but 
independent Voices Remain', END Bulletin 10, July-August 1982,2 1. 
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Dibblin - made between them two visits to the GDR to meet women 
activists. These visits continued up to the end of the decade, even though, 
as indicated above, two members of the "nucleus" of the GDR/German 
Working Group, Barbara Einhom and John Sandford, were for much of 
this period denied entry to the country. Most of the visits, and thus the 
face-to face contacts, were with independent peace activists in East Berlin, 
as it could be visited from West Berlin with a day-visa purchased at the 
border; trips to other parts of the GDR required applying for a visa 4-6 
weeks in advance. 
At home, after the publication by END/Merlin Press in early 1983 
of John Sandford's The Sword and the Ploughshare: Autonomous Peace 
Initiatives in the GDR, ENDers in the GDR/German Working Group 
promoted independent peace activities in the GDR through a variety of 
channels. These included, in 1984, an unpublished update of Sandford's 
book; and, in 1987, in two editions, one German, one English, Stimmen 
aus der DDRIVoicesfrom the GDR, a unique collection of documents by 
East Germans on peace, ecology, and human rights. In addition, the 
Group's newsletter, first published in 1985, GDR Peace News (later 
Borderlines), contained a mixture of news about peace-related 
developments involving, as well as documents by, state, Church and 
independent forces. The content of this newsletter was, indeed, a good 
example of END's twin-track approach to East-West relations. 
Yet though END activists continued to monitor and report on the 
GDR, independent East German peace and human rights activists, 
according to Gerd Poppe, the member of the IFM responsible for 
East-West relations, gradually turned away from END. END's place in 
the East-West dialogue was taken over by the European Network for 
East-West dialogue. 90 This was not so much because of anything British 
END had done but because of perceived failings of the END Convention. 
But Poppe, like some others in CEE/SU, saw British END and the 
Convention process as one entity. At the same time, according to Poppe, 
90 Gerd Poppe, 'Die Aussenbeziehungen der DDR-Opposition in den achtziger Jahren', 
unpublished draft article, 6 June 1997,8. (END Archive. ) 
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GDR activists became increasingly interested in developing relations with 
other East European groups. From the mid- I 980s, he states, the key 
influences on the GDR opposition came from Eastern, not Western 
Europe: an indication that GDR oppositionists felt they did not have a 
great deal in common with Western peace activists. 91 
Ibid. 
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Part 11: British END, the 
END Convention 'Process' and the 
European Network for East-West Dialogue 
However, as indicated, British END was not the only Western peace group 
trying to create a 'cross-bloc' alliance by engaging independent groups in 
the East in dialogue and, simultaneously, maintaining relations with Soviet 
bloc regimes. Others were, too, and their and British END's East-West 
work often intersected in the main transnational institution of the West 
European peace movement, the END Convention 'process'. The Ostpolitik 
of the Convention process not only affected British END's East-West 
relations; it sometimes partly constituted them. In this section I therefore 
analyse this Ostpolitik. and show how, as with British END, the way 
Westem peace activists framed East West relations decisively shaped 
their policies towards the East. 
East-West Strategies in the END Convention Process 
Mary Kaldor has written of how the goal of building a "transcontinental 
movement of citizens" was not "widely accepted", indeed, was "bitterly 
contested" in the Western peace movement. 92 While there were some 
differences within British END over what kind of relationship it should 
have with independents and regimes in CEE/SU, the differences were 
much greater in the Convention process. They were expressed in terms of 
campaigners emphasizing different aspects of the 'project' the END 
Appeal had sketched out with regard to East-West relations. 
As the Convention 'process', and the debates over East-West 
relations within it, developed, two broad tendencies, or 'streams', emerged. 
Each of these, while still within the 'pan-European' current of the peace 
movement, framed the role of official and unofficial forces in the East, and 
92. Mary Kai dor, Bringing Peace and Human Rights Together, Lecture series: The Ideas of 
1989 (London: London School of Economics, The Centre for the Study of Global 
Governance, 2000), 7. 
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the respective relationships between them and Western peace groups. 
differently. Specifically, each implicitly - or, in the period of Gorbachev's 
rule, explicitly - framed the political opportunities offered or denied by the 
regimes in the East differently. These disagreements dominated the 
Conventions from 1983 until 1988. 
One 'tendency' stressed the creation of a European nuclear- 
weapons free zone. In its East-West work, this strategy tended to promote 
contacts with official bodies in the East and was sceptical about the value 
of what came to be known as 'detente from below'. This approach was 
promoted mainly by those adherents of 'pan-Europeanism' who were 
political party activists and trade unionists: for example, members of the 
Labour Party, the TGWU (Transport and General Workers' Union), the 
West German SPD and the disarmament and security campaigning group 
linked to it, IFIAS (Initiativefür Frieden, internationalen Ausgleich und 
Sicherheit). The most active British proponent of this approach within the 
'END process' was the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation (BRPF), 
though, as we have seen, it was also broadly favoured by CND. It reflected 
an understanding of the Western peace movement's strategy in general, and 
of the END campaign in particular, that was similar to that of the West 
German Social Democratic Party (SPD): namely, that d6tente and nuclear 
disarmament could and should be kept separate from the question of human 
rights and democracy in CEE/SU. 
Others, by contrast - while supporting the idea of a nuclear- 
weapons free zone in Europe - increasingly emphasized that part of the 
project which called for an end to the Cold War and for Europe to go 
93 'beyond the blocs' . This approach prioritised the 
dialogue with 
independent groups in the East and the aim of creating an alliance of 
independent citizens' initiatives in East and West (though for the most part 
not to the exclusion of contacts with official bodies). This approach was 
followed by peace groups, including British END; in France, CODENE; in 
9'. See, for example, Edward Thompson, 'Beyond the blocs', End Journal 12, October - 
November 1984,12-15; Mary Kaldor, 'Beyond the Blocs: Defending Europe the Political 
Way', lVorld Policy Journal 1,1,1-21. 
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Austria, ARGE-UFI; in West Berlin, the East-West Dialogue Group; in the 
Netherlands, IKV; and in the USA, the Campaign for Peace and 
Democracy, East and West - as well as by, in West Germany, the Greens. 
An important characteristic of most these groups, was that, like British 
END (and, in some cases, even more so) they were small, even marginal, in 
their domestic movements but also played key roles in international 
networks: the IPCC and the END Convention process. Participation in 
these networks put them in touch with other groups, and sometimes large 
organizations, in the Western peace movement. This combination of 
marginality and participation in the peace movement had, arguably, two 
consequences: first, it allowed these small groups to pursue what were - by 
the standards of the Western peace movement - radical East-West policies 
without having to worry about, as a result of this work, being marginalized 
within their movements: they were already peripheral. Secondly, the fact 
that they were active members of Western peace movement networks 
meant that they could not be ignored; they could disseminate ideas to other 
Western relatively easily, and, therefore, influence the debates in these 
groups. 
In the Convention process the tension between these two strategies 
surfaced above all in the regular debates on the Liaison Committee about 
who from CEE/SU should be invited to the next Convention, and under 
what conditions. For example, should only signatories of the END Appeal 
be invited as full participants, with non-signatories attending as observers 
only? should only independent activists be invited? official peace 
committees and independents? should the presence of officials be 
conditional on that of 'unofficials'? was this sensible, given that unofficial 
activists would almost certainly not be able to attend? (If this happened, 
there would be no CEE/SU presence at all the Conventions, which some 
felt would undermine the END commitment to dialogue with the East. ) 
Until 1987 independent activists from CEE/SU were either absent 
from the Conventions or, if present, only in very small numbers and almost 
anonymously: no declared independent activist would receive an exit -visa 
from their regime if they stated that they wanted to attend the next END 
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Convention. The debates on the LC about how to ensure the presence of 
independents thus always had a touch of unreality about them. They were 
substitutes for more profound debates about the kind of political 
relationship the END Convention process, and the Western peace 
movement more generally, should have with Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union: with whom it should ally itself, and which forces in the East were 
the best vehicles for effecting the kind of change peace activists wanted to 
see brought about. 
These debates were sometimes very heated - above all in the run- 
up to West Berlin in 1983, Perugia in 1984, and Coventry in 1987 - and 
even boiled over into the Conventions themselves, most notably at Perugia. 
The two approaches to East-West relations were pursued side-by-side 
within the framework of the Convention process until the end of the 
decade. By the time of the preparations for the END Convention in 
Coventry in 1987, one British END activist could note that there was a 
"fundamental divergence of peace movement perspectives" between these 
"two very differently motivated tendencies" on the Liaison Committee. 94 
But already at Perugia disagreements between these approaches had given 
rise to a new initiative, the European Network for East-West Dialogue, 
which effectively pursued a third strategy, one that focused on dialogue 
with independents to the almost total exclusion of relations with official 
bodies. 
The WestBerlin Convention 
The emphasis and particular function of the [first END] Convention [in 
Brussels was] ... to 
be the creation of links and the pooling of information 
among peace organisations from Western Europe'; 
95 as a result 
East-West relations played a minor role in the discussions before Brussels, 
94 Pat Chilton, report on END Convention Liaison Committee meeting, 3-5 April 1987. 
(END Archive. ). Pat Chilton was a member of British END. 
95 Luciana Castellina - with John Lambert (the leading figure in agenor) and Ken Coates a 
member of the 'organising committee' - quoted in John Mepham, 'Links with Europe - 
END supporters conference', END Bulletin 10, July-August 1982,22. 
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and at the Convention itself East European and Soviet participation in the 
Convention was minimal. 
It was not until the preparations for the next Convention-West 
Berlin in May 1983 - that East-West issues assumed prominence. The 
author(s) of the 'insider' agenor account later wrote that before Berlin the 
END Liaison Committee talked "repeatedly and intenninably" about East- 
West issues; and that, at the Convention itself, East-West relations "really 
came to the fore". Moreover, on the LC "east-west relations ... was the 
,, 96 one issue on which the search for consensus was condemned to fail 
The reasons why East-West issues became important before and at 
the Berlin Convention in a way that they had not been earlier were that 
END supporters actively made them so, and because of the intervention of 
outside forces. Firstly, the choice of West Berlin as the venue for the 
Convention - it was selected above all for political reasons: the city 
symbolized, as nowhere else in Western Europe did, the division of the 
continent to the ending of which the signatories of the END Appeal were 
committed 97 - was not uncontroversial amongst Western peace groups. 
98 
Secondly, the inclusion on the Convention agenda of the 'German 
Question' many thought would be provocative and destabilizing. Thirdly, 
for the first time, the question of invitations to the East became 
controversial. The Liaison Committee decided to invite as full participants 
" Talking Peace, 20. 
97 The 'platform', or 'working paper', agreed by the LC as a framework for the 
Convention gave this as one of the three reasons for choosing West Berlin. The others 
were that 1983 would be the fiftieth anniversary of the Nazi seizure of power, the 
consequences of which were more manifest in Berlin than anywhere else in Europe; and - 
seeing the Convention as an intervention in the domestic politics of the host country - that 
holding the Convention in West Berlin would offer the opportunity of influencing public 
opinion in West Germany (as well as elsewhere in Western Europe and the USA). 
See also Talking Peace, p. 18; Luciana Castellina, 'Aufwledersehen in Berlin', END 
Journal 1, December 1982-January 1983,20-21; and Jan Williams, 'Why in Cold War 
City? % END Journal 3, April-May 1983,9. 
" Bruce Kent, the General Secretary of CND, in an internal report of a visit to Moscow on 
25-27 October 1982, indicated his extreme concern about the choice of West Berlin as a 
venue for the Convention: 'are ive not daft - considering all the divisions in the 
German 
peace movenient and the sensitivilýv of Berlin - to try to hold a Convention there?? 
'. El, ý D 
Archive. 
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from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union all those who had signed the 
END Appeal. Non-signatories - official bodies or independents -would be 
invited as guests, or observers, with the right to speak in workshops but 
not in plenary sessions or international sessions. This, however, did not 
please the Soviet Peace Committee. Indeed, the SPC displayed a clear 
interest not just in attending but in becoming involved in the preparations 
of the Convention; in fact, in being accorded a key role, on its own terms, 
in the European 'anti-war' movement. The SPC's president, Yuri 
Zhukov's, 2000-word broadside against the 'Movement for European 
Nuclear Disarmament' was his response to being excluded from the 
process. (See above. ) The letter's intemperate tone and above all its 
misrepresentation of the END 'movement' made it easy to refute. Critical, 
and often strongly-worded, replies to the SPC document, or letters of 
support for the Convention, were sent from a wide range of opinion, from 
the Communist-founded Dutch group Stop the Neutron Bomb, to the East 
German exile Rirgen Fuchs, to British END CC. The effect of the Zhukov 
letter seems to have been to create a united front across a fairly wide range 
of Western peace movement opinion. But the SPC's public hostility to the 
END 'movement' not only ensured that East-West relations would be 
controversial before Berlin; they also meant that no peace committees 
would attend the Convention. 
Nor were any 'independents' who lived in Eastern Europe or the 
Soviet Union present, with the exception of Gy6rgy Konrdd, the 
Hungarian novelist at that point living temporarily in West Berlin, who 
spoke at the opening plenary. Various independent groups or individuals 
in Eastern Europe, also unable to attend, sent letters or statements to the 
Convention: from Czechoslovakia, Jiri Dientsbier, writing in his capacity 
as one of the spokespeople of Charter 77; from Hungary, the Peace Group 
for Dialogue; and from the Soviet Union, the Moscow Trust Group. 
Despite not being unable to attend the Convention, therefore, these groups 
were able to continue the dialogue with the Western peace movement. 
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The Perugia Convention 
At the 1984 END Convention, in Perugia, the simmering dispute on the 
END Liaison Committee about what kinds of relations the LC should have 
with official committees and independent groups was brought out into the 
open. This process began when three Liaison Committee members from 
West Berlin, Dieter Esche, Jurgen Graalfs, and Walther Grunwald, 99 wrote 
an open letter to all LC members, in which they argued that the LC was 
giving "covert priority" to a "dialogue with official representatives" rather 
than to "the dialogue with our real partners in Eastem Europe, independent 
peace groups and movements". 100 The reason for this, they claimed, was 
that ("some people in the Committee regard independence of blocs as ... 
mere rhetoric ... without relevance for short-or medium-term strategies", 
and for two reasons: some LC members "have problems when the 
discussion turns to subjects such as human rights, social emancipation or 
national self-determination in Eastem Europe"; and "[do] not want to 
provoke ... official peace movements 
in Eastem Europe". Dieter Esche 
later described the targets of these criticisms as a "traditional left-wing", 
'6soci al -democratic tendency", which wanted to promote "only detente 
from above", and which, for the sake of this detente, wanted to avoid a 
confrontation with the regimes of Eastem Europe. The key issue, in 
Esche's words, was "do human rights and peace belong together ... peace 
and democracy", or should they be treated separately, as of course "high- 
level politicians" ("die grosse PolitiF) did. ' 01 
99 The authors of the letter were members of a West Berlin group, 'Initiative for an East- 
West Dialogue', founded shortly after the END Convention held in West Berlin in May 
1983. For the group's open letter, see Across Frontiers, Premier Issue (Spring 1984), SI- 
S4. See also interview with Dieter Esche, II July 1998. 
100 Dieter Esche, Jurgen Graalfs, Walther Grunwald, 'Some remarks about the controversy 
concerning the East-West dialogue', Lisiy: Documents of Independent 
Peace Movements 
East- 11'est 2, n. d. 3-7. The letter is dated 27 February 1984. 
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The dissatisfaction of these and other LC members continued up to 
the Convention. The day before the Convention began a group of activists 
meeting in Perugia heard that all the Peace Committees were coming - 
that they had been invited as "organizations ... as it were as guests of 
honour"; 1 02 but that 59 invited independents from Eastern Europe, by 
contrast, had not been given permission to travel by their regimes. The 
response to this news marked the symbolic beginning of an institutional 
division within the END 'current' of the Western peace movement. On the 
following day, during the opening session of the Convention, a group of 
these activists - including members of the German Greens/the Alternative 
List, Lega per I'Ambiente, and ARGE-UFI - with red cloths tied around 
their mouths, climbed on to the stage carrying placards on which were 
printed the names of the Central-East European and Soviet groups and 
movement whose members which had been prevented from attending the 
Convention: Charter 77, Swords into Ploughshares (GDR), the Moscow 
Trust Group, Solidarity, KOS (Poland), and PGD (Hungary). In addition, 
one activist carried a banner with 'Palestine' on it, another with 'Turkey', 
to symbolise the Israeli and Turkish states' refusal to allow two 
Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and a representative of the 
Turkish Peace Association, respectively, to travel to Perugia. 
In the later words of one of the participants, the protest was not 
directed at the presence of the East European Peace Councils but at the 
absence of independent activists. ' 03 The protest, and its theme, was both 
divisive and became a- perhaps the - dominant theme of the Convention. 
The daily Convention News reported that the "protesters were clapped as 
they came onto the stage. On behalf of the Liaison Committee, the 
chairperson, Ken Coates, asked the protesters to leave the stage, and stated 
that such a demonstration was not in the interest of dialogue, which also 
received hearty applause. " An American participant was struck by 
102 Ibid. 
103 Jordan, 'European Nuclear Disarmament' 191. 
192 
the intensity associated with East-West dialogue ... at the 
Convention. The struggle over how to deal with the peace 
committee representatives ... was quite divisive. No one opposed 
the expansion of dialogue to include the quasi-officials [sic] from 
the East, but fennent surrounded how to treat such representatives 
in the face of a refusal to allow independent peace people (with the 
partial exception of Hungary) to attend the Convention. 104 
The Coventry Convention 
The 1985 END Convention - in Amsterdam - and the 1986 Convention - 
in Evry, near Paris - were not marked by the same controversy over 
East-West relations as had been Perugia and, to a lesser extent, West 
Berlin. The problem was dealt with for Amsterdam by hiving off the 
East-West side of the Convention to individuals and groups who would 
organize bilateral projects for the Convention with partners in the East. In 
addition, arguably, the fierceness of the dispute at Perugia led LC 
members to try to avoid such divisiveness. In addition, the LC members 
who had protested so loudly at the East-West policies of the LC were 
now concentrating their work in a new organization, the European 
Network for East-West Dialogue (see below). Evry avoided East-West 
conflict by concentrating on issues affecting Western Europe. At the 
1987 Convention in Coventry, however, East-West relations, and 
controversy about them, again dominated discussions, with, as a leading 
US activist noted, participants debating the "diverse implications of 
glasnost and perestroika". Yet, while East-West issues dominated at 
Coventry partly because participants wanted to debate the significance of 
the Gorbachev reforms, they did so also, before and after the Convention, 
because the old disagreements about the Convention's East-West 
relations surfaced again; indeed so much so that they crowded out other 
issues. Melinda Fine noted that "movement leaders ... spent [hours] 
104 Richard Falk et al, 'Five days of discussion', END Journal 11, A ugust- September 
1984,9-10. 
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debating responses to [the] ... violation of the Helsinki Accords" 
represented by the denial of visas to "independent activists from Eastern 
,, 105 Europe"; yet "there was apparently little discussion of INF . Likewise, 
Juergen Maier, a member of the Federal Executive of the West German 
Greens, recorded that "END veterans" were so busy with the "old dispute 
... about the status of Eastern European official 'Peace Committees' and 
independent grassroots activists" that they largely "ignored that the 
political realities in NATO and Europe are changing in the wake of the 
INF negotiations": namely, the strengthening of NATO"s European pillar 
and the transformation of NATO into a "superpower United Sates and a 
superpower-in-the-making Western Europe". 106 
Invitations to the East were controversial - indeed, more than ever 
- because, for the first time, the Liaison Committee had invited not just all 
the Peace Committees, but, much more controversially, 107 the ruling 
communist parties of Central-Eastem Europe and the Soviet Union as 
well. In the end, there were official delegations from the Soviet Union, the 
GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. In addition there was, for the first 
time a significant number of independents present from Hungary and 
Poland. But the rows created by the invitations to 'officials' threatened, 
with another controversy, to undermine the whole Convention process. 
Some of the Convention organizers wanted a representative of Freedom 
and Peace (WiP) to speak at one of the plenaries. British END, as we have 
seen, was - with many other Western peace groups -a staunch supporter 
of the dialogue with WiP. The BRPF was not. At the May 1987 LC 
meeting Ken Fleet of the BRPF was recorded as expressing scepticism 
about WiP: "Freedom and Peace have not signed the END Appeal. They 
105 Melinda Fine, 'Movements meet in Coventry', END Journal 3 0,10. 
"' Juergen Maier, 'Impressions from the European Nuclear Disan-nament Convention, 
Coventry/UK, July 15-18 1987'. END Archive. 
107 See Stephen Brown and Jane Mayes, 'Responding to Gorbachev means some "new 
thinking" in the peace movement', Tribune, 17 July 1987,4. 
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are therefore not direct partners of ours". 108 Ken Coates later wrote that 
Freedom and Peace "does not really fit into the European peace 
movement" because " it seems to make the disarmament of other countries 
[i. e., the West] conditional on a change in the political regime in Poland". 
While it would be quite proper for WiP members to attend a Convention it 
"was absolutely wrong to invite this organization to provide a speaker in 
the closing plenum at Coventry": Radziwill's speech "did not represent the 
consensus of the European peace movements, and indeed had very little to 
do with the overall objective of European Nuclear Disarmament". 109 After 
a bitter argument on the LC, with many of its members opposed to the 
proposal, the proposal for a WiP plenary-speaker was passed. (Konstanty 
Radziwill addressed the closing plenary. ) 
The invitations controversy pointed to profound differences in 
attitude to the new Soviet leadership, with proponents of 'Mente from 
below' unwilling to place too much trust even in a reformist Soviet leader. 
The invitations to the communist parties were proposed by Ken Coates, 
who believed strongly the peace movements in the West should strongly 
support Soviet 'new thinking'. "At the beginning of the decade [when the 
END Appeal was launched] ... we might have been tempted to be equally 
censorious of the Soviet leadership [as of the US leadership]. Today, this 
would be quite unjust ... Mikhail Gorbachev has carried the Soviet Union 
into an increasingly vigorous policy of disarmament. "' 10 These and related 
"changes in Soviet policy" are "profoundly significant" and "need a warm 
answering response from peace movements": 111 "we should be concerned 
to help them obtain a ftiendly reception by public opinion, East and West 
alike". 11 2 One can assume that the proposal to invite the communist parties 
108 Minutes of END LC meeting.. END Archive. 
109 Coates, Listeningfor Peace, 20. 
110 Ibid., 5. 
111 Ken Coates, letter, 'To members of the Liaison Committee', 16 April 1987. 
112 Ibid. 
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was inspired by the wish to use the Convention to find common ground 
with - at least - the Soviet party: to "establish common perspectives, and a 
sense of solidarity and mutual support", as Coates later put it. 113 What the 
Western peace movement should not do is undermine Gorbachev. Writing 
after the Convention, Coates attacked Mient Jan Faber of IKV for - Coates 
alleged - doing just this. At the Convention, Faber, in Coates's words, 
argued that, after "Gorbachev had brilliantly destabilized NATO with his 
disarmament policies ... 
it was the task of the peace movement to 
similarly destabilize the Warsaw Treaty Organization with their politics of 
detente from below". But, writes Coates, this is "not what most of us have 
meant by 'detente from below' Creating an upheaval in Eastern Europe" 
would "be precisely the way to undermine the Gorbachev revolution, at 
home and abroad". ' 14 
Against this Lynne Jones of British END argued that, while 
Western peace groups did "welcome and support the changes taking place 
under Gorbachev [and] ... his disarmament 
initiatives", it was a mistake to 
think that "political change" was "solely a top-down" process. On the 
contrary, "far-reaching reform is only brought about by pressure from 
below. It is, therefore, important not to put too much trust in Gorbachev's 
leadership but, instead, to "maintain ... pressure " as the "only way to 
maintain and extend reform". 115 This stance was based on a view of the 
East-West conflict quite different to Coates's, one which echoed the 
ýutopian' paragraph in the 1980 END Appeal: "The main division is not 
between East and West but between those who see the established power 
structures as part of the problem ... and those who see them as part of the 
solution and wish to support them. 116 For that reason, what was needed was 
113 Coates, Listeningfor Peace, 9. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Lynne Jones, 'Time For a Change', END Journal 28/29, Summer 1987,19. 
116 Jones, ibid., 20. The 'utopian' paragraph in the END Appeal: "We must commence to 
act as if a united, neutral and pacific Europe already exists. We must learn to be loyal, not 
to "East" or "West", but to each other, and we must disregard the prohibitions and 
limitations imposed by any national state. " 
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a "'league of oppositions' ... an autonomous citizens' coalition that 
crosses the East-West divide, confronting issues of peace, democracy and 
ecology directly in a co-ordinated manner". A model of this approach is 
"the recent proposal for a Europe-wide campaign against nuclear-power 
construction, from Sizewell in England to Zarnowiec in Poland. ", 17 
The arguments sparked off by the invitations to the Communist 
parties and the WiP-speaker affair were so strong that some participants 
questioned the viability of the whole Convention process. One British 
END activist suggested in early 1987 that "the Liaison Committee is now 
dominated by individuals and groups whose main interest is in talking to 
representatives of state power in Eastern Europe", not in "strengthening 
ties between social movements in East and West Europe". 118 Another 
argued that the "LC does NOT represent the peace movement.... On 
East-West issues, the fact that the majority of [European Network for 
East-West Dialogue] contacts have pulled out, has shifted the political 
balance enormously"; and later recorded that the "mood among the peace 
movements [represented on the LC] is. . [ofl a growing sense of revolt": 
the "conditions are there for a serious consideration of withdrawing from 
the process which would probably collapse if IKV, Pax Christi, END, 
SPAS and CODENE left. "' 19 
At the Convention itself, unhappy peace activists and those CEE 
independents present at Coventry held three meetings at which, among 
other things, they discussed the question of leaving the Convention 
process altogether. (The extent to which those present felt there was a gulf 
between the two 'tendencies' on the LC is indicated by the fact that these 
meetings were by invitation only. At least two leading members of the LC 
thought to be insufficiently sympathetic to the dialogue with independents 
were turned away: the Belgian activist Jean de Bosch and IFIAS 
representative Gert Weisskirchen. ) 
117 Jones, 'Time for a Change', 33. 
"' Patrick Burke, 'Report of Febl4'15 1987 Liaison Comittee meeting'. END Archive. 
119 Fiona Weir, 'Liaison Committee Report, 23/4 May 1987 Coventry'. 
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In the end these groups did not leave the Liaison Committee. But 
the Convention ended with both tendencies as fin-nly entrenched in their 
positions as they had been before the event. In her report of the next END 
Convention, held in Lund in 1988, Mary Kaldor described this separation 
bluntly: "the Liaison Committee ... is unworkable, given the 
irreconcilable division between political parties and peace movements. .. 
. 
[T]he Liaison Committee is unable to reach a united position on 
East-West questions". 120 
The European Network for East-West Dialogue 
The European Network for East-West Dialogue, or Network, represented 
a rejection of the approach to East-West politics that prioritised relations 
with official bodies. But it also indicated disagreements with those in the 
other tendency, for groups in the Network decided that they would simply 
concentrate on developing close relations with independent groups in 
CEE/SU, largely ignore official peace committees, and, crucially, not 
concern themselves with trying to bring in to the dialogue reluctant 
Western peace groups. Participants in the founding meeting of what would 
become the Network, at the Perugia Convention, stated that their aim was 
not to create a faction within the Convention process, or a "parallel or rival 
body to the Liaison Committee or other international coordination bodies 
of the peace movement". Many members of the Network remained on the 
LC, at least in name. Yet the Network did, in effect, become, at least with 
regard to East-West politics, an alternative to the Convention process. ' 
21 
Coordinated by activists in West Berlin, and meeting roughly twice 
a year for planning sessions, the Network had two main campaigning foci: 
organizing seminars and conferences and producing publications. The 
former included, in Western Europe, a seminar on the meaning for 
contemporary Europe of 'Yalta', held in West Berlin on 8-10 February 
120 Mary Kaldor, 'From Gloom to Surprise', END Journal 36, October 1988-January 
1989,21. 
12 1 European Coordination for an East-West Dialogue, 'Protocol of the first Coordination 
meeting on 21 July 1984 in Perugia'. (Trotocol' drafted by Dieter Esche. ) 
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1985, the 40th anniversary of the Yalta conference: 'Peace in a Divided 
Europe - 40 Years after Yalta'; in May 1986, in Milan, a forum on the 
Helsinki process, 'Giving Real Life to the Helsinki Accords', the focus of 
which was the document of the sane name (see below); and in September 
1988, in Nijmegen, a conference on the Prague Spring and its 
consequences, 'Twenty Years After the Prague Spring'. 
The Network was small. But, arguably, it played a role in the 
East-West dialogue 'from below' quite out of proportion to its size. The 
combination of marginality in the Western peace movement with being 
represented in key international networks, characteristic of many of the 
groups promoting 'detente from below', was perhaps even more significant 
here. A key group in the Network, the Initiative East-West Dialogue in 
West Berlin, was itself on the periphery of organized left politics in that 
11 22 city: in the words of a co-founder, Dieter Esche, 'absolutely marginal 
Other figures important in its foundation and later were East European 
exiles - Jan Kavan, Jiri Pelikan, Jan Minkiewicz, Wlodek Goldkom; they 
had links with, but were not active (let alone mainstream) participants in 
the peace movements of the countries in which they lived. Network 
activists were behind two of the three seminars, unique in their location - 
Central Eastern Europe - size, and breadth of participation, that brought 
together West European (and US) and independent Eastern activists (see 
above). The idea for the first -in Warsaw in May 1987- grew out of 
discussions between Jacek Czaputowicz of the host organization Freedom 
and Peace, and Dieter Esche of the Network; 123 and the second - in 
Budapest in November of that year - was co-sponsored by the Network. 
124 
Its most influential, and best-known, contribution to the East-West 
dialogue 'from below', however, was Giving Real Life to the Helsinki 
Accords, the 'Helsinki Memorandum', a document written in 1985- 86 by 
122 Interview with Dieter Esche. 
123 
. Padraic 
Kenney, A Carnival of Revolution (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2002), 115. 
124 
. 'Hungarian meeting a success', 
END Journal 3, December 1987-January 1988,8. 
The third seminar, in Prague in June 1988, was disrupted by the authorities. 
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independent peace and human rights activists in East and West Europe. 
Inspired in part by the 'Prague Appeal' (see above), the 'Memorandum', as 
its full title suggested, both outlined how the three 'baskets' of the 1975 
Helsinki Final Act could be made interdependent and how the work of 
citizens, not just governments, was needed to realize the aims of the Act. 
The Memorandum was important in the East-West dialogue for 
various reasons. First, as a tangible way of continuing and 'deepening' the 
dialogue: instead of statements or letters written on one side being sent to 
the other side or exchanged, or short documents being jointly drafted and 
signed by small numbers of Easterners and Westerners, this time a 
relatively wide circle of activists in both 'halves' of Europe were drafting 
the document together - and establishing common ground in the process. 
(Eastern and Western activist were equal partners in the drafting process: 
Gerd Poppe of the East German Peace and Human Rights Initiative has 
testified how he and other GDR activists valued their contribution to the 
drafting process being taken seriously. 125) Secondly, because it inspired 
further, practical steps in the East-West dialogue: both the Warsaw and 
Budapest seminars. And, thirdly, because it was an important part of the 
process that led to the foundation of the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, the 
post-Cold War international organization-cum-network, launched in 1990, 
of 'civil society' organizations in the Helsinki states. Indeed, the Network 
dissolved when, in 1989, most of its active members became involved in 
the founding of the HCA. 
Frame Disputes within British END over East-West Relations 
The arguments at Perugia and the founding of the Network fed into and 
stimulated discussions within British END over the direction of its East- 
West policy. We have seen that there were differences of emphasis within 
British END's basic 'twin-track' approach to East-West relations: while, 
for example in relation to Poland, END activists concentrated almost 
exclusively on the dialogue with independent forces; and with regard to the 
125 Interview with Gerd Poppe, Berlin, 14 July 1998. 
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GDR, they conducted this dialogue and maintained relations vvith the Peace 
Council; the transnational Churches work, carried out mainly by Stephen 
Tunnicliffe of the Churches Lateral Committee, focused almost entirely on 
relations with 'officials' in the East. 
These differences in emphasis reflected different conceptions of 
how the 'pan-European' aims of END were to be achieved; that is, ýN'hich 
social forces needed to be mobilised if these goals were to be reached. For 
most of the decade these varying approaches did not produce major 
disagreement - nothing on the scale, that is, of the arguments in the END 
Convention process before and at the Perugia and Coventry Conventions. 
One reason they did not is because there was a broad consensus within the 
group about its East-West policies; another, arguably, that British END's 
federal structure produced a mutual live-and-let-live attitude in the 
organization - activists in one part of the group could have very little to do, 
if they wished, with those in another who might be pursuing a policy they 
did not like. 126 On one occasion, however, stimulated by the Network 
dispute, the Ostpolitik of British END was a cause of sharp disagreement 
that both contributed to the break-up of one of END's important working 
groups and, indeed, at one point seemed to threaten the same for the whole 
organization. This dispute was emblematic, in as much as it highlighted the 
essential features, and contradictions, of British END's twin-track East- 
West strategy. 
The disagreement - expressed, in late 1984 and early 1985, in 
increasingly fractious rows - was about END's relationship with the 
Network. Some wanted the organization to join this new entity; others did 
not. The dispute, which surfaced at regular meetings of the organization's 
'Coordinating Committee', in memos and letters, and at specially convened 
meetings, reached a crisis in February 1985, just after the Network's first 
126 There might have been sharp disagreements about East-West politics between 
'Nottingham' and 'London' if the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation had not left British 
END in 1982/3. But the East-West relations of the END 'current', at both leý'els, were 
still In too embryonic a phase in this period to become a major source of disagreement 
between the factions of British END. There were enough other issues to fight over. 
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public event, the Yalta seminar. British END had formally decided not to 
sponsor the seminar. One reason for doing so, was that, in its view, the 
rejection of the division of Europe symbolised by 'Yalta' had become 
associated with Western "cold-war propaganda" advocating the ... roll- 
back"' of Soviet hegemony only; another was that the seminar was taking 
place outside the "mainstream of the peace movement". 127 Mary Kaldor 
and three of the four staff members, however, plus a handful of other END 
activists, attended the seminar; indeed, Mary Kaldor spoke at it. Shortly 
after their return, Edward Thompson, furious at what he saw as an 
unden-nining of an agreed position, announced his provisional withdrawal 
from British END. 128 
In the arguments about the Network within British END, activists 
advocated two different approaches to the East-West dialogue 'from 
below'. Some argued, amongst other things, that in the two existing 
transnational peace movement fora of the Western peace movement - the 
IPCC and the Convention process - East-West politics were marginalized. 
They favoured British END's joining a new body that would concentrate 
on the dialogue with independents. These activists tended not to address or 
to downplay the possible deleterious effect on END's relations with CND 
and other mainstream peace organizations of END's joining the Network. 
Such effects might include these groups distancing themselves from British 
END, thus reducing the possibility of its influencing them. They would do 
this because British END was becoming involved in an organization, the 
Network, that would be too much concerned with an issue irrelevant to, or 
even harmful to the interests of, the Western peace movement: human 
rights and democracy in CEE/SU. 
Others, most notably Edward Thompson, the most influential 
opponent of the Network within British END, argued that British END 
must remain committed to the strategy that was at the heart of END's 
12 ' Letter from Peter Crampton (chair of END) "[t]o all members of the provisional 
secretariat of the European Network for East-West Dialogue, 14 January 1985. (END 
Archive. ) 
128 Letter to British END Coordinating Committee, 9 February 1985. (END Archive. ) 
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strategy for ending the Cold War: "plural" dialogue. 129 (He also objected to 
some of the people linked to the Network: groups and individuals who, he 
claimed, not only did not support the END Appeal 130 but, in some cases, 
had no credentials as peace movements or even - he mentions Polish KOS 
- actually welcomed NATO's 'modemisation'; 1 31 and he argued that the 
Network might unnecessarily expose East Europeans to the attention of 
their security services. 132 ) His case - argued forcefully in a series of 
internal letters and memos in early 1985, and in somewhat coded form, in 
Double Exposure - was that the Network strategy would undermine this 
strategy, both in East and West: "To be effective, the dialogue between 
East and West must engage widening constituencies of citizens. " In the 
East, it must not, on the one hand, "be co-opted by official diplomatic 
organs"'; while, on the other, "it must not be short-circuited into a few 
advanced intellectual groups" such as Charter 77 and KOS - on which, 
Thompson feared, the Network would concentrate. 133 These groups, though 
admirable and important, were in a sense "Westerners"; that is, they wrote 
and acted partly with an eye to Western responses. The moments of 
breakthrough had come, he claimed, when Eastern Europeans had "thrown 
up their own forins": the Peace Group for Dialogue, the Moscow Trust 
134 Group or 'Swords into Ploughshares'. And in the West, the dialogue 
"must involve majority peace movements" such as CND. 135 The large 
Western non-aligned movements, Thompson argued, had not been brought 
into the Network. 136 In addition, the Network's strategy of concentrating on 
129 E. P. Thompson, Double Exposure, London: Merlin Press, 1985,150. 
130 E. P. Thompson, 'END and the East', internal discussion document for British END, 21 
March 1985. (END Archive. ). 
131 'END and the East'; 'Letter to END CC', 9 February 1985. 
132 E. P. Thompson, Letter to Paul Anderson, 10 March 1985. 
133 Thompson, Double Exposure, 150. 
134 Letter to Paul Anderson, 10 March 1985. 
135 Thompson, Double Exposure, 150. 
136 'END and the East'. 
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independent CEE/SU groups undermined another aspect of the "plural 
dialogue": the need to engage Eastern "officials". 137 
The Network dispute was also played out in the Czechoslovak Task 
Group. Here, disagreements reached such a pitch that Dorothy and Edward 
Thompson resigned from the group, arguing that it was placing too much 
emphasis on supporting 'dissidents' and not thinking enough about how to 
involve in the East-West dialogue a much wider spectrum of opinion, both 
in Britain and in Czechoslovakia, of those interested in 'peace'; moreover, 
most other members of the group supported END's joining the Network. 
(In her reply, Nancy Wood, the group's convenor, reflected the views of 
the rest of the group that it was difficult to see, in the relatively closed 
society that was Czechoslovakia, who END could approach other than 
Charter 77 signatories. ) 
Eventually, the crisis in END caused by the row over the Network 
subsided. As the Network arguments threatened END's cohesion - of 
which Edward Thompson's threat to withdraw was the most dramatic 
expression - the Coordinating Committee dropped the issue. Thompson did 
not leave British END; and END did not join the Network. British END 
stayed in touch with the Network in various ways, including by sending 
observers to at least some Network meetings. Meanwhile, in the second 
half of the 1980s, up to 1989, British END continued its Central East 
European and Soviet work, as we have seen: END activists were frequent 
visitors to Poland and, with other Western groups, worked closely with 
Freedom and Peace; in Czechoslovakia, they maintained relations with 
Charter 77 and established them with the Jazz Section and the Independent 
Peace Association; they ran or participated in national and international 
defence campaigns in defence of peace and human rights activists in 
Czechoslovakia; they continued to support the Moscow Trust Group and to 
visit the GDR; and they opened relations with Slovenian peace activists. At 
the same time, the END Jounial continued to publicize the dialogue and to 
137 Thompson, Double Exposure, 15 1. 
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promote the idea of "detente from below". British END supporters even 
participated as observers at planning meetings of the Network. And though 
British END campaigners played only a minor role in the drafting of the 
'Helsinki Memorandum', they were active participants in the seminars. In 
other words, once British END had decided not to join the Network, it 
continued its East-West work alongside, and sometimes participating in, 
the Network. At the same time, "detente from below", though continually 
contested, continued to be conducted within the Convention "process". 
Why, then, is the Network episode significant? It is of interest 
above all to the student of the Western peace movement of the 1980s 
because it was in the arguments about the Network that the tensions within 
the East-West component of the END 'project' were sharply (and, in the 
case of the Perugia demonstration, dramatically and publicly) revealed. 
These tensions were rooted in the difficulties inherent in a strategy of 
creating a movement, in the Cold War, that would span borders not only 
between countries but also between social systems. This strategy raised the 
question of how to combine the Western peace movement's demands for 
detente and disarmament with the need for human rights and democracy in 
CEE/SU, whether this need was voiced explicitly or was merely implicit in 
the treatment of independent groups by their regimes. The peace 
movement's demands entailed (a return to) stability in East-West relations. 
Democracy and more human rights in CEE/SU implicitly required a 
transformation of state-society relations: as such they challenged the 
legitimacy of the regimes in the Soviet bloc and were thus potentially 
destabilising. 
The tensions manifested themselves on two levels. First, as we have 
seen within the END Convention process, where groups committed to the 
pan-European citizens' dialogue and those sceptical of its value disagreed 
continually about the Convention's relations with the East. Here, two kinds 
of pan-European strategy possible within the framework of the END 
4project' co-existed: 'd6tente from below' and what might be called 
'd6tente from above'. The Network was created when enough proponents 
of 'detente from belmv' felt that the Convention 'process'could not 
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function properly as a forum for this dialogue. They then pursued an 
East-West policy that largely ignored state bodies. 
The tensions were also evident within British END, as it reconciled 
its commitment to the dialogue with its commitment to its relationship vvith 
CND, whilst also talking to official bodies in the East. On the one hand, 
British END's close engagement with independent groups in CEE/SU 
meant that the lack of human rights in, and the need for the 
democratization of, that region became an increasingly important issue for 
the organization. On the other hand, British END was a committed part of 
the British and West European peace movement; and its main partner in the 
UK, CND, which it wanted to influence, had little interest in linking its 
peace campaign with the issues of civil rights and democracy in CEE/SU, 
nor of promoting a strategy of cooperation with independent groups in the 
East. The same was true of some peace organizations outside the UK, and 
political parties in Britain and abroad. 
This dilemma, in principle, faced all Western peace groups 
involved in the East-West dialogue. The Network represented one solution 
to the dilemma: the peace groups in it had decided that they would simply 
concentrate on developing close relations with independent groups in 
CEE/SU, largely ignore official peace committees, and, crucially, not 
concern themselves with trying to bring in to the dialogue reluctant 
Western peace groups. END, by contrast, offered another solution, with the 
tensions this created surfacing most sharply in the arguments about the 
Network: to try, until the end of the decade, to bridge the gap between the 
Western peace movement and independent peace and human rights groups 
in Central Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, while keeping open the 
channels to the 'officials'. 
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Chapter 7 
Success or Failure? 
Did British END succeed or fail in its aims? I have not tried in this thesis to 
reach a conclusion about whether or not END played a role in achieving its 
4external' goals, and indeed whether these goals were achieved at all, as in 
both cases this would be very hard, if not impossible, to do. Instead I have 
described and analysed both the other main aim outlined in the END 
Appeal - the creation of a "transcontinental movement" against the nuclear 
arms race and the Cold War - and the extent to which British END played 
a role in creating it, as well as the organizational means END activists 
chose to conduct this campaign. In this chapter I thus assess - in tenns of 
the explanatory framework of this thesis - the extent to which END 
achieved these aims. 
Creating an Organization 
The success or failure of British END as an organization can be judged in 
terms of two criteria: did its organizational structure correspond to its 
supporters'/members' wishes? And was its structure appropriate to the 
tasks British ENDers had set themselves? 
The founders of British END decided not to establish a national 
membership organization; in this they had the backing of many, perhaps 
all, early supporters of the group. They resulting organization was at the 
loose, spontaneous, rather than at the hierarchical, end of the organizational 
spectrum, a small federation of semi-autonomous local, regional and 
specialist groups directed by a more-or-less representative coordinating 
committee and serviced by a central office. With no members (only 
4supporters') until 1985, and no more than 600 members from then until its 
demise - membership was introduced too 
late in the life of the peace 
movement for END to be able to attract more - its resource 
base, ývhether 
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measured in activists' time, energy and expertise, or in money, was 
relatively limited. It relied for the bulk of its income on fund-raised money. 
However, from an early stage the group operated in a relatively 
disorganized way that the group - and some END supporters were 
unhappy about this. ( Edward Thompson was at various points extremely 
exercised about the lack of financial and political accountability in END. 
Other supporters of British END expressed similar concerns. Such 
anxieties were voiced less often as the decade progressed - at least in 
public - but, in the early years of British END at least, it was clear that 
some supporters were not happy with the structure of END. ) The bitter 
row with the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation - which significantly 
distracted many END activists, including most of its 'leaders' from 
carrying out their political work - was in part an expression of the 
disorganization of the group and of the unhappiness with this. 
At the same time, British END was never able fully to solve a basic 
problem: how to be a small, flexible organization and yet be able to raise 
enough money to do all that its ambitious activists wanted to do. Every 
organization - in a social movement or not - has to worry about how to 
keep itself afloat financially: British END's particular problem was that it 
wanted to do so without having a core source of income in the form of 
membership subscriptions. Overall, then, though the size and structure of 
British END corresponded to the wishes of END activists, the 
disorganization of the group and its lack of material resources, were a 
hindrance to effective campaigning. And activists were not able to solve 
the dilemma of how to be small and independent and free from as many 
internal and external constraints as possible, but financially relatively 
stable. 
Was the structure of British END appropriate to the task at hand? 
On the hand, arguably, yes. British END was flexible and could be 
spontaneous. The lack of a transparent structure within which everyone 
would have been in some way accountable for their actions (before and 
after the introduction of membership) meant that British END activists 
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were able to engage in delicate work without having to worry about being 
challenged by a disgruntled or worried membership. This applies to the 
launching of the END Convention, something which would probably have 
been much more difficult to do had its main proponent, Ken Coates, been 
constrained by a democratic structure. But it is true above all of the 
dialogue with independent activists in Central Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union whose agenda often fundamentally challenged that of many 
Western peace organizations. A large membership, containing as it 
probably would have a wider spectrum of views on East-West issues, and 
able to control other activists through policy-making conferences, might 
have watered down British END's radical (by peace movement standards) 
approach to East-West relations. The range of political views in British 
END would perhaps have closer to that of CND, and it would have been 
harder than it was for END supporters who wanted to do so to engage in 
'detente from below'. (Many of the other Western peace groups actively 
involved in the East-West dialogue 'from below' were also small and 
marginal, and thus had the freedom to engage in controversial work. ) 
On the other hand, arguably, no: British END's small resource base 
- whether measured in number of supporters or money - meant that its 
message could not be heard that well, at least in the UK. The fact that some 
ENDers - Edward Thompson, Mary Kaldor, for example - were prominent 
only offset this to an extent. By choosing to become (and then having to 
remain) a small organization British END limited itself to being a small 
pressure group on the margins of the British peace movement. 
Building a Movement 
The aim of helping to create a "trans-continental movement" against the 
nuclear arms race and the Cold War had three, closely linked, dimensions: 
involving CND, and to a lesser extent other political forces in Britain, in 
END-type transnational work; helping to build a pan- West European 
movement; and trying to develop some kind of alliance that spanned the 
East-West divide. Adapting Christian Smith's argument, we cannot know 
what the British and West European movements would have looked like if 
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there had been no END. Nevertheless, this is a useful heuristic question to 
ask. 
In Britain, END operated as a cross between a pressure group and a 
ginger group within the peace movement, above all national CND. In 
certain parts of the country, the peace groups that sprang up in 1980 were 
influenced by the END idea: for example, in Oxford, Campaign Atom; in 
the West Midlands, Leamington END; in Yorkshire, West Yorkshire END; 
and Hull END. Such groups, or individuals in CND who supported the 
END idea, promoted the END approach in CND (Though some of these 
groups lost their END character after a period. ) The extent of British 
END's influence on CND is, arguably, evident, among other things, in 
resolutions submitted to CND conference; campaigns organized by peace 
activists (for example, the 1981 'March Across the Sky'); the positive 
response some local CND/peace groups gave to END initiatives (for 
instance, the 1983 'Five Nations' and the 1984 'Beyond the Blocs' 
international -speaker tours); the "active internationalism" of the anti-cruise 
missiles campaign in 1980-83, in which CND cooperated with peace 
movements in other West European countries; ' as well as in the fact that 
CND joined, and remained in, the West European peace movement's two 
non-aligned fora: the International Peace Coordination and Communication 
Centre (IPCQ and the END Convention/Liaison Committee. 
Moreover, some leading CND activists have testified to the 
influence on their thinking and/or campaigning of END ideas. Some 
founding members of - and/or leading activists in - British END were 
important, sometimes key, figures in CND. One could argue that this 
involvement, combined with the presence in the peace movement of British 
END as a distinct organization, helped push CND somewhat in an END-ish 
direction, though only as far other groupings and individuals would allow. 
Conversely, END provided an important counterweight to those 
International Committee members, or to others elsewhere in the CND 
leadership, who were pro-Soviet, or simply sceptical about the point of the 
' The phrase is James Hinton's: Protests and Visions, 194. 
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East-West dialogue 'from below', or who were strongly anti-American. 
Without END CND would have been markedly more pro-Soviet, and thus 
less attractive to a wide range of opinion in Britain. 
Yet there were also clear limits to END's influence on CND. When 
CND had to decide on a new focus for its work after 1983 it finally settled 
on the 'Basic Case' campaign, the aim of which was to persuade people of 
the case for unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain (as opposed to just 
rejecting cruise and Trident missiles). James Hinton has argued that this 
campaign "failed to connect effectively with those changes in the 
international context which increasingly appeared to be making an 
anachronism' precisely of unilateralism. ,2 Further, CND was only ever 
peripherally involved in the dialogue with independent forces in the East. 
Indeed, CND invested - by contrast - considerable effort in a "dialogue" 
with officialdom in the East. ) British END could not persuade CND of the 
value of 'detente from below' for CND's core programme. 
One can explain the extent of END's influence within CND partly 
in terms of organizational capacity - British END simply did not have the 
resources with which to make a big impact on CND - and in terms of 
political opportunity structure: in a system of nation-states, in which 
political decisions are, or appear to be, taken by individual states, 
movements that try to affect such decisions will necessarily focus on 
individual states - they will be national movements. Any group, such as 
British END, that tries to persuade other campaigners to think of 
themselves as part of a transnational entity will face a particularly difficult 
task. 
However, the limited influence of British END on CND is also 
ascribable to the differences between the ways in which the two 
organizations framed the world. In one crucial respect, at least, the 
organizations were in agreement: the need to stop deployment of US cruise 
missiles in Britain (and elsewhere in Western Europe). British END was an 
acfive participant in the anti-cruise campaign of the early 1980s. But there 
Ibid. 
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were fundamental tensions, even incompatibilities, between the CND and 
the British END 'frames'. Though many in British END would probably 
have agreed with the dominant view in CND that the USA more 
responsible for the arms race than the Soviet Union, the END engagement 
with Soviet as well as US power - with the Cold War - in Europe found 
only limited response in CND. Moreover, the argument that a "trans- 
continental movement" - necessarily composed in part of independent, 
even 'dissident', forces in the East - would have to emerge if the arms race 
and the Cold War were to be opposed successfully made almost no 
headway in CND. 
Finally, it is worth remembering that British END's being 
intertwined with CND shaped END's East-West work. Though END 
activists were committed to the 'dialogue' with independent forces in 
CEE/SU, British END as a group resisted becoming fully engaged in the 
intensive dialogue represented by the drafting of the 'Helsinki 
Memorandum'. This was partly because some END activists - including 
one very influential one, Edward Thompson - did not want British END to 
pursue an Ostpolitik that was too far away from that of CND. 
In Western Europe, other peace movements were, like CND, 
national. Much of the peace campaigning took place locally. However, 
together, these movements also constituted a transnational social 
movement, that is, in Tarrow's definition, they were "connected networks 
of challengers" both "rooted in domestic social networks" and "organized 
across national boundaries", and engaged in "sustained contentious 
interaction with opponents - national or nonnational', .3 The movements 
were "connected" in two ways. First, they shared a "collective action 
frame": 4 that is, they agreed that a particular set of issues was a problem, 
offered a solution to that problem, and specified an agent of the solution. 
Second, the movements were linked, both informally and organizationally; 
5 
3 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 184. 
4 Tarrow, Power in Moventent, 109-11. 
5 See Tarrow, Power in Movement, 184-85. 
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and there were institutionalised, longer-term networks of, and links 
between, movements: most significantly, the IPCC, and the END 
Convention process. 
British END's work in this region consisted of trying to help build 
and sustain this movement. It did so above all by helping create the 
multilateral fora, - the Convention process and the IPCC (indeed, the 
Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation wing of British END initiated the 
Convention process); by forging bilateral links with non-UK West 
European peace groups; and by co-organizing and/or participating in public 
peace movement events (including some of those mentioned above). The 
success of the IPCC lay above all in the fact that it limited its membership 
to a) peace groups and b) peace groups that were both 'non-aligned' - that 
is, which worked within the END framework - and were supported 
'detente from below'. That is, all its members stood in the same relation to 
the political process; and they broadly agreed on the importance of 
dialogue with independent groups in the East as part of a peace campaign: 
they had a common 'frame'. Conversely, the permanent tensions, and 
frequent arguments, within the Convention 'process' can be ascribed to a 
'misalignment' of 'frames' between two groupings within the process. On 
the one hand there were those who - while still subscribing to the aims of 
the END Appeal - were at best sceptical of the value of a dialogue with 
independent groups in the East; many of these were political party activists 
and trade unionists. On the other hand, there were those who saw this 
dialogue as a key element in a pan-European peace campaign; most of 
these were peace groups. Groups in both tendencies could agree on much 
to do with West European politics; their differences over East-West 
relations, however, made cooperation between them very difficult. So, 
while the Convention process was a success in the sense that it provided a 
forum in which representatives of many parts of the West European peace 
movement could meet, it was a (partial) failure when measured against the 
implicit aims of its initiators: to provide an institutional framework within 
which these many parts of the peace movement could agree common 
positions not just on Western but also on East-West matters. Put 
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differently, it revealed the profound differences - sometimes incompatible 
differences - over East-West matters amongst even END-supporting 
activists. 
To the extent that all this work - the creation of bilateral links and 
multilateral fora, the organizing of public events - helped create a pan- 
West European movement, British END was partly responsible for the 
emergence of this movement. Of course, British END was only one group 
that can claim this credit. Yet a central role in this work was played by the 
END Appeal, by the fact that the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation 
distributed it widely along networks it had helped create - and thus helping 
it to become what Edward Thompson called one of the charters of the 
peace movement - and by British END activists helping to create and 
sustain the relevant institutions. Similar institutional links might have been 
created had there been no END and no END Appeal; but it is clear that the 
Appeal and theframe it proposed, was crucial in helping to unite many 
sections of the Western peace movement. 
In the East-West politics of the peace movement, the END frame 
was even more important. In the course of the 1980s, working broadly 
within the framework outlined by the END Appeal, a number of Western 
peace groups, amongst them END, entered into and sustained a dialogue, 
and indeed sometimes actively cooperated with, a range of independent 
groups in Central- Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: 'd6tente from 
below', as some called it. A negative response by Charter 77 signatories to 
the overtures of Edward and Dorothy Thompson in 1980 gave way to a 
lively exchange of ideas and analyses and the establishment of (some) 
common ground. The first visits to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the GDR 
in 1982, for example, the drafting in 1985-86 by individuals in East and 
West Europe of a common document, Giving Real Life to the Helsinki 
Accords - the 'Helsinki Memorandum', and the 
independent seminars in 
Warsaw, Budapest and Prague in 1987 and 1988 broadly on theme of 
d6tente, disarmament, and human rights: all of these can be seen in part as 
the outcome of the initiative first given voice in the END Appeal. 
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That this dialogue was possible is explicable partly in terms of the 
existence of a basic level of political opportunity in CEE/SU states. 
However, the Soviet bloc regimes were also able to constrict these 
opportunities, either by repressing their 'own' groups or by preventing 
Western activists from entering their countries; in 1983 in Hungary, for 
example, the regime's closing of the 'space' in which the Peace Group for 
Dialogue could operate brought an end to a lively relationship between the 
groups and Western peace groups. At the same time, one can identify a 
rough correlation between the nature of the political opportunity structure 
in individual CEE/SU states and the kind of relations END had with them: 
the more liberal the regime, the less confrontational the relations, and vice 
versa. 
Yet the main explanatory factor of the content of the dialogue is the 
way ENDframed actors in CEE/SU states: the regimes and the 
independent forces, and how groups in the East responded to the Western 
peace movement. For many END supporters the END frame identified 
above all independent groups and individuals as the agents of the political 
changes END sought. They pursued the relationship with these groups in 
the framework of a 'twin-track' policy: the other, less, important track, was 
the relationship with offical bodies, above all peace committees. In this 
relationship they both tried to disseminate END ideas about ending the 
nuclear anus race and the Cold War into official circles in the East and 
apply pressure on the authorities to increase the 'space' available to 
independent groups in the East. 
There were, however, disagreements amongst END supporters, in 
Britain and abroad, over East-West relations. These disagreements 
broadly reflected the three different approaches to the Soviet bloc present 
within the END 'current' of the West European peace movement: in 
addition to the 'twin-track' approach, some END activists in the 
Convention process were sceptical of the value of 'd&tente from below' and 
were more interested in pursuing relations with state bodies in the East. 
Others again, once they felt that 'detente from below' could not be pursued 
satisfactorily in the END Convention process, partly detached themsel-.,,, es 
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from the process and set up a new organization, the European Network for 
East-West Dialogue, which concentrated on relations with independent 
groups and largely ignored state actors. 
The pan-European entity that emerged out of this dialogue Nvas a 
network of groups and individuals committed to a dialogue on a range of 
issues at the heart of which were 'peace' - in the sense of disarmament, 
foreign and defence policy, and detente - and 'human rights' and the 
relationship between the two. Various CEE/SU activists involved in the 
dialogue, at the time and later, said that their thinking on these matters had 
been influenced by the dialogue with Western activists. Arguably, many 
British END activists, starting out from the view - expressed in the END 
Appeal - that peace and human rights were linked in a limited sense, came 
to the view that the two were indivisible. In practice this meant that 
democracy in Eastern Europe was a condition of ending the Cold War. 
Mary Kaldor, a founder of END, has claimed that 
by the end of the decade there was a growing consensus, at least 
among those who took part in the dialogue, that democracy in 
Eastern Europe was the best strategy for ending the Cold War but, 
at the same time, democracy could best be achieved within the 
framework of a detente process and a wind down of the arms race. 6 
The 'Helsinki Memorandum' was, one could argue, evidence of the 
existence of this consensus. 
Beyond this consensus, however, there was, arguably, another, 
namely about the role of citizens in East-West, and by implication in any 
international, relations: namely that, just as 'civil society' - roughly, 
citizens organizing on social, political and cultural matters outside the state 
- were crucial for the domestic 
health of societies, so civil societies could 
link up with each other across borders to help bring about change 
in 
transnational relations. The view is expressed in the 'utopian' paragraph of 
' Mary Kaldor, Bringing Peace and Human Rights Together, 7. 
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the END Appeal as well as in Lynne Jones's claim, made in 1987, that the 
(A main division is not between East and West but between those who see 
the established power structures as part of the problem (and therefore wish 
to challenge them) and those who see them as part of the solution and wish 
to support them". 7 Again, the Helsinki Memorandum, drafted by 
individuals outside state structures in East and West, can be seen as 
exemplifying this consensus. 
Mary Kaldor has argued that the essence of the dialogue is 
captured, with regard to both these areas of consensus, by the notion 
'transnational civil society'. 8 First, the concept is a 46 statement about certain 
civic internationalist values", specifically the notion of "democratic peace", 
or the "inseparability of peace and democracy, disarmament and human 
rights", around which notion the participants in the dialogue came together. 
Secondly, "transnational civil society" is a "description" of what happened: 
((autonomous self-organised groups operating across borders". 9 
On the Western side, the participants in 'd6tente from below' were 
for the most part not the large, mainstream, organizations of the Western 
peace movement. In this sense, the aim of creating a "trans-continental 
movement" was not realised. They were, rather mainly small, sometimes, 
marginal groups. Yet they were linked to, and could thus disseminate the 
content of East-West dialogue to, the mainstream movement either, as in 
the case of British END's relations with CND, because they overlapped in 
many ways with the dominant peace organization of their country and/or 
because they were integrated into transnational West European peace 
movement networks such as the IPCC and the END Convention. 
British END can, then, claim some success, but must also admit 
some failure, in the movement-building part of its work. It was unable to 
involve CND closely in 'detente from below'; on the other hand, it 
arguably helped keep CND non-aligned. END did this both actively - END 
7 Lynne Jones, 'Time For a Change,. 20. 
' Mary Kaldor, 'Transnational Civil Society', 198-202. 
Ibid., 202. 
217 
supporters exerting pressure exerted from within and passively - by "'irtue 
of the example it set in the British peace movement. British END was also 
partly responsible for the creation and continued existence of the IPCC and 
the END Convention, the existence of which are important reasons why 
one can talk about a transnational West European peace movement. 
Finally, British END, for can also claim some responsibility for the 
emergence and development of the citizens' dialogue between East and 
West. This may not have been the "trans-continental movement" 
summoned up by the END Appeal, but it was more than might have been 
expected in 1980, when there were almost no contacts between the new 
END activist and independent opinion in the East. 
A final measure of success, perhaps, for END and other activists 
involved in the East-West dialogue, was the creation of the Helsinki 
Citizens' Assembly (HCA), the post-Cold War pan-European network of 
4civil society' groups that grew out of the East-West dialogue. In 1980 
the idea of a pan-European alliance of citizens had been just an idea; by the 
end of the decade the alliance was strong enough to give birth to a 
successor that did indeed span the continent. 
"1 
Interviews conducted 
(In brackets the relevant organizations or groups of which the interviewees were 
members or with which they were associated [and, in one case, a classification]) 
Meg Beresford (CND, END), Biggar, 18 December 2002 
Ken Coates (END, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation), Matlock, 12 December 2001 
Dieter Esche (European Network for East-West Dialogue), Berlin, II July 1998 
Mient Jan Faber (Interchurch Peace Council), Amsterdam, 9 March 2003 
Gabor Fodor (FIDESZ), Budapest, 28 August 1998 
Miklos Haraszti (Hungarian Democratic Opposition), Budapest, 22 July1998 
Julian Harber (CND, END), Mytholmroyd, 21 November 2002 
James Hinton (CND, END), University of Warwick, 21 June 2001 
Lynne Jones (END), Cambridge, 9 March 1996; 10 August 1998 
Mary Kaldor (END), Brighton, 20 June 2002 
John Keane (END), London, 22 February 2000 
Ferenc K6szegi (Peace Group for Dialogue), Budapest, 9 July 1998 
Andras Kovacs (Democratic Opposition), Budapest, 27 August 1998 
Jan ter Laak (Pax Christi), Amsterdam, 10 March 2002 
Arthur Lipow (END), London, 4 September 1998 
Julianna Matrai (FIDESZ), Budapest, I September 1998 
Jane Mayes (CND, END), Alston, 17 December 2002 
Jan Minkiewicz (WiP/Freedom and Peace), Amsterdam, 11 March 2002 
Ferenc Miszlivetz (independent Hungarian activist), Budapest, 3 September 1998 
Gerd Poppe (Peace and Human Rights Initiative), Berlin, 14 July 1998 
Ulrike Poppe (Women for Peace, Peace and Human Rights Initiative), Berlin 14 July 
1998 
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Jaroslav ýabata (Charter 77), Bmo, 20 July 1998 
Anna ýabatova (Charter 77), Prague, 15 July 1998 
Dan Smith (CND, END), London, 5 August 2003 
Ruth ýonnova (Independent Peace Association), Sobdslav, 16 July 1998 
Istvan Szent-1vanyi (Dialogue, Democratic Opposition) Budapest, 26 June 1998 
Dorothy Thompson (END), Worcester, 20 June 2001 
Jan Urban (Charter 77), Prague, 17 July 1998 
Peter Valki (Hungarian Peace Council), Budapest, I September 1998 
Ole Waever (No to Nuclear Weapons, Denmark), London, 5 June 2002 
Reinhard Weisshuhn (Peace and Human Rights Initiative), Berlin, 13 July 1998 
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For a Nuclear-Free Zone in all Europe 
We are entering the most dangerous decade in human his- 
tory. A third world war is not merely possible but increas- 
iney likely. Economic and social difficulties in advanced 
industrial countries, crisis, militarism and war in the third 
world compound the political tensions that fuel a demented 
arrns race. In Europe, the main geographical stage for the 
East-West confrontation, new generations of ever more 
Jeadly nuclear weapons are appearing. 
For at least twenty-five years, the forces of both the 
North Atlantic and the Warsaw alliance have each had 
; ufficient nuclear weapons to annihilate their opponents, 
and at the same time to endanger the very basis of civilised 
afe. But with each passing year, competition in nuclear 
umarnents has multiplied their numbers, increasing the 
probability of some devastating accident or miscalculation. 
As each side txies to prove its readiness to use nuclear 
weapons, in order to prevent their w by the other side, 
aew more "usable" nuclear weapons are designed and the 
idea of "limited" nuclear war is made to sound more and 
more plausible. So much so that this paradoxical process 
: an logically only lead to the actual use of nuclear weapons. 
Neither of the major powers is now in any moral position 
to influence smaller countries to forego the acquisition of I 
iuclear armament. The increasing spread of nuclear reactors 
uid the growth of industry that installs them, reinforce the 
Ocelihood of world-wide proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
hereby multiplying the risks of nuclear exchanges. 
Over the years, public opinion has pressed for nuclear 
Warmament and detente between the contending mili- 
: ary blocs. This pressure has failed. An increasing propor- 
ion of the worls resources is expended on weapons, even, 
hough mutual extermination is already guaranteed. This 
-conomic burden, in both East and West, contributes to 
7owing social and political strain, setting in motion a 
icious circle in which the arms race feeds upon the in- 
tability of the world economy and viýe versa- a deathly 
lialectic. 
We are now in great danger. Generations have been 
lom beneath the shadow of nuclear war, and have be- 
orne habituated to the threat. Concern has given way to 
pathy. Meanwhile, in a world living always under menace, 
ýar extends through both halves of the European can- 
inent. The powers of the military and of internal security 
orces are enliarged, limitations are placed upon free ex- 
hanges of ideas and between persons, and civil rights of 
'dependent-minded individuals are threatened, in the West 
s well as the East- 
We do not wish to appc rtion guilt between the political 
nd military leaders of East and West. Guilt lies squarely 
, pon both parties. Both parties have adopted menacing 
Ostures and committed aggressive actions in different 
arts of the world- 
Die remedy hes on our own hands. We must act to- 
, ther to free the entire territory of Europe, from Poland 
) Portugal, from nuclear weapons, air and submarir., e 
ases, and from all instituions engaged in research into or 
lanufacture of nuclear weapons. We ask the two super 
owers to withdraw all nuclear weapons from European 
Irritory. In particular, we ask- the Soviet Union_ to 
halt 
production of the SS-20 medium range missile and we ask the United States not to implement the decision to develop 
cruise missiles and Pershing 1[ missiles for deployment in Western Europe. We also urge the ratification of the SALT 11 
agreement, as a necessary step towards the renewal of effec- 
tive negotiations on general and complete disarmament. 
At the same time, we must defend and extend the right 
of all citizens, East or West, to take part in this common 
movement and to engage in every-kind of exchange. 
We appeal to our friends in Europe, of every faith and 
persuasion, to consider urgently the ways in which we can 
work together for these common objectives. We envisage a 
European-wide campaign, in which every kind of exchange 
takes place; in which representatives of different nations 
and opinions confer and co-ordinate their activities; and in 
which less formal exchanges, between universities, churches, 
women's organisations, trade unions, youth organisations, 
professional groups and individuals, take place with the 
object of promoting a common object: to free all of Europe 
from nuclear weapons. 
We must commence to act as if a united, neutral and 
pacific Europe already exists. We must learA to be loyai, 
not to "East" or "West", but to each other, and we must 
disregard the prohibitions and limitations imposed by any 
national state. 
It will be the responsibility of the people. of each nation 
to agitate for the expulsion of nuclear weapons and bases 
from European soil and territorW waters, and to decide 
upon its own means and strategy, concerning its own terri- 
tory. These will differ from one country to another, and we 
do not suggest that any single strategy should be imposed. 
But this must be part of a trans-continental movement in 
which every kind of exchange takes place. 
We must resist any attempt by the ktatesmen of East 
or West to manipulate this movement to their own advant- 
age. We offer no advantage to either NATO or the Warsaw 
alliance. Our objectives must be to free Europe from con- 
frontation, to enforce detente between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, and, ultimately, to dissolve both. 
great power alliances. 
. In appealing to fellow Europeans, we are not turning our 
backs on the world. In working for the peace of Europe 
we are working for the peace of the world. Twice in this 
century Europe has disgraced its claim to civilisation by 
engendering world war. This time we must repay our debts 
to the world by engendering peace. 
This appeal will achieve nothing if it is not supported by 
determined and inventive action, to win more people to 
support it. We need to mount an irresisible pressure for a 
Europe free of nuclear weapons. 
We do not wish to impose any uniformity on the move- 
rnent nor to pre-empt the consultations and decisions of 
Uy exercising their influence those many organisations alreal, 
for disarmament and peace. But the situation i5 urgent. The 
14 StCa-'o-, advance. We invite Your support for this J 
common objective, and we shall welcome both your help 
and advice. 
British Committee E. P. Thompsong Bruce Kent, Dan Smith, Peggy Duff, 
Mary Kalldorq Stuart Hollandl and Ken Coates. 
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